State v. Collier

• Decision Date: 13 December 1994
• Docket Number: Nos. WD,s. WD
• Citation: 892 S.W.2d 686
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Johnathan L. COLLIER, Appellant. Johnathan L. COLLIER, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. 47604, WD 48773.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 686

892 S.W.2d 686

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Johnathan L. COLLIER, Appellant.

Johnathan L. COLLIER, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

Nos. WD 47604, WD 48773.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

Dec. 13, 1994.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied Jan. 31, 1995.

Application to Transfer Denied March 21, 1995.

Robert G. Duncan, Kansas City, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Cheryl A. Caponegro, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before HANNA, P.J., and BRECKENRIDGE and ELLIS, JJ.

BRECKENRIDGE, Judge.

Johnathan L. Collier appeals his convictions for the class A felonies of murder in the first degree, § 565.020, RSMo Cum.Supp.1993, and armed criminal action, § 571.015, RSMo 1986. ¹ He was sentenced respectively to life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole, and to twenty-five years' imprisonment. Mr. Collier also appeals the denial of his Rule 29.15 post-conviction motion. Mr. Collier raises three points on appeal, claiming that the trial court (1) abused its discretion by overruling objections to testimony which brought out his earlier crimes and prison violations; (2) erred in denying his Rule 29.15 motion, which asserts that his defense counsel was ineffective in stipulating to his juvenile probation and in failing to object to evidence of Mr. Collier's juvenile adjudications and probation; and (3) committed prejudicial plain error in disallowing into evidence the remainder of the defendant's interview and statement to the police, after the State had elicited testimony about portions of those communications. The judgment is affirmed.

The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Mo. banc 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 997, 114 S.Ct. 562, 126 L.Ed.2d 462 (1993). In December 1990, Mr. Collier was seventeen years old and was on probation for juvenile offenses in Kansas. Several months earlier, he had become good friends with Roy Andrews, a twenty-four-year-old man who was on parole. Together, they devised a scheme that led to the crimes at issue.

Mr. Andrews was scheduled to see his parole officer, George Ranft, on December 6, 1990. Mr. Andrews told Mr. Collier that he was afraid his parole would be revoked at this meeting because he had recently lost his job and because he had been smoking marijuana. Mr. Collier was due to report to his probation officer, Candice Wagner, one day earlier than Mr. Andrews, on December 5, 1990. Mr. Collier told Mr. Andrews that he also believed he would be in trouble at his probation meeting, but did not explain why. The men then plotted how they could escape the potential repercussions of these meetings. They agreed that each one would frighten the other's parole or probation officer. The theory was that if the officers were scared badly enough, neither one would show up for work on the day of the respective meetings.

The first part of the scheme called for Mr. Andrews to hit and injure Mr. Collier's probation officer, Candice Wagner. Because Ms. Wagner was a woman, the two believed that a strike would be sufficient to frighten her and keep her from work. The second part of the agreement required Mr. Collier to shoot through George Ranft's front door with a gun. They concluded that such an attack would be enough to scare Mr. Ranft so that he too would not come to work the next day.

Despite this plan, Mr. Andrews never completed his part of the agreement, and no assault occurred on Ms. Wagner. Mr. Collier then met with Probation Officer Wagner on December 5, 1990. Contrary to his earlier fears, however, he experienced no difficulties as a result of the meeting.

After Mr. Collier's appointment with Ms. Wagner, he drove to Mr. Andrews' residence. Although Mr. Andrews had failed to hit Mr. Collier's probation officer, Mr. Collier still planned to carry out the second part of the agreement. By the time he arrived at Mr. Andrews' home, Mr. Andrews had looked up the address of his parole officer in the telephone book, where it was listed as 5419 Oxford. Unknown to the defendant and Mr. Andrews, however, Officer Ranft no longer resided at that location.

Mr. Andrews drove himself and Mr. Collier to the general area in Raytown, Missouri where he believed his probation officer lived, and then stopped at a gas station for specific directions. While Mr. Andrews got gasoline, the defendant talked to a gas station attendant, who showed him where Oxford Street was on a map.

