State v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 22 July 1882
• Citation: 17 S.C. 473
• Parties: STATE v. COLEMAN.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

17 S.C. 473

STATE v. COLEMAN.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

July 22, 1882

1. Exceptions to refusals to charge not considered, the requests so to charge appearing in the brief only in the exceptions themselves.

2. On motion in arrest of judgment, an indictment for murder that did not state where the deceased died, was held bad as well at common law as under those statutes that provide for cases where the wound was inflicted in one jurisdiction and death ensued in another, These statutes considered.

3. An indictment under a statute must closely follow the terms of the statute.

Before PRESSLEY, J., Laurens, February, 1882.

This was an indictment against Neel Coleman for the murder of his son by cruel treatment. The opinion states the case. There was no report by the presiding judge.

Messrs Ball & Watts , for appellant.

Mr Solicitor Duncan , contra.

OPINION

Mr JUSTICE MCIVER.

Under an indictment for murder, the appellant was convicted of manslaughter, and moved in arrest of judgment because there was no allegation in the indictment of any place where the deceased died. The motion was refused by the circuit judge whereupon this appeal was taken, alleging error in such refusal. The defendant also appeals upon the ground that the circuit judge refused to charge certain propositions of law but as it does not appear from the " Case" as presented for argument here that any request was made to charge these propositions, or any exception taken to the refusal so to charge, these grounds are not properly before us for consideration, and indeed were not urged in the argument here.

The only question, therefore, presented by this appeal is whether the omission to state in the indictment the place where the deceased died is a fatal defect. There can be no doubt that such an omission would have been fatal at common law, and the question then is narrowed down to the inquiry whether there are any statutory provisions which render such an allegation unnecessary. The statute relied on for this purpose is the Act of 1859 (12 Stat. 822), incorporated into the General Statutes (Chap. 128, Sections 19, 20 and 21), as amended by the Act of December 21st, 1880 (17 Stat. 336).

It will be observed that these statutory provisions do not purport to make any change in the rules of criminal pleading, but are simply designed to prescribe a place of trial in certain cases, where, as the law then stood, it was at least doubtful as to where would be the proper place of trial. They do not declare in general terms that, no matter where the death ensues, the accused may be indicted and tried where the injury causing the death was inflicted, but they specify particularly that where death ensues in a particular place from an injury inflicted in another...