State v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 10 January 1989
• Docket Number: No. 6350,6350
• Citation: 552 A.2d 442,17 Conn.App. 307
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Charles COLEMAN.

Page 442

552 A.2d 442

17 Conn.App. 307

STATE of Connecticut v. Charles COLEMAN.

No. 6350.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 20, 1988.

Decided Jan. 10, 1989.

Jon C. Blue, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, was Joette Katz, New Haven, for appellant (defendant).

James M. Ralls, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Arnold Markle, State's Atty., Susan Marks, Asst. State's Atty., and Eileen McCarthy Geel, Legal Intern, for appellee (State).

Before SPALLONE, STOUGHTON and NORCOTT, JJ.

STOUGHTON, Judge.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered following his pleas of guilty to twenty of twenty-six counts in nine separate informations. The pleas were made under the doctrine of the Alford ¹ case. Before he was sentenced, the defendant moved to withdraw his pleas. The motion was denied except as to one count and sentence was imposed.

The defendant claims (1) that his pleas were not made knowingly and voluntarily because the presiding judge had advised him incorrectly as to the mandatory minimum sentences for the crimes charged, (2) that participation by the judge in the plea negotiations rendered the pleas involuntary, and (3) that the judge should have disqualified himself. We find no error.

The defendant was arrested and charged with twenty-six counts arising out of nine different incidents. These counts included six sexual assaults, eight burglaries, multiple robberies, larcenies, assaults, and various criminal attempts. The maximum penalty for all the charges could have been 311 years. A plea agreement between the state and the defendant was reached on the eve of trial. Under the agreement, the defendant was to plead guilty to a majority of the charges while the state would nolle the remaining charges and recommend a thirty-five year sentence. The defendant would be free to argue for a thirty year sentence. The judge had been present during some of the negotiations between the state and the defense counsel. After an agreement was reached, the judge stated that he would follow the recommendations unless, upon review of the presentence report, he believed that there should be a more lengthy sentence, in which case he would allow the defendant to withdraw his pleas.

On May 27, 1987, the defendant pleaded guilty to various charges under the Alford doctrine. The state then recited its factual basis for the charges, which included the fact that the defendant's fingerprints were found at all the crime scenes. The terms of the plea agreement were noted by the state with the concurrence of defense counsel.

The court then canvassed the defendant to determine whether his pleas were made voluntarily and intelligently. After the court was satisfied that the pleas were entered knowingly and voluntarily, and that the defendant had understood the crimes charged and their possible penalties and had received adequate and effective assistance of counsel, the court accepted the pleas.

Thereafter, the defendant moved to withdraw his pleas. After a hearing before the judge who had accepted the pleas, the motion was denied. The court then sentenced the defendant to serve a total maximum effective sentence of thirty-five years.

The defendant's first claim is that his pleas were not voluntarily and knowingly made because the court incorrectly informed him that the mandatory minimum sentence to be served was thirty years. ² The defendant points out that under General Statutes § 53a-37, a sentencing court may make all mandatory minimum sentences run concurrently. The defendant correctly states that if the sentences had run concurrently, the mandatory minimum sentence would have been five years rather than thirty years as stated by the court. He asserts that this error by the court rendered his plea involuntary and unknowing because he thought that the sentence recommended was close to the minimum sentence that could have been imposed. The defendant raises this issue for the first time on appeal. "Those claims which implicate the knowing and voluntary nature of a plea are reviewable under the exceptional circumstances doctrine of State v. Evans, [165 Conn. 61, 70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973) ]." State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 286, 542 A.2d 299 (1988). Accordingly, we undertake a review to ascertain if the claim affects the knowing and voluntary nature of the defendant's plea. Id., at 287, 542 A.2d 299.

Our review of the plea canvass discloses that while the defendant was understandably unhappy about having to choose between going to trial in the face of strong state's evidence and accepting the plea agreement, he clearly understood that he could receive a harsher sentence if he were to be convicted at trial. The defendant was informed of the rights he was waiving, the charges against him, and the possible sentences. The defendant stated that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, that he had consulted with his lawyer, that he had not been threatened, and that it was his own decision to enter the pleas under the Alford doctrine.

After careful review, we conclude that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. The defendant received the sentence he bargained for. See D'Amico v. Manson, 193 Conn. 144, 154, 476 A.2d 543 (1984). A defendant's less than perfect understanding of all aspects of his situation does not "inevitably render his guilty plea 'unknowing' and therefore involuntary ..." Id. The trial court's failure to advise the defendant that the mandatory sentences could be made concurrent did not affect the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea. The defendant's further contention that there was a violation of Practice Book § 711(2), ³ thus requiring a finding that the plea was not knowing and voluntary, has been foreclosed by our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Collins, 207 Conn. 590, 595, 542 A.2d 1131 (1988), which held that such claims are not reviewable under the Evans bypass doctrine.

The defendant's second claim is that the judge's participation in the plea negotiations rendered the pleas involuntary. Again, this issue is raised for the first time on appeal. Because this claim also involves the voluntariness of the defendant's plea, we will review it under the doctrine of State v. Evans, supra. Upon our review of the record, we find no support for the defendant's proposition that the judge "forged" the plea...