State v. Cole
Decision Date | 25 March 1959 |
Docket Number | Nos. 722,723,s. 722 |
Citation | 249 N.C. 733,107 S.E.2d 732 |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. James COLE, James Garland Martin and others to the State unknown. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Atty. Gen. Malcolm B. Seawell, Asst. Atty. Gen. Claude L. Love, Bernard A. Harrell, Staff Atty., Raleigh, for the State.
Charles B. Nye, Daniel M. Williams, Jr., Durham, for defendant Cole.
E. L. Alston, Jr., Greensboro, for defendant Martin.
We shall first consider certain assignments of error based on exceptions which both defendants have preserved and argued in their respective briefs.
The defendants insist that the trial court committed error in refusing to sustain their respective motions to quash the bill of indictment. They contend that while the indictment attempts to charge the defendants and their companions or associates with unlawful assembly, the indictment does not set forth any unlawful purpose or any unlawful acts which the defendants assembled to commit; that it does not charge the defendants with the necessary elements of an attempt to mutually assist each other against lawful authority. The arguments in the briefs are substantially as if the defendants were charged with engaging in a riot, when, as a matter of fact, the bill of indictment charges the defendants, and others to the State unknown, with inciting a riot.
The crimes of inciting a riot and participating in a riot are separate and distinct offenses against the public peace. Both crimes have their origin in the common law.
Commonwealth v. Safis, 122 Pa. Super. 333, 186 A. 177, 180; 77 C.J.S. Riot § 1(b), page 423.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Egan, 113 Pa.Super. 375, 173 A. 764, 766, it was held that inciting to riot is a common law offense, the gist of which is its tendency to provoke a breach of the peace, though the parties first assembled for an innocent purpose. The Court said: Commonwealth v. Sciullo, 169 Pa.Super. 318, 82 A.2d 695.
In the instant case, the bill of indictment does charge that the defendants while armed with certain weapons, did assemble near the Town of Maxton for the common purpose of conducting a meeting and rally of the so-called Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, with the common intent to preach racial dissension and to coerce and intimidate the populace. We hold that the indictment adequately charges an unlawful purpose and that the case of State v. Baldwin, 18 N.C. 195, relied on by the defendants, is distinguishable and not controlling on the charge contained in the bill of indictment in this case.
The defendants were not convicted of unlawful assembly or riot, but of inciting to riot. Naturally, they could not have been convicted of inciting to riot unless the incitement resulted in a riot. Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure (1957 Ed.), Vol. 2, section 864, page 731; State v. Lustig, 13 N.J.Super. 149, 80 A.2d 309. This assignment of error is overruled.
The defendants assign as error the failure of the trial court to sustain their motions for judgment as of nonsuit at the close of the State's evidence, which motions were renewed after the defendants announced they would offer no evidence.
The overwhelming weight of authority seems to be to the effect, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, that persons may assemble together for a lawful purpose, but if at any time during the meeting they act with a common intent, formed before or during the meeting, to attain a purpose which will interfere with the rights of others by committing disorderly acts in such manner as to cause sane, firm and courageous persons in the neighborhood to apprehend a breach of the peace, such meeting constitutes an unlawful assembly. See Annotation: Unlawful Assembly, 58 A.L.R. 751, and 93 A.L.R. 737, where the authorities in support of this view, from many jurisdictions, are assembled.
In the case of People v. Burman, 154 Mich. 150, 117 N.W. 589, 592, 25 L.R.A., N.S., 251, the defendants were convicted of a breach of the peace in violation of a city ordinance. The defendants had marched through the streets of the City of Hancock, Michigan, displaying red flags. They had been warned that the display of such flags would cause a breach of the peace and riots. The Court, in upholding the convictions, said: conduct. This merely proves that they and defendants were joint wrongdoers; that they, as well as defendants, violated the ordinance in question. The object of this proceeding is not to redress the grievance of these other wrongdoers, but it is to redress the grievance of the public whose rights they and defendants jointly invaded. The guilt of their associate wrongdoers does not lessen defendants' responsibility. It is sufficient to say that defendants by their conduct did 'aid, countenance, and assist in making a riot, noise, and disturbance, and therefore violated ordinance No. 10 of the city of Hancock."
In the case before us, the evidence supports the view that the so-called Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, under the leadership, control and direction of the defendant Cole, did by inflammatory speeches and crossburnings, and reports thereof published in the newspapers, incense the Indians of Robeson County to such an extent that the proposed rally at Maxton would tend to provoke a breach of the peace and incite to riot. In fact, Cole was so advised before and after the rally was underway. Moreover, Cole and Martin knew that the purpose of the rally was to incense, intimidate, and scare the indians. There is evidence to the effect that when Sheriff McLeod arrived at the scene of the planned rally on Saturday night, 18 January 1958, he advised Cole not to try to hold the rally; that Cole said 'he couldn't see any reason why he should not hold it, but would tone it down some.' This we think is tantamount to an admission by Cole that he originally intended to make statements that would be resented by the Indians and likely to cause them to riot. Otherwise, why 'tone it down'? As to Martin, according to the evidence admitted against him, Cole had told him about a week or two before the Maxton rally that there were about 30,000 half-breeds in Robeson County and he was going to have a meeting and try to 'scare them up.' Therefore, it is evident that Martin knew the purpose of this particular meeting.
In light of the evidence disclosed on the record on this appeal, there can be no justification for the defendants and their associates to go to the rally at Maxton on 18 January 1958, armed with rifles, shotguns, pistols and other weapons, some concealed and others unconcealed, if their intent and purposes were legitimate and peaceful....
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...their face and as applied. We begin our evaluation of defendant's argument by examining the common law offense of riot. In State v. Cole, 249 N.C. 733, 107 S.E.2d 732, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 867, 80 S.Ct. 128, 4 L.Ed.2d 107 (1959), this Court, in an opinion by Justice Denny (later Chief Jus......
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