State v. Coella

• Citation: 8 Wash. 512,36 P. 474
• Parties: STATE v. COELLA.
• Decision Date: 28 March 1894
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

36 P. 474

8 Wash. 512

STATE v. COELLA.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 28, 1894

Appeal from superior court, Island county; Henry McBride, Judge.

Dominico Coella was convicted of murder in the second degree, and appeals. Affirmed.

For former appeal, see 28 P. 28.

John Fairfield, Daniel Kelleher, and Del Car Smith, for appellant.

R. W Jennings, for the State.

SCOTT J.

This case was here once before, and was reversed, and remanded for a new trial. 3 Wash. St. 99, 28 P. 28. A change of venue was taken to Island county, and on a retrial the defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree whereupon he prosecuted this appeal. The errors complained of in appellant's brief, which were not waived at the oral argument, are as follows:

That the court erred in not sustaining the defendant's challenge to one of the jurors. This juror had heard what purported to be the facts relative to the killing of Deletis from several persons soon after it occurred. He, however testified that he could disregard any impression he had received therefrom, and try the case fairly upon the evidence. After a somewhat full examination relating to his competency to sit as a juror, the court found that he was qualified, and we think the finding is justified by the testimony.

The next point complained of was the refusal of the court to permit an answer to the following question asked by defendant's attorney: "From the looks of things when you arrived there, was there anything about the appearance of the things in the room that would indicate that a scuffle had taken place there?" There was no error in this; it was merely asking for a conclusion of the witness. It was for the witness to state the condition of the room, etc., and for the jury to draw the conclusion.

The next matter complained of is with reference to the confession made by defendant that he killed Deletis, detailing the circumstances. A somewhat different state of facts is presented in this particular from that which was shown by the record on the former appeal. This is due in a measure to the fact that the testimony was taken by a stenographer at the last trial, and the parties had the benefit of his notes in making up their record, which was not the case on the former appeal. It is now contended by the defendant that this confession is inadmissible, for the reason that it clearly appears that the same was made under the influence of fear produced by threats. It now appears from the testimony of the witness Jones, who was called by the state: That upon approaching Coella, immediately after the shooting, the witness and Delaney had pistols in their hands, which were kept pointed at the defendant. That the witness placed his left hand upon the defendant, and held his pistol in his right hand, pointed at Coella's head or body. That the defendant said: "Please, Mr. Tommy, don't kill me. I want to tell you the truth." That at this time the defendant was sitting down. That the witness asked him who killed Deletis, and the defendant answered that he killed him. It appears that the defendant was very much excited at this time, and was afraid of being killed by the parties present. While it does not appear that he was threatened by word of mouth, we agree with counsel for appellant that such a confession might be induced through fear occasioned by the acts of other parties, and it fairly appears that such was the case here. Nevertheless, we do not think there is any error in the premises, for the reason that at this particular time the defendant only admitted that he killed Deletis, a fact which he at no time disputed. The theory of the defense was self-defense. The balance of the confession, wherein he detailed the manner of the killing, was made some considerable time after this, while the parties were on their way to Port Townsend, and after they had stopped for a short time at a wayside inn, and after the defendant had become composed in mind, and understood he was not in danger of immediate harm, but had been arrested for the purpose of placing him on trial for the killing of Deletis. The material facts in the confession made by him, over which any controversy could or did arise, were related at this time, and, under the circumstances, we think the confession was admissible in evidence; and the first statement made by him relative to the killing of Deletis, which was made at the time the pistols were pointed at him, worked no injury, and was harmless.

It is contended that the court erred in admitting the trunk and its contents in evidence, and also in admitting the gun (Exhibit D). It is contended that the trunk was not admissible for the reason that a portion of its contents, consisting of watches, jewelry, and $90 in gold, had been removed, and were not produced at the trial, and that it was error to admit the gun, for the reason that it was in no way connected with the killing. We see nothing in this, however, which could have resulted in any harm to the defendant. The trunk had been identified, and its contents fully accounted for, by the testimony introduced, and the gun, with the mallet with which the defendant admitted he struck the deceased, were part of the contents of the trunk.

The...