State v. Coleman
| Decision Date | 25 March 1949 |
| Docket Number | 28442,28443. |
| Citation | 84 N.E.2d 709,227 Ind. 161 |
| Parties | STATE v. COLEMAN. STATE v. PIERCY. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Appeal from Criminal Court, Marion County; William D. Bain judge.
Cleon H. Foust, Atty. Gen., Merl M. Wall, Deputy Atty. Gen., and John H. Daily and Judson L. Stark Prosecuting Atty., both of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Edwin McClure and David M. Lewis, both of Indianapolis, for appellee.
Edwin Steers, Sr., of Indianapolis, amicus curiae.
Each of these causes involved a prosecution for the violation of the Indiana Election Code. This Code was adopted in 1945 and is Chapter 208 of the Acts of the Indiana General Assembly of that year and is §§ 29-2801-29-6003 Burns' 1933 (Supp.)
In Cause No. 28442 the appellee, Slathan Coleman, was indicted in two counts. The first count of this indictment charged the appellee with unlawfully entering and remaining in the voting room in election Precinct Five of the Seventh Ward in the City of Indianapolis, during the primary election held May 7 1946, contrary to that provision of the Indiana Election Code which is set out in § 29-5024, Burns' 1933 (Supp.). The second count thereof charged the appellee with being unlawfully etc., in possession of certain ballots to be used in said election contrary to that provision of the Indiana Election Code which is set out in § 29-5944, Burns' 1933 (Supp.).
In Cause No. 28443 the appellee, Frank Piercy, was indicted in two counts. In each of these counts he was charged with unlawfully voting in the Ninth Precinct of the Fifteenth Ward of the City of Indianapolis in the said primary election contrary to that provision of the Indiana Election Code which is set out in § 29-5911, Burns' 1933 (Supp.).
In each of these causes the appellee moved to quash the indictment for the reason: first, that the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense; second, that the offense was not stated with sufficient certainty. In each cause the motion to quash was sustained. The State has appealed from this ruling in each case and has assigned as error the sustaining of the motion to quash.
These causes were consolidated for the purpose of argument, and we are consolidating them for the purpose of disposing of the questions raised. The questions presented in each of these cases are the same.
To sustain the decision of the trial court, the appellees contend: first, the title of the Indiana Election Code being as above stated, Chapter 208 of the Acts of the Indiana General Assembly of 1945, is not sufficient to cover the provisions contained therein, providing for criminal liability in connection with primary elections; and, second, that each of these indictments fails to show for what purpose the election was held, and due to this fact, the offense was not stated with sufficient certainty. We will consider these questions in their order.
The title to the Indiana Election Code is in the following language:
'An Act concerning elections; providing penalties for the violation thereof, and repealing all conflicting laws.'
Section 19, Article 4 of the Constitution of Indiana is as follows:
Whether the term 'concerning elections' in the title of this act, or the word 'election' as used in the title of this act is broad enough to include primary elections and criminal liability in connection therewith, must, therefore, be decided.
The appellees have cited Kelso v. Cook, 1915, 184 Ind. 173, 110 N.E. 987, Ann.Cas.1918E, 68 wherein this Court held that 'elections' as used in § 2, Art. 2 of our Constitution does not include primary elections. They have also cited decisions from other jurisdictions wherein different courts, in construing their statutes and constitutions, have held likewise. It is our opinion that these various decisions properly applied the rules of statutory construction. Under the rules of statutory construction, the word 'elections' might in some instances include primary elections, and in others would not. For a case where this term has been construed to include primary elections, see State v. Hirsch, 1890, 125 Ind. 207, 24 N.E. 1062, 9 L.R.A. 170. The present case, however, is not one of statutory construction. The question before us is whether or not the title of this act is sufficient, or whether it is in contravention of said § 19, Art. 4, of our Constitution. It is our opinion that the appellees' objection to the title to this act is not well taken. Our reason for this conclusion is well stated in the case of Albert v. Milk Control Board of Indiana 1936, 210 Ind. 283, on page 288, 200 N.E. 688, 690 wherein Judge Hughes, speaking for the Court in discussing this particular section of our Constitution, said:
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