State v. Collier

• Decision Date: 18 December 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-2053,90-2053
• Citation: 581 N.E.2d 552,62 Ohio St.3d 267
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. COLLIER, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 267

62 Ohio St.3d 267

581 N.E.2d 552

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. COLLIER, Appellee.

No. 90-2053.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Sept. 25, 1991.

Decided Dec. 18, 1991.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

R.C. 2925.11, which provides that a person who knowingly obtains, possesses or uses a controlled substance is in violation of the law unless he or she obtained the controlled substance pursuant to a prescription issued by a practitioner, and the drug is in the original container in which it was dispensed to such person, is not void for vagueness.

On March 2, 1989, officers of the Hamilton Police Department obtained a search warrant for the residence of one Bonita Hemphill, located at 737 South Front Street in Hamilton, Ohio. The search warrant was based on information from a confidential source that persons at that address had engaged in an illegal drug transaction involving crack cocaine. The search warrant authorized a search of the premises and persons therein, and seizure of drugs, other contraband and "fruits" of any drug transactions.

While executing the warrant, police officer James Cifuentes observed appellee, Tonie Collier. Upon seeing the officer, appellee ran into an upstairs bedroom and was subsequently found hiding face down in a closet. Police officer Joyce Williams searched appellee at the scene and discovered six white tablets loose in her change purse. These tablets were later identified as Ritalin, which contains methylphenidate, a Schedule II controlled substance. See R.C. 3719.41. No prescription bottle or container was found on appellee. Upon questioning, appellee stated that the pills were prescribed for her fifteen-year-old son. Appellee later testified that the six Ritalin pills were not in their original prescription container because she feared being robbed, and hence left the bottle of Ritalin with her mother. Appellee's mother would bring the required daily dosage to appellee for administration of the prescription to her son.

Appellee was indicted on May 10, 1989 on two counts of drug abuse, in violation of R.C. 2925.11. The first count alleged that appellee knowingly possessed Ritalin and the second count alleged that appellee knowingly possessed cocaine, both of which are Schedule II controlled substances. The second count was dismissed prior to trial. The case proceeded to jury trial on July 5, 1989, and appellee was found guilty. Appellee was subsequently sentenced to six months of incarceration.

Upon appeal, appellee presented one assignment of error, asserting that the trial court erred when it refused to give a jury instruction regarding the reasonableness of having the pills in her possession. The court of appeals sua sponte ordered the parties to brief the issue regarding the constitutionality of R.C. 2925.11(A). The appellate court framed the question as follows: "Is R.C. 2925.11(A) void for vagueness in that the only exception set out in the statute is for controlled substances obtained pursuant to a prescription while in the original container?" (Emphasis sic.)

The court of appeals rejected appellee's original assignment of error, but held that "R.C. 2925.11 insofar as it applies to possession or use of prescription drugs not in their original containers is void for vagueness." The court of appeals reasoned that the statute does not provide fair warning as to what conduct is prohibited because an ordinary person must speculate as to exactly what conduct the legislature intended to criminalize by enacting R.C. 2925.11. Lastly, the court of appeals determined that the statute impermissibly allows great potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Hence, the appellate court reversed appellee's conviction and ordered her discharged.

This cause is before this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

John F. Holcomb, Pros. Atty., Daniel J. Gattermeyer and Daniel G. Eichel, Hamilton, for appellant.

Fred Miller, Hamilton, for appellee.

ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, Justice.

The issue presented for our review is whether R.C. 2925.11 is unconstitutionally void for vagueness. It is well established that all legislative enactments must be afforded a strong presumption of constitutionality. State v. Anderson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 566 N.E.2d 1224; State v. Klinck (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 108, 541 N.E.2d 590; State v. Tanner (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 1, 15 OBR 1, 472 N.E.2d 689. Moreover, if at all possible, statutes must be construed in conformity with the Ohio and United States Constitutions. See Tanner, supra, at 2, 15 OBR at 2, 472 N.E.2d at 690, citing R.C. 1.47. Lastly, the party asserting that a statute is unconstitutional must prove this assertion beyond a reasonable doubt in order to prevail. Anderson, supra, 57 Ohio St.3d at 171, 566 N.E.2d at 1226.

