State v. Cogdell, 21041
| Decision Date | 27 August 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 21041,21041 |
| Citation | 273 S.C. 563,257 S.E.2d 748 |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Robert Harold COGDELL, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Noel Turner and Richard H. Rhodes of Burts, Turner, Hammett, Harrison & Rhodes, Spartanburg, for appellant.
Asst. Atty. Gen. Brian P. Gibbes and Staff Atty. Lindy Pike Funkhouser, Columbia, for respondent.
Appellant was convicted on twenty-one (21) counts of obstructing justice and was sentenced to three (3) years imprisonment. The charges arose out of his failure, while Mayor of the Town of Landrum, South Carolina, to report traffic convictions to the South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation as required by law.
The statute law of this State requires public officials in charge of the disposition of certain cases involving traffic violations to report any convictions to the South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation (Department). See: Sections 56-1-330, 56-1-780, and 56-5-2970 of the 1976 Code of Laws. Code Sections 56-1-500 and 56-5-2970 impose penalties for the failure to make the required reports to the Department. These reports are made by forwarding the "yellow copy" of the Uniform Traffic Ticket in each case to the Department within ten (10) days.
The "yellow copy" of the traffic ticket is referred to in the record as "dispositional" in nature and is used by the Department to impose statutorily mandated penalties against traffic violators. Upon the basis of these reports, the Department would have in some instances automatically suspended the motorist's drivers license (Code Section 56-5-2990); and in others the motorist's license would have been suspended if a total of twelve points had been assessed against him (Code Section 56-1-740). Therefore, the prompt reporting of convictions for traffic violations vitally affected the enforcement of the laws regulating traffic upon the highways of the State. For example, a motorist, who was convicted of an offense which required the automatic suspension of his license by the Department, would probably never have his drivers license suspended unless the official in charge of the disposition of the offense reported the conviction to the Department.
It is, therefore, apparent that the General Assembly has established the penalty of suspension of a motorist's drivers license as a basic part of the program to enforce safety upon the highways of this State, and has made the reporting of traffic violations by the appropriate officials an integral part of the enforcement of the traffic laws.
The twenty-one (21) counts charged in this case against appellant arose from his failure to forward to the Department the notices of traffic violations required by the foregoing statutes. The statutory penalty for failure to make the reports of traffic convictions is not more than thirty days or a fine of $100. The State, in this case, instead of charging appellant with the statutory offense, which would carry the maximum penalty of thirty days or $100 on each count, charged appellant with the offense of obstructing justice which carries a maximum sentence of ten (10) years on each count.
Appellant raises three questions in this appeal, the first of which asserts that the conduct for which he was convicted did not constitute the crime of obstructing justice.
Appellant was charged and convicted for the intentional failure to perform his statutory duty to report convictions of the traffic laws. These reports followed the judicial determination of the traffic violation and constituted a necessary step in the proceedings designed by the General Assembly for the enforcement of the traffic laws. The failure of the proper official to make the reports prevented the imposition of the penalties mandated by statutory law.
The trial judge properly held that the intentional failure of appellant to report convictions of traffic violations, as required by the foregoing statutes, constituted the common law offense of obstruction of justice.
At common law it is an offense to do any act which prevents, obstructs, impedes, or hinders the administration of justice. 67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice §§ 2 and 3. The intentional failure of a responsible public...
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... ... Conrad ... Antonio Allen (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner ... who filed this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus ... pursuant to ... unusual punishment per se. Clark, Id. ; ... State v. Cogdell, 273 S.C. 563, 257 S.E.2d 748 ... (1979). The Applicant has failed to show his sentence was ... ...
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