State v. Collins, No. E2004-01133-CCA-R3-CD (TN 7/29/2005)
| Decision Date | 29 July 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. E2004-01133-CCA-R3-CD.,E2004-01133-CCA-R3-CD. |
| Parties | STATE OF TENNESSEE v. THOMAS DAVID COLLINS, ALIAS. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County; No. 67229; Ray L. Jenkins, Judge.
Judgment of the Trial Court is Affirmed.
M. Christopher Coffey, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Thomas David Collins.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Seth P. Kestner, Assistant Attorney General; Randall E. Nichols, District Attorney General; Zane Scarlett, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Jerry L. Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which David G. Hayes and James Curwood Witt, Jr., JJ., joined.
The appellant, Thomas David Collins, was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter. As a result, the trial court sentenced the appellant to five (5) years as a Range I, standard offender. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the appellant claims that: (1) the jury did not properly reject the appellant's claim of self-defense; (2) the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict; (3) the trial court improperly applied several enhancement factors; and (4) the trial court improperly denied the appellant alternative sentencing. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In November of 1998, the appellant was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for second degree murder in the death of Edward James. A jury trial was held on October 27-28, 2003.
At trial, the evidence indicated that on November 5, 1998, the victim took his nine-year-old stepson, James Bomar, to basketball practice at the New Hope Recreation Center. When they arrived at the Center, the gates were locked. The victim and Mr. Bomar waited in their car at the gate for the coach to arrive. The appellant was raking leaves at his home across the street from the Center. As the victim and Mr. Bomar were waiting, the appellant walked from his yard toward the car and asked the victim why he was parked on the side of the road. The victim informed the appellant that they were waiting on the gate to the Center to be opened, in order for Mr. Bomar to attend basketball practice.
Mr. Bomar testified that, at that time, the victim asked if that was all the appellant needed. Mr. Bomar stated that the men were "talking calmly." The appellant responded, "I don't see why that's all I need to know." At that point, the victim said, "Look, don't make me get out of the car and kick your ass" in a "frustrated" tone. The victim then got out of the car, went to the trunk and retrieved a baseball bat. Mr. Bomar testified that after the victim got the bat out of the trunk, the victim pointed the bat at the appellant and told witnesses on the lawn to "come get this fool." Mr. Bomar claimed that the victim then started to lower the bat when the appellant stepped back, removed a gun from his jacket and shot the victim in the chest. Mr. Bomar heard the victim fall to the ground and moan. Mr. Bomar witnessed the events from the passenger seat of the car and had to turn around in his seat in order to see what was going on outside. He could hear most of the conversation between the appellant and the victim because there was a large hole in one of the car's windows. At that point, Mr. Bomar testified that the appellant went to his truck, got something to drink and came back to stand over the victim. Mr. Bomar claimed that the appellant "walked kind of funny . . . kinda swayed back and forth when he walked." Mr. Bomar remained in the car until other people arrived on the scene. The victim died from his wounds.
Knoxville Police Officer Robert Taylor testified that as he arrived on the scene he noticed two (2) men, one lying on his back and the other on top of him face down with his head about chin level of the other man. Officer Taylor instructed the appellant several times to remove his hands from the victim. The appellant finally complied, and Officer Taylor handcuffed the appellant and conducted a pat-down search of the appellant's person. During the search, Officer Taylor recovered a handgun in the appellant's right vest pocket. Officer Taylor commented that the appellant had a "fairly" strong odor of alcohol about his person. Officer Taylor noticed that the victim's son was still sitting in the car at the time he arrived on the scene.
Officer Roger Scott Solomon of the Knoxville Police Department also responded to the dispatch call on the night of November 5. When he arrived on the scene, he read the appellant his Miranda rights. Officer Solomon believed that the appellant was "definitely intoxicated." Officer Solomon was instructed to transport the appellant from the scene to UT Hospital for a blood test.1
Investigator Gary Jones of the Knoxville Police Department recalled that the appellant had a strong odor of alcohol about his person the night of the incident. Investigator Jones spoke with Mr. Bomar the day after the incident. Mr. Bomar told Investigator Jones that the victim actually swung the bat at the appellant and that the appellant told the victim to "stay back" twice before the appellant shot the victim.
William Shaun Collins, the nephew of the appellant, lived at the residence across from the Center with his grandmother, grandfather and uncle. On the night of November 5, Mr. Collins and his friend "Woody" got home from the mall. When they pulled into the driveway, the appellant was outside raking leaves and there was a car parked across the street. Mr. Collins took his packages into the house then came back outside. At that time, he "noticed a man get out of his car in a rage —," go back to the trunk and pull out a bat. Mr. Collins claims that the victim pointed the bat at the appellant and stated, "I'm going to open you up, motherfucker." At that point, Mr. Collins claims the victim came toward the appellant. According to Mr. Collins, the appellant told the victim to step back and stop two (2) times. Mr. Collins testified that the victim started swinging the bat at the appellant when he heard a gunshot, saw the victim stumble back across the road and fall on his own car. According to Mr. Collins, the appellant yelled for someone to call the police and started to perform CPR on the victim.
Teri Arney, a criminalistic officer with the Knoxville Police Department, testified that the bullet that killed the victim was shot from the appellant's gun. She also testified that the victim was shot from a distance of at least five (5) feet away.
Sandra K. Elkins, the Knox County Medical Examiner, testified that she performed an autopsy on the victim and was able to conclude that the victim died as a result of a gun shot wound to the chest.
At the conclusion of the two (2) day trial, the jury found the appellant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a lesser-included offense of second degree murder. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to five (5) years as a Range I, standard offender. The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the jury properly rejected the appellant's theory of self-defense; (2) whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the verdict; (3) whether the trial court properly enhanced the appellant's sentence; and (4) whether the trial court properly denied the appellant alternative sentencing.
The appellant argues on appeal that "this was a classic case of self-defense based on uncontraverted proof that [the appellant] was being attacked by an assailant armed with a baseball bat." As a result, the appellant claims that the State failed by not proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant did not act in self-defense. The State contends that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's rejection of the appellant's self-defense argument.
Tennessee defines self-defense as follows:
A person is justified in threatening or using force against another person when and to the degree the person reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force. The person must have a reasonable belief that there is an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. The danger creating the belief of imminent death or serious bodily injury must be real, or honestly believed to be real at the time, and must be founded upon reasonable grounds. There is no duty to retreat before a person threatens or uses force.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(a). Self-defense requires a reasonable belief that "force is immediately necessary to protect against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force" and that there was an "imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury" to the defendant. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(a). When a defendant relies upon a theory of self-defense, the State bears the burden of proving that the defendant did not act in self-defense. State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tenn. 2001). Further, it is well-settled that whether an individual acted in self-defense is a factual determination to be made by the jury as the sole trier of fact. State v. Ivy, 868 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). Upon our review of a jury's rejection of a claim of self-defense, "in order to prevail, the [appellant] must show that the evidence relative to justification, such as self-defense, raises, as a matter of law, a reasonable doubt as to his conduct being criminal." State v. Clifton, 880 S.W.2d 737, 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
It is obvious in this case that the jury chose to reject the appellant's claim of self-defense. The testimony concerning the events immediately prior to the appellant's attack on the victim was contradictory. The jury could have decided...
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