Once they arrived at Oxford Street, Mr. Andrews stopped the car so that Mr. Collier could retrieve from the trunk a .380 caliber handgun belonging to the defendant. Mr. Collier went up to the house while Mr. Andrews waited in the car with the engine running. The defendant rang the doorbell. When one of the new residents of 5419 Oxford, Duane "Pete" Jarrett, walked towards the entrance, the defendant fired one shot through the front door. Mr. Collier's shot fatally struck Mr. Jarrett in the chest. Mr. Collier then returned to the car, in which he and Mr. Andrews fled the scene.

On the way home, Mr. Andrews stopped the car so that Mr. Collier could return the gun to the trunk. The two then stopped at another filling station so that Mr. Andrews could call his parole officer's house to determine whether police were there. He believed that if police were present, it would signify that Mr. Ranft was truly scared, in which case he would stay home from work the next day. When someone answered the telephone, however, Mr. Andrews hung up. He attended his meeting the following day, where he saw Mr. Ranft. His parole was not revoked.

The defendant and Mr. Andrews first learned of the fatality through Mr. Andrews' sister. She told them that she had seen Mr. Collier's picture on television in connection with a killing. Mr. Andrews' mother, Mary Jane Andrews, also told the defendant about his picture and asked whether he was responsible for the shooting. According to her testimony, Mr. Collier admitted that he was the one who had shot the murdered man. During his court testimony, however, Mr. Collier repeatedly denied firing the fatal shot, and instead blamed Mr. Andrews.

I.

As his first point on appeal, Mr. Collier argues that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling objections to cross-examination and to the testimony of Roy Andrews, insomuch as his testimony involved the defendant's prior crimes and prison violations. Mr. Collier maintains that this evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible, and that its resulting prejudice outweighed any probative value.

It should first be noted that Roy Andrews never testified as to prison violations. The defendant apparently confuses Mr. Andrews' testimony with that of Duane E. Page, a prisoner who was in jail at the same time as the defendant, Mr. Collier. Because, in his Point Relied On, the defendant challenges only his own cross-examination and the testimony of Mr. Andrews, we will limit our review to that portion of the record. See Rule 30.06(d)-(e); Washington v. State, 772 S.W.2d 728, 729 (Mo.App.1989).

The extent of cross-examination of an accused rests within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent the showing of a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Hoopingarner, 845 S.W.2d 89, 94 (Mo.App.1993). A defendant who testifies can be cross-examined and impeached like any other witness. Id.; State v. Ford, 623 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Mo.App.1981). In the court's discretion, specific acts of misconduct may be shown to discredit the defendant's veracity, regardless of whether those acts result in conviction. Ford, 623 S.W.2d at 575. However, a court cannot go into detail of the crimes leading to past convictions. State v. Silcox, 694 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Mo.App.1985). These limitations are in place due to the risk that a jury will believe that prior convictions and misconduct are a sign of bad character, which is probative of guilt. State v. Cleveland, 583 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Mo.App.1979).

By volunteering information regarding his good character, a defendant invites inquiry into mere arrests or investigations not resulting in conviction. State v. Parson, 815 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Mo.App.1991). In addition, when a defendant testifies that he has never been in any "trouble," he opens the door not only to prior arrests, State v. Macon, 547 S.W.2d 507, 514 (Mo.App.1977), but also to earlier acts of misconduct. State v. Withers, 347 S.W.2d 146, 150-51 (Mo.1961); State v. Whitt, 592 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Mo.App.1979).

During direct examination, Mr. Collier denied participating in prior illicit activity:

Q. After a while, did you tell the police the truth as to what happened?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you tell them?

A. I basically told them from that point on. They kept questioning me. They was scaring me to death. I never been in no trouble. I never done nothing wrong ... I'm like it's better to be scared and tell the truth than be scared and end up in some kind of trouble.

(Emphasis added).

Because Mr. Collier claimed that he had never been in any trouble and that he had never done anything wrong, the court allowed the prosecution to refute his statement by bringing in testimony of prior crimes and misconduct. In essence, it found that Mr. Collier had opened the door to further inquiry. On appeal, the defendant claims that this inquiry also brought out impermissible evidence of juvenile adjudication, thereby creating reversible error. We disagree.

The State scrutinized the defendant with respect to three types of evidence that we will review. First, it explored ownership of the murder weapon, since the defendant claimed that he never fired it and that it belonged to Mr. Andrews. Second, the State inquired into Mr. Collier's probation. And finally, it asked about his past criminal conduct, at which time the defendant admitted that he had jaywalked, stolen candy and shoplifted. We will address each category...