State v. Coffin

• Decision Date: 24 July 2008
• Docket Number: No. 32772.,32772.
• Citation: 146 Idaho 166,191 P.3d 244
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Benny Dale COFFIN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

191 P.3d 244

146 Idaho 166

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Benny Dale COFFIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 32772.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

July 24, 2008.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Diane M. Walker, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge.

Bennie Dale Coffin appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of felony domestic violence. We affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

On June 1, 2005, police twice responded to Coffin's residence to investigate two separate reports of domestic violence. The first report was made by Coffin's live-in girlfriend, Kalee Chandler, who called 911 reporting that she and Coffin had been in an altercation. After arriving at the residence to investigate, an officer suggested to Coffin, who was "clearly intoxicated," that he leave the residence. No arrests were made at the time.

Approximately a half-hour after the officers left the residence, Chandler fled to a nearby house screaming and told her neighbor that Coffin had hit and kicked her and thrown her to the ground. Chandler spoke to a 911 operator, telling her that Coffin had returned to the house wanting a ring and that Chandler had put the ring in her mouth. She stated that Coffin then put his fingers in her mouth, she bit them, and he threw her on the ground and kicked her in the head.

When the officers returned to Coffin's residence, he was not there. They interviewed Chandler and took photographs of her injuries which included a scratch and bruise on her arm, bite marks on her forehead, a noticeable bump on the back of her head, and lacerations under her tongue. The police then left the residence in search of Coffin who they found several blocks away. He told the officers that when Chandler would not give him the ring, he had pried her mouth open and attempted to retrieve the ring. She then bit down on his fingers, causing Coffin to press his teeth against her forehead and to hit the back of her head in an attempt, he claimed, to have her release her bite. He also admitted to pushing her to the ground to free himself but denied kicking her in the head as she had claimed.

Coffin was charged with felony domestic violence, Idaho Code §§ 18-903, 18-918(2). Following a jury trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to ten years, with five years determinate. The court, however, suspended the sentence, placing Coffin on probation for ten years. Coffin now appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jury Instructions

For the first time on appeal, Coffin contends that the district court committed reversible error when it instructed the jury with regard to the definition of "willfully" for the purpose of the "willful infliction of a traumatic injury" element of the domestic violence charge (jury instruction no. 10).

The question whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which we exercise free review. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 P.2d 691, 694 (1992). When reviewing jury instructions, we ask whether the instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable law. State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942, 866 P.2d 193, 199 (Ct.App. 1993).

Ordinarily, a party may not claim that a jury instruction was erroneous unless the party objected prior to the jury beginning to deliberate. Idaho Criminal Rule 30(b). However, even absent a timely objection to the trial court, some claims of instructional error are reviewable for the first time on appeal under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 748, 170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007). Fundamental error has been defined as error that "so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his fundamental right to due process." Anderson, 144 Idaho at 748, 170 P.3d at 891; State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992).

Coffin contends the instruction given by the court on the "willful" element of infliction of traumatic injury for domestic violence was an erroneous statement of the law that was prejudicial to him. Specifically, he argues that the court instructed the jury on "willfulness" by giving "the less culpable conduct-oriented meaning" of the term and thereby reducing the state's burden of proof in regard to the mental element of the offense.

The United States Supreme Court has held that in a criminal trial, "the State must prove every element of the offense, and a jury instruction violates due process if it fails to give effect to that requirement." Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437, 124 S.Ct. 1830, 1832, 158 L.Ed.2d 701, 706 (2004); Anderson, 144 Idaho at 749, 170 P.3d at 892.

The applicable code section which Coffin was charged with violating, I.C. § 18-918(2)(a),¹ stated that:

Any household member who commits a battery, as defined in section 18-903, Idaho Code, and willfully and unlawfully inflicts a traumatic injury upon any other household member is guilty of a felony.

(Emphasis added).

In State v. Sohm, 140 Idaho 458, 95 P.3d 76 (Ct.App.2004), the lower court used the definition of "willfully" in Idaho Code § 18-101(1)² in instructing the jury on a domestic violence charge. The instruction stated that "[a]n act is `willful' or `done willfully' when done on purpose. One can act willfully without intending to violate the law, to injure another, or to acquire any advantage." (Emphasis added). We held that in light of State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 80 P.3d 1103 (Ct.App.2003), where this Court had held that to establish a violation of I.C. § 18-918(3), the state must prove that the defendant willfully inflicted injury, it was error for the lower court to instruct the jury on the definition of "willfulness" in I.C. § 18-101(1). The erroneous instruction would have allowed the jury in Sohm to find the defendant guilty even if he had not intended to injure the victim with his actions, because the instruction had defined "willful" as a state of mind not necessarily requiring an intent to injure another. The error was held to be not harmless because the instruction was confusing and misleading. We concluded, "[t]here can be no doubt that this error was prejudicial because it diminished the state's burden of proof on the mental element of the offense." Sohm, 140 Idaho at 461, 95 P.3d at 79.

Similarly, in State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 64 P.3d 296 (2002), the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the use of a jury instruction utilizing the I.C. § 18-101(1) definition of "willfully" in the context of the charge of felony injury to a child. The court held that the error was not harmless because "[a]t best, [the erroneous instruction] is confusing. At worst, it misstates the law...." Young, 138 Idaho at 373, 64 P.3d at 299. See also State v. Lilly, 142 Idaho 70, 72-73, 122 P.3d 1170, 1172-73 (Ct.App.2005) (relying on Sohm to find that the "willful" instruction was erroneous as given in the context of a felony domestic battery charge).

Here, jury instruction no. 10 regarding willfulness consisted of the first half of I.C. § 18-101, stating that:

"Willfully" when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make the omission referred to.

The state argues that the court's deletion of the last sentence of the "willfulness" definition as articulated in I.C. § 18-101(1) was sufficient to distinguish the case from Sohm and Young. Specifically, the state argues that unlike in Sohm, instruction no. 10 in this case did not define the term "willfully" in such a manner that the jury could find Coffin guilty of domestic violence even if he did not intend to injure the victim. The state asserts that when considered together with instruction no. 7, which instructed the jury that Coffin must have "willfully" inflicted a traumatic injury, the effect of instruction no. 10 was "simply to convey to the jury that Coffin must have purposely inflicted a traumatic injury, i.e., that he intentionally injured the victim." Coffin, however, argues that despite the fact the instruction consisted of only the first sentence of the instructions at issue in the cases discussed above, it still operated to reduce the state's burden of proof in regard to the mental element of the offense.

Examining the instructions as a whole, we conclude that instruction no. 10 was not an erroneous statement of the law. In Sohm and Young it was the second sentence of the instructions which the courts focused on as operating to reduce the state's burden of proof in regard to a mental element of the offense. We agree with the state that without the second sentence, the instruction merely conveys that an act is done "willfully" when it is done on purpose. Read in concert with instruction no. 7, that the defendant must have "willfully ... inflicted[ed] a traumatic injury upon [the victim]," instruction no. 10 was sufficient to convey the requirement Coffin must have intended to injure the victim when he struck her. Thus, we conclude the court did not err in giving instruction no. 10.

Coffin also contends the district court erred in its actions taken to correct instruction no. 7 after it was read to the jury. After the prosecutor alerted the court to an error, the court instructed that each juror take out their writing instruments and make the corrections on their individual copies of the instruction. Coffin argues that the court's failure to give the jurors a clear, corrected version of the instruction was apt to mislead and confuse them. However, Coffin cites no authority for the proposition that each juror is required to have a "clean" copy of an instruction, and we note that the judge read the corrected version of the instruction to the jury in its entirety prior to releasing them for deliberations. The trial...