State v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 22 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. C,C
• Citation: 791 S.W.2d 504
• Parties: STATE of Tennessee, Appellant, v. Carla COLEMAN, Appellee. C.A. 89-44-III. 791 S.W.2d 504
• Court: Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 504

791 S.W.2d 504

STATE of Tennessee, Appellant, v. Carla COLEMAN, Appellee.

No. C.C.A. 89-44-III.

791 S.W.2d 504

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee at Nashville.

Nov. 22, 1989.

Permission to Appeal Denied by

Supreme Court May 21, 1990.

Jeff K. Walker, Goodman and Walker, Springfield, for appellee.

Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. and Reporter, Kymberly Lynne Anne Hattaway, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Arthur F. Bieber, Asst. Dist. Atty. Gen., Clarksville, Dent Morriss, Asst. Dist. Atty. Gen., Springfield, for State of Tenn.

OPINION

WADE, Judge.

The state appeals a judgment of the trial court granting the motion of the defendant, Carla Coleman, to suppress evidence.

The sole question presented for review is whether the trial court committed error in its determination that there was not a reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop.

We find no error and affirm.

On August 9 and 10, 1988, Officer Stanley Henderson of the Robertson County Drug Task Force received information about a possible drug transaction from a confidential informant Henderson had previously arrested on other charges.

The informant, whom "he had previously arrested," told the officer that between 2:00 and 2:30 P.M. on August 10, a white female, between 25 and 35 years of age and whose first name was Carla, would be en route to Robertson County from Davidson County on Highway 431 South. The informant stated that she would be driving an older model black Monte Carlo, would have in her possession several pounds of marijuana, and would ultimately drive to a location on Washington Road.

The informant, who had never been used as a confidential source in any previous police investigation, did not reveal to the officer how he knew about the impending transaction.

At about 1:00 P.M. on August 10, Officer Henderson instructed Deputy Marty Groves of the Robertson County Sheriff's Department to intercept any automobile fitting the description of that provided by the informant. At about 2:30 P.M., after a surveillance period of 45 minutes, Deputy Groves observed an older model black Monte Carlo travelling from Davidson to Robertson County on Highway 431 South. As the deputy pulled behind the vehicle, he saw its operator adjust the rear view mirror with her right hand. The deputy followed for about two miles, noted that the defendant weaved as she looked into her rear view mirror, and then ran a radio license plate check.

When Deputy Groves learned the plates were registered in the name of Carla Coleman, he turned on his blue lights and followed the defendant into the parking lot of Debbie's Pantry. Officer Henderson arrived on the scene, explained to the defendant why she had been stopped, and asked for the defendant's consent to a search of the vehicle. The defendant consented and directed the officers to a tote bag located in the back seat of her vehicle in which the officers found six one pound packages of marijuana. While Deputy Groves testified that a second reason he had stopped the vehicle was because he suspected alcohol use by the operator, he admitted that he never questioned the defendant in that regard, conducted no field sobriety tests, and cited no traffic violations. ¹

Our determination of the reasonableness of the stop of the defendant's vehicle turns on whether Deputy Groves had an "articulable and reasonable suspicion" that the vehicle or its occupant was subject to seizure for violation of the law. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). While probable cause is not necessary for an investigative stop, it is a requirement that the officer's suspicion be supported by specific and articulable facts. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Hughes v. State, 588 S.W.2d 296, 305 (Tenn.1979); State v. Foote, 631 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tenn.Crim.App.1982).

The particular facts of this case, however, present an uncommon analysis of the investigatory stop rule. The stop was made exclusively upon the basis of information supplied by an informant and not upon the officer's own observations. In such instances, courts have generally resorted to a comparative application of the probable cause standard:

[I]t is still sensible after Gates, in trying to ascertain in informant cases "the degree of relaxation from probable cause standard by the Williams-Terry standard of reasonable cause to stop," to examine those particular factors. That is, it remains useful to ask just how differently those factors weigh in the determination when the issue concerns grounds to stop rather than grounds to arrest or search (citations omitted).

3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, Sec. 9.3(e), at 477 (1987).

In State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn.1989), our Supreme Court, on October 2, 1989, adopted the two-prong test of Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), regarding the adequacy of information necessary to support the issuance of a search warrant. Although no warrant issued in this case, we find Jacumin helpful in our analysis just as Gates provides assistance in the interpretation of the federal constitution.

In Aquilar, the United States Supreme Court held that there must be a "basis of knowledge" when the officer relies on hearsay information from a confidential informant:

[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, ... was "credible" or his information "reliable."

The search warrant in Aquilar was held invalid because nothing in the affidavit established that the affiant had personal knowledge of the matter attested to or that the affiant's source spoke from personal knowledge rather than a mere suspicion. Aquilar, 378 U.S. at 113, 84 S.Ct. at 1513.

In Spinelli, the affidavit upon which the search warrant was based did not provide the magistrate any reason to support the officer's conclusion that the informer was reliable. Nor did it contain a sufficient statement of the underlying circumstances from which the informer concluded that Spinelli was running a bookmaking operation. 393 U.S. at 416, 89 S.Ct. at 589.

In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the information supporting the issuance of the search warrant was received in an anonymous letter. There was nothing upon which the investigating officers or the magistrate who ultimately issued a search warrant could conclude that the author was reliable. Significantly, the information supplied did not indicate the basis for the writer's predictions as to the future drug transaction. Yet, because of the "totality of the circumstances," the warrant was upheld.

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution secures the "right of the people ... against unreasonable searches and seizures ... and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation." In Jacumin, our Supreme Court compared the federal constitution's language with Art. 1, Sec. 7 of the Tennessee Constitution:

[T]he people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable...