State v. Cole
| Decision Date | 01 June 1884 |
| Parties | THE STATE v. COLE |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
TUESDAY OCTOBER 16, 1883.
Appeal from Clarke District Court.
THE defendant was indicted for the crime of murder by means of poison. Having been convicted, he was sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for life. From this judgment he appeals.
AFFIRMED.
P. J Goss, and Temple & Tallman, for appellant.
Smith McPherson, Attorney-general, for the State.
The defendant was charged with the murder of his wife. In April 1880, the deceased, Laura Cole, became confined in childbirth. While thus confined, she manifested symptoms of having been poisoned. She survived the birth of her child a few days and died. Soon after the burial the suspicion that she was poisoned became so strong that the coroner caused the body to be exhumed and a post mortem examination to be made. The examination, as the evidence tends to show, revealed arsenic in the stomach. The defendant was suspected of having administered the poison, and was indicted and tried, with the result above stated.
I. The deceased was but little more than fifteen years of age at the time of her marriage to the defendant, and only about seventeen years of age at the time of her death. The state introduced evidence tending to show that the defendant lost his affection for her, and had threatened to send her home to her father's house. Some of the evidence introduced for the purpose of showing his want of affection, and his criminal disposition toward her, was objected to by the defendant. The state was allowed, against the objection of defendant, to introduce evidence to the effect that the defendant called her a "d d big footed squaw;" that he allowed her to work out of doors in cold weather, in clothing insufficient, while he was warmly clad; that he made her get into a pen and milk a vicious cow; that when she was dying, and he was told by the attending physician that she could not live more than fifteen or twenty minutes, he commenced talking about his orchard and improving his house, and put on a jovial and frivolous air. The ruling of the court in admitting this evidence is assigned as error. It may be conceded, as the defendant claims, that upon a trial for a criminal offense evidence of independent acts of bad conduct is not ordinarily admissible, and in no case to establish the body of the crime. But upon a trial for murder, where there is evidence that would justify a jury in believing that the crime has been committed by some one, and there are circumstances which point to the defendant as the guilty person, evidence of conduct exhibiting a bad state of feeling on the part of the defendant toward the deceased is admissible. State v. Moelchen, 53 Iowa 310, 5 N.W. 186; State v. Watkins, 9 Conn. 47. In the latter case the defendant was tried for the murder of his wife. It was held admissible to show that defendant had been guilty of adultery. The affection which a husband ordinarily entertains for his wife renders it improbable to the last degree that he would be guilty of murdering her. But this affection is sometimes wanting, and, where it is wholly so, the marital relation may be a burden. In State v. Watkins, HOSMER, Ch. J., speaking of the evidence of adultery, said: "The proof alluded to would not establish the position, if the wife were killed, that the husband perpetrated the act; but the presumption (of innocence) created by the marital relation would be repelled, and a weight be given to the other proof in the case which it would not otherwise possess." See, also, in this connection, State v. Zellers, 2 Halstead 220; Hendrickson v. People, 1 Parker's Crim. Rep. 406; Benedict v. State, 14 Wis. 423. We think that the court did not err in admitting the evidence.
II. One Abernathy was allowed to testify, against the objection of the defendant, that he had seen the deceased carrying water. It is not shown for what purpose nor under what circumstances. The defendant was living upon a farm and keeping house. It is to be presumed that the deceased was carrying water from the usual place of supply for domestic purposes. We are not able to say that this was anything more than an ordinary household duty which the defendant might properly enough, under ordinary circumstances, allow his wife to perform. Such being our view, we have to say that it appears to us that the evidence was immaterial. But we are not able to see how it could have prejudiced the defendant.
III. The defendant assigns as error that the court erred in allowing certain physicians to testify, as experts, to having made a post mortem examination, and to having found indications of arsenic in the stomach of the deceased. The objection urged in argument is that it did not appear that they were competent to testify as experts. Without any doubt the question as to the condition of the stomach was one involving skill and science. The physicians who testified were shown merely to be physicians of considerable length of standing in practice. Whether such persons should have been held to be qualified to testify as experts in respect to the post mortem examination, and indications of arsenic, is a question upon which we are not entirely agreed. The post mortem examination of a human stomach for the detection of indications of poison does not necessarily come within the experience of a medical practitioner. But toxicology is treated as a branch of medical jurisprudence, and it may be regarded as belonging to medical science. On a question, then, as to whether a person is qualified to make a post mortem examination of a human stomach, and testify to indications of arsenic, it would be proper to allow evidence that he is a medical practitioner. We do not say that the court, upon such fact alone being shown, should necessarily allow him to testify. We merely say that, if he is admitted upon such fact, the court does not act wholly without evidence. This matter of passing upon expert qualifications is not one that is subject to very well defined rules. There must, of course, be some evidence of the existence of the qualifications; but beyond that it must be left somewhat in the discretion of the court. In a criminal case of the gravity of this one, the discretion must, to be sure, be exercised cautiously; and if the appellate court should be satisfied that it had not been done, and should apprehend that the defendant had suffered injustice, it would doubtless be justified in reversing. But, in passing upon the question of a proper exercise of discretion the appellate court may look into what transpired upon the trial. Where the defendant thinks that the evidence is insufficient to establish with proper fullness the expert qualifications, his true course would be to interpose an objection upon that ground. Upon the preliminary question of the admission of offered expert witnesses, it is probable that their qualifications are seldom shown as fully as they might be. The witnesses, we think, are often admitted upon very slight evidence, leaving the party against whom they are admitted to show by cross-examination and otherwise the absence of the qualifications. It is not regarded as easy for an unqualified person to sustain himself in the character of an...
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State v. Kellogg
...were struck "The evidence was competent, because it tended to show that the parties had not lived together agreeably"); State v. Cole, 63 Iowa 695, 697, 17 N.W. 183, 184 ("evidence of conduct exhibiting a bad state of feeling on the part of the defendant towards the deceased is admissible")......
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State v. Grba
... ... second degree. The general rule is that a failure to instruct ... as to an included offense is not error, where the evidence ... shows that the defendant is guilty of the higher offense or ... is not guilty of any offense. State v. Cole, 63 Iowa ... 695, 17 N.W. 183; State v. Sigg, 86 Iowa 746, 53 ... N.W. 261; State v. Reasby, 100 Iowa 231, 69 N.W ... 451; State v. Murphy, 109 Iowa 116, 80 N.W. 305; ... State v. Stanley, 109 Iowa 142, 80 N.W. 228; ... State v. Bertoch, 112 Iowa 195, 83 N.W. 967; ... State v ... ...
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State v. Grba
...is not error, where the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of the higher offense or is not guilty of any offense. State v. Cole, 63 Iowa, 695, 17 N. W. 183;State v. Sigg, 86 Iowa, 746, 53 N. W. 261;State v. Reasby, 100 Iowa, 231, 69 N. W. 451;State v. Murphy, 109 Iowa, 116, 80 N. W......
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State v. Deases, 90-414
...the defendant's state of mind when the murder is committed. See State v. Kellogg, 263 N.W.2d 539, 542 (Iowa 1978); State v. Cole, 63 Iowa 695, 697, 17 N.W. 183, 184 (1883); State v. Moelchen, 53 Iowa 310, 314, 5 N.W. 186, 189 (1880). We have difficulty applying the rationale of these cases ......