R.C. 2925.11 provides in pertinent part:

"(A) No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance.

"(B) * * * This section does not apply to any person who obtained the controlled substance pursuant to a prescription issued by a practitioner, where the drug is in the original container in which it was dispensed to such person."

Appellee contends, and the appellate court agreed, that R.C. 2925.11 is unconstitutional in that it is void for vagueness. In Anderson, supra, this court unanimously held that "[i]n order to prove such an assertion, the challenging party must show that the statute is vague 'not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. * * * ' Coates v. Cincinnati (1971), 402 U.S. 611, 614 [91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688, 29 L.Ed.2d 214, 217]. In other words, the challenger must show that upon examining the statute, an individual of ordinary intelligence would not understand what he is required to do under the law. Thus, to escape responsibility * * *, appellee must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statute was so unclear that he could not reasonably understand that it prohibited the acts in which he engaged." Anderson, supra, 57 Ohio St.3d at 171, 566 N.E.2d at 1226-1227.

A tripartite analysis must be applied when examining the void-for-vagueness doctrine. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville (1972), 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110; Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222; Kolender v. Lawson (1983), 461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903. In Tanner, supra, Justice Locher instructed that "[t]hese values are first, to provide fair warning to the ordinary citizen so behavior may comport with the dictates of the statute; second, to preclude arbitrary, capricious and generally discriminatory enforcement by officials given too much authority and too few constraints; and third, to ensure that fundamental constitutionally protected freedoms are not unreasonably impinged or inhibited. Proper constitutional analysis necessitates a review of each of these rationales with respect to the challenged statutory language." Id., 15 Ohio St.3d at 3, 15 OBR at 3, 472 N.E.2d at 691.

The first value identified above involves the following maxim: "Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that '[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.' Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 [59 S.Ct. 618, 619, 83 L.Ed. 888, 890]." (Bracketed words sic.) Papachristou, supra, 405 U.S. at 162, 92 S.Ct. at 843, 31 L.Ed.2d at 115. R.C. 2925.11 may have been inartfully drafted. Yet, "[t]o be enforceable, legislation need not be drafted with scientific precision." Anderson, supra, 57 Ohio St.3d at 174, 566 N.E.2d at 1229. Indeed, " ' * * * few words possess the precision of mathematical symbols, most statutes must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations, and the practical necessities of discharging the business of government inevitably limit the specificity with which legislators can spell out prohibitions. * * * ' " Id., quoting Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States (1952), 342 U.S. 337, 340, 72 S.Ct. 329, 330-331, 96 L.Ed. 367, 371. See, also, Grayned, supra, 408 U.S. at 110, 92 S.Ct. at 2300, 33 L.Ed.2d at 228-229. For the reasons which follow, we find that R.C. 2925.11 provides adequate notice and fair warning to persons of ordinary intelligence so that they can conform their conduct to the dictates of the statute.

R.C. 2925.11 begins with a general prohibition: "No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance." R.C. 2925.11(A). This language is clear and unambiguous. The average person reading this portion of the statute would have little doubt as to its meaning. Indeed, the conduct prohibited is set forth with notable lucidity. Likewise, the exception to the general prohibition is readily comprehensible and understandable. R.C. 2925.11(B) states that the prohibition against obtaining, possessing, or using a controlled substance "does not apply to any person who obtained the controlled substance pursuant to a prescription issued by a practitioner, where the drug is in the original container in which it was dispensed to such person." We see little room for speculation as to the meaning of this language. Nor would a person of ordinary intelligence need to guess as to its application. See Columbus v. Thompson (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 26, 54 O.O.2d 162, 266 N.E.2d 571, syllabus. The phrase "[t]his section does not apply to * * * " is sufficiently clear to put the reader on notice that what follows is an exception to the prohibited conduct set forth in paragraph (A) of R.C. 2925.11. The statute then sets forth two conditions for the exception: (1) that the controlled substance must have been prescribed by a practitioner; and (2) that the drug must be in the original container in which it was dispensed to the possessor.

When read in light of the general prohibition, the...