State v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 03 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. 29,143.,29,143.
• Citation: 150 N.M. 622,2011 -NMCA- 087,264 P.3d 523
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.Jericole COLEMAN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

150 N.M. 622

264 P.3d 523

2011 -NMCA- 087

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Jericole COLEMAN, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 29,143.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

May 6, 2011.Certiorari Denied, Aug. 3, 2011, No. 33,053.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Farhan Khan, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.Chief Public Defender, Carlos Ruiz de la Torre, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

CASTILLO, Chief Judge.

{1} Defendant was convicted of aggravated fleeing in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30–22–1.1 (2003), and conspiracy to commit shooting at a dwelling in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30–28–2 (1979). He challenges two evidentiary rulings, claims that the denial of his motion for directed verdict was error, and raises two issues regarding jury instructions. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} At approximately 4:00 a.m. on April 12, 2008, Defendant received a phone call from Mario Montoya and Daniel Martinez. They asked Defendant for a ride from a party, Defendant agreed, picked them up, and then accompanied them back to Mario's home. Mario then suggested that they go “do some shootings.” Defendant reluctantly agreed to this plan and drove them to a location in Roswell selected by Mario, a trailer located at 2409 North Mesa Street. When they reached the trailer, Mario exited Defendant's vehicle and fired three rounds at the trailer.

{3} At the time of the shooting, Richard Villa was the owner of the targeted trailer. Although he had recently moved from the trailer, he still kept varying possessions there and parked two vehicles in front of the trailer. The shots Mario fired entered the trailer's bedroom, living room, and kitchen and struck one of Villa's cars.

{4} A sheriff's deputy, who happened to be in the vicinity of Villa's trailer at the time of the shooting, heard the shots and proceeded in his marked sheriff's vehicle toward the sounds. The deputy encountered Defendant as he was driving away from the trailer with Daniel and Mario. The deputy began to follow Defendant, who rapidly accelerated in an attempt to flee. A high speed chase ensued; Defendant drove in excess of 100 miles per hour, ran through several stop signs, and a shotgun was jettisoned from the vehicle. The deputy's emergency lights and siren were activated throughout the pursuit. The chase came to a sudden conclusion when Defendant slammed into a curb, immobilizing his vehicle.

{5} Defendant, Daniel, and Mario were arrested and taken to the police station. At the station, Defendant was advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and he agreed to speak with Officer Northcutt. Defendant acknowledged his participation in the shooting and the high speed chase, but explained that his conduct was a consequence of peer pressure, and he claimed that he was merely following Mario's commands.

{6} In May 2008, Defendant was charged by criminal information with one count of aggravated fleeing in violation of Section 30–22–1.1 and one count of conspiracy to commit shooting at a dwelling in violation of Section 30–28–2. At a pretrial conference, the State raised the issue of the admissibility of evidence relating to the deputy's compliance with the Chaves County high speed pursuit policy. Citing State v. Padilla, 2008–NMSC–006, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299, the State asked the court to “exclude from all stages of the trial” any inquiry into whether the officer's conduct conformed to the requirements of the policy. After reviewing Padilla, the court issued a letter ruling prohibiting “evidence pertaining to the ... pursuit policy or compliance therewith.”

{7} At his jury trial, Defendant objected to Officer Northcutt's testimony about Defendant's post-arrest statements. The district court denied the objection and determined that the State had laid a sufficient foundation. At the close of the State's case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict as to both counts. Defendant asserted that there was insufficient evidence that he committed aggravated fleeing or conspiracy to commit shooting at a dwelling. The court disagreed and denied the motion.

{8} As to jury instructions, Defendant asked the court to provide the jury with an instruction informing them of the requirements of NMSA 1978, Section 31–1–5(A) (1973), which states that “[f]ollowing arrest, any person accused of a crime is entitled to have reasonable opportunity to make three telephone calls beginning not later than twenty minutes after the time of arrival at a police station.” Defendant explained that he wanted the jury to be aware that he had not been informed that “he could make three phone calls as required by the statute.” The court denied the requested instruction and concluded that the statute did not require officers to inform suspects of their right to make phone calls.

