State v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 27 July 1981
• Citation: 619 S.W.2d 112
• Parties: STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. Michael Angelo COLEMAN, Appellant.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 112

619 S.W.2d 112

STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. Michael Angelo COLEMAN, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Jackson.

July 27, 1981 Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court May 3, 1993.

A. J. Archibald, Memphis, for appellant.

Gordon W. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., William M. Leech, Jr., Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellee.

OPINION

COOPER, Justice.

Appellant Michael Angelo Coleman has appealed his conviction of murder in the first degree in the perpetration of a robbery, and the sentence of death. ¹ He questions the denial of his motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendant, Michael Anthony Bell, the refusal of the trial court to remove a juror for alleged cause, the admission in evidence of appellant's confession and that of his codefendant, and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence generally. Appellant also insists that sections of T.C.A. § 39-2404, dealing with punishment for first degree murder, are unconstitutional.

After consideration of the several assignments of error and of the entire record, we are of the opinion that the verdict and sentence are sustained by the evidence and that no reversible error was committed in the trial. We are also of the opinion that T.C.A. § 39-2404 is constitutional.

Appellant and his codefendant were convicted of the killing of Leon Watson during a robbery, which occurred in Memphis, Tennessee, on May 2, 1979. That morning, Mr. Watson left his home to go to a nearby grocery store. He did not return. At about 10:00 p. m. Mrs. Watson was contacted by a representative of the Memphis Police Department and was taken to view a white 1964 Buick automobile, which she identified as being that of her husband's. Blood was found on the seat and floor of the automobile, and a bullet was found in the left door.

Appellant and codefendant Bell were arrested about one hour later on another charge. The next morning, at about 5:15 a. m., both appellant and Bell were advised of their Miranda rights. Appellant then told the officers of finding a body of a black man in a field near Third Street in Memphis. He directed officers to the scene where they found the body of Mr. Watson. Mr. Watson's empty billfold was on the ground near his body. Items from Mr. Watson's automobile was strewn around the body, indicating the automobile had been ransacked before it was driven from the scene.

Appellant was advised again of his Miranda rights. Thereafter, he confessed to shooting and killing Mr. Watson in Mr. Watson's automobile. He also admitted going through the victim's billfold after the shooting, and stated he had removed the C.B. radio from the automobile, but had decided not to keep it.

Codefendant Bell, in his statement to the police and in his testimony at the trial, named appellant as the man who shot and killed Mr. Watson. He also testified that a pistol belonging to Mr. Watson was taken after the shooting and that appellant had taken the gun to his grandmother's house.

Appellant insists the statements given by him to police officers were not given freely and voluntarily and, therefore, should not have been admitted in evidence. It is a truism that an involuntary confession is not admissible in evidence. However, we find nothing in the record to support appellant's contention that his confession was not voluntary. The trial judge held a pretrial hearing on appellant's motion to suppress, and denied the motion "upon the testimony of Patrolman A. C. Speight and Sergeant L. A. Simpson." The transcript of the suppression hearing is not in the record, but both officers testified in the trial and were examined concerning the circumstances attendant the giving of statements by the appellant. Their testimony unequivocally shows that appellant's confession was freely given and was voluntary. Before any statement was made, appellant was advised of the rights due him under the Miranda decision, ² and he was advised of his rights a second time before he confessed to the killing of Mr. Watson.

Counsel argues from the fact that appellant was placed in jail at 1:00 a. m. and questioning by the officers began at 5:00 a. m., that appellant was denied the opportunity to sleep over such a period of time that his resistance had dissipated and that he would sign anything in order to sleep. The argument is ingenious but is not borne out by the record. As noted by counsel, what appellant did between 1:00 a. m. and 5:00 a. m. is not recorded. What is recorded is the fact that appellant instigated the questioning by indicating that he had information to give the officers.

Considering the totality of circumstances attendant the interrogation of appellant, we are of the opinion the statements given to the police by appellant were the fruit of proper custodial interrogation, ³ were voluntarily given, and were properly admitted in evidence. We are also of the opinion that the confession of appellant, buttressed as it was by physical evidence and the testimony of codefendant Bell was sufficient to justify the jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of "murder in the first degree in perpetration of a robbery."

Appellant has not specifically challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that is the basis of the jury's imposition of the death penalty, but directs his challenge to the issue of constitutionality of the Death Penalty Act. However, T.C.A. § 39-2406(c) specifically requires this court, in reviewing a sentence of death for murder in the first degree, to determine whether (1) the sentence of death was imposed in an arbitrary fashion; (2) the evidence supports the jury's findings of a statutory aggravating circumstance or statutory aggravating circumstances (3) the evidence supports the jury's finding of the absence of any mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found; and (4) the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the nature of the crime and the defendant."

A jury may impose the death penalty on a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree only upon its finding that one or more aggravating circumstances, listed in the statute, are present, and that such circumstance or circumstances are not outweighed by mitigating circumstances. See T.C.A. § 39-2404(i).

In this case, in addition to finding that appellant was guilty of murder in the first degree in the perpetration of a robbery, ⁴ the jury found appellant had been "previously convicted of one or more felonies other than the present charge which involved the use or threat of violence to the person." ⁵ The jury also specifically found that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the statutory aggravating circumstances, and fixed appellant's sentence at death.

We have heretofore related, in capsule form, evidence supporting the jury's finding that appellant is guilty of murder in the first degree in the perpetration of a robbery. As to the other aggravating circumstance found by the jury, the record shows that appellant had been convicted for assault with intent to commit robbery with a deadly weapon, assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree, kidnapping, and robbery with a deadly weapon. The testimony detailing appellant's felony convictions, each of which involved the use of threat or violence to the person of the victim, is not controverted. Furthermore, appellant introduced no evidence of a mitigating circumstance. He only called one witness at the sentencing hearing, Dr. John Hutson, a professor of...