State v. Collins
| Decision Date | 16 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. COA15–659.,COA15–659. |
| Citation | 245 N.C.App. 478,783 S.E.2d 9 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Anfernee Maurice COLLINS. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Attorney General, Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General, Alexandra Gruber, for the State.
The Phillips Black Project, by John R. Mills, for defendant-appellant.
Anfernee Maurice Collins ("Defendant") appeals from judgments entered following his conviction of four counts of first-degree rape of a child. We vacate three of Defendant's four convictions and arrest the judgments for those three convictions for lack of jurisdiction, find no error on the fourth conviction, and remand for resentencing and rehearing on the imposition of lifetime satellite-based monitoring.
A.B. testified to four acts of sexual intercourse, which occurred between her and Defendant in 2011. On 8 April 2013, Defendant was indicted in two separate documents for four counts of first-degree rape of a child. All four charges were stated in identical language and two counts were alleged in each indictment. According to the indictments, the four offenses allegedly occurred between "January 1, 2011 and November 30, 2011." The jury convicted Defendant of all four offenses. The offenses were consolidated and Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 192 to 240 months in prison. Upon release from prison, Defendant was also ordered to be subject to satellite-based monitoring for the remainder of his natural life.
A.B. was fourteen years old when she testified at trial in 2014. She testified the first incident of sexual intercourse occurred in the spring or summer of 2011, while she was a student in the fourth grade. A.B. told the investigating officer the incident occurred
A.B.'s grandmother had dropped A.B. off at her aunt's house. When she arrived, Defendant and his mother were both in the home. A.B. fell asleep on the couch. Her aunt, Defendant's mother, left the home to go to work. When A.B. awoke, she and Defendant began talking. Defendant asked A.B. what sports she liked to play, and A.B. told Defendant she liked to play basketball at the local recreational center. Defendant told her to be careful about walking to the center alone. A.B. responded, "whatever," and walked to the refrigerator to get a drink.
Defendant told A.B. "not to talk to him like that," grabbed A.B. by the arm, and pulled her into his bedroom. Defendant pushed A.B. onto the bed and forced himself onto her despite her requests to stop. A.B. testified that Defendant held her down, pulled her pants and his pants down, and "put his private area in [her] private area." Afterward, A.B. testified Defendant stated "not to tell anybody and he was going to kill everybody [she] knew."
The second incident occurred on a day when A.B. was visiting at a friend's house. She developed a serious headache and called her grandmother. Her grandmother was unable to pick her up and told her to walk four or five houses down the street to her aunt's house. Defendant was present at the house when A.B. arrived. A.B. went into her aunt's bedroom alone to lay down and watch television. Defendant entered the bedroom about ten minutes later. A.B. tried to leave the room, but Defendant blocked her way. He held her down on the bed, pulled up her skirt, and forcibly engaged in sexual intercourse with her.
A.B. testified she was not sure exactly when the second incident occurred. The following exchange occurred during direct examination of A.B.:
The investigating officer testified A.B. told him the second incident had occurred "during the first semester of her fifth grade year."
A.B. also did not recall when in 2011 the third incident occurred. A.B. testified she was at her aunt's house and Defendant gave her a pill. She took the pill and did not remember anything until she woke up while Defendant was "having sex" with her. A.B. was "drowsy, sleepy," and Defendant was "inside her" for "a couple of minutes." After the incident, A.B. "just put [her] clothes back on and went back to sleep."
The final incident occurred "around Thanksgiving" of 2011. A.B. was alone at her aunt's house when Defendant came in the back door. He pushed her down on the couch, kissed her on the mouth, and stated he was "going to go away for a while." Defendant then pulled down A.B.'s pants and engaged in intercourse with her.
Over a year later, in November of 2012, A.B. told her stepmother she had been raped by Defendant. On the same day, A.B.'s stepmother took her to speak with a law enforcement officer. Defendant was seventeen years old when he was arrested on 21 December 2012.
Defendant's arrest warrants erroneously stated his date of birth as 14 September 1994. According to the uncontroverted evidence presented by both the State and Defendant, Defendant was born on 14 September 1995. He turned sixteen years old on 14 September 2011. Defendant would have been either fifteen or sixteen years old during the relevant time period between 1 January 2011 and 30 November 2011, when A.B. alleged all the offenses occurred, and as is alleged in both indictments.
Defense counsel moved to dismiss all charges at the close of the State's evidence "based on the fact that the State has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [Defendant] committed these various acts that he's charged with."
The following exchange occurred:
Neither party corrected the mathematical error in calculating Defendant's age as fifteen years old until he reached his sixteenth birthday on 14 September 2011. Defendant has filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR) in this Court. A copy of Defendant's birth certificate, attesting his date of birth as 14 September 1995, is attached to Defendant's MAR.
Defendant argues: (1) the State failed to meet its burden to prove the existence of subject matter jurisdiction for the first three offenses; (2) the indictments were insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction for any count, after the indictments failed to allege dates specific enough to show Defendant was at least sixteen years old at the time the alleged offenses occurred; and, (3) this case should be remanded to the trial court for a hearing on the reasonableness of lifetime satellite-based monitoring in light of Grady v. North Carolina, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1368, 191 L.Ed.2d 459 (2015).
Defendant also argues his MAR should be granted where: (1) the superior court lacked jurisdiction over the counts during which Defendant was less than sixteen years old at the time of the offenses; (2) trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to move to dismiss three of the charges at the close of the State's evidence, after the State failed to provide any substantial evidence tending to show Defendant was at least sixteen years old at the time of the offense; and, (3) trial counsel was ineffective and prejudiced Defendant for failing to request a special verdict on those three charges.
"Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed de novo on appeal."
State v. Herman, 221 N.C.App. 204, 209, 726 S.E.2d 863, 866 (2012). "Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment." In re Appeal of the Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P'ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003) (citing Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cnty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 13, 565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002) ). "A court empowered to hear a case de novo is vested with full power to determine the issues and rights of all parties involved, and to try the case as if the suit had been filed originally in that court." Caswell County v. Hanks, 120 N.C.App. 489, 491, 462 S.E.2d 841, 843 (1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendant argues the superior court was without subject matter jurisdiction on the first three offenses, because no evidence presented at trial showed Defendant was at least sixteen years old at the time those offenses were committed. We agree.
The district courts have N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1601(a) (2013) (emphasis supplied). "If, however, a juvenile commits a criminal offense on or after the juvenile's 16th birthday, the juvenile is subject to prosecution as an adult in superior court." State v. Pettigrew, 204 N.C.App. 248, 257, 693 S.E.2d 698, 704 (citing N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1604 ), appeal dismissed, 364 N.C. 439, 706 S.E.2d 467 (2010).
The Juvenile Code, contained in the North Carolina General Statutes, provides the exclusive procedure under which a juvenile may...
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...the habitual felon charge.¶ 7 We review de novo whether a trial court had subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Collins , 245 N.C. App. 478, 482–83, 783 S.E.2d 9, 13 (2016). "Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the ......
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State v. Wall
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...the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo, State v. Collins , 245 N.C. App. 478, 482–83, 783 S.E.2d 9, 13 (2016), we review the validity of an arrest warrant de novo.II. Requirements for a Valid Criminal Pleading: Legal Princip......
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