{9} The jury convicted Defendant of both charges. The court entered judgment and sentenced Defendant to eighteen months of incarceration to be followed by one year of parole. Defendant appeals.

DISCUSSION

{10} Defendant raises five issues on appeal. As to the evidence presented, Defendant claims that the district court erred in admitting Officer Northcutt's testimony regarding Defendant's post-arrest statements and asserts that the court erred “in suppressing evidence regarding” the Chaves County high speed pursuit policy. Defendant next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict as to both counts. Finally, Defendant claims two errors in the jury instructions. First, he argues that the court erred in failing to issue an instruction “concerning his right to be informed that he could make three phone calls while in custody, pursuant to ... Section 31–1–5(A).” Second, he asserts that the instruction given as to the charge of conspiracy to commit shooting at a dwelling was insufficient because the jury was not instructed that Defendant must have known or should have known that the trailer was occupied. We address these arguments in turn.

Evidentiary Rulings

{11} “We review the admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard and will not reverse in the absence of a clear abuse. An abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling is against logic and is clearly untenable or not justified by reason.” State v. Sarracino, 1998–NMSC–022, ¶ 20, 125 N.M. 511, 964 P.2d 72 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

{12} Defendant's first claim is that Officer Northcutt should not have been permitted to testify about the statements Defendant made during the post-arrest interrogation. Defendant asks this Court to suppress this portion of Officer Northcutt's testimony on the basis that Defendant's statements were involuntary. The State objects that this argument was not preserved and asserts that Defendant failed to file a motion to suppress at or before trial nor did he raise the issue of voluntariness at trial. The State asserts that a careful review of the record reveals that Defendant objected to the admissibility of Northcutt's testimony on foundational grounds only. We review the events at trial and the circumstances surrounding Defendant's objection.

{13} On direct examination, Officer Northcutt testified that he had been on duty the night of the shooting, during which he interviewed Defendant and his two companions. He explained that he read Defendant his Miranda rights prior to questioning him. Officer Northcutt also stated that, in his opinion, Defendant understood his rights. The State asked whether Defendant admitted involvement in the incident at 2409 North Mesa and asked Officer Northcutt, “What did [Defendant] eventually say about how he got involved?” Defendant objected at this point stating, “Your honor, unless he's [going to] introduce the statement, the court needs to rule on admissibility.” The court appeared confused by this objection and said, “Uh ... well ... [State], I'll allow you to establish or lay some more foundation if you'd like in regard to a knowing and voluntary statement” by Defendant. The State proceeded to inquire further about whether Defendant had been properly Mirandized. Afterwards, the State addressed the court and stated, “I believe that's sufficient foundation, your honor.” The court agreed and directed the State to “proceed.” Defendant made no further objection.

{14} Defendant cites the portion of the record discussed above and claims that he objected to Officer Northcutt's statements “arguing that the foundation for a valid and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights had not been laid” and goes on to argue that the district court should have concluded that his statements were involuntary and suppressed Officer Northcutt's testimony. At trial, Defendant did not, however, raise the issue of voluntariness and did not request suppression. He made only a foundational objection as to whether Officer Northcutt complied with the procedural requirements of Miranda. On appeal, Defendant conflates the necessity for Miranda warnings with the voluntariness of the statement.

{15} In State v. Gallegos, 92 N.M. 336, 340, 587 P.2d 1347, 1351 (Ct.App.1978), we observed that the “[ Miranda ] requirements for admissibility and the ‘voluntariness' requirements for admissibility are separate concepts.” This distinction arises from the fact that Miranda not only requires that a defendant's statements be voluntary to be admissible, but also holds that admissibility is independently contingent on officer compliance with the strict procedural rules articulated in Miranda. Gallegos, 92 N.M. at 340, 587 P.2d at 1351. We provided the following explanation:

[U]nless law enforcement officers give certain specified warnings before questioning a person in custody, and follow certain specified procedures during the course of any subsequent interrogation, any statement made by the person in custody cannot over his objection be admitted in evidence against...