State v. Colton
| Decision Date | 27 December 1977 |
| Citation | 384 A.2d 343,174 Conn. 135 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Philip COLTON. |
John R. Williams, New Haven, for appellant (defendant).
William F. Gallagher, Special Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on brief, was Arnold Markle, State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before HOUSE, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and SPEZIALE, JJ.
The defendant, Philip Colton, was convicted by a jury under an information charging him, Harold Young and other persons known and unknown with the crime of conspiracy, General Statutes § 53a-48, in that they conspired to commit the crime of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111. The preliminary statement of issues in the defendant's appeal from the judgment rendered on the verdict included the court's rulings on his motions for a bill of particulars, to set aside the verdict, and to dismiss. Those claims have not been briefed and are therefore deemed abandoned. State v. Grasso, 172 Conn. 298, 300, 374 A.2d 239. The remaining issues concern three evidentiary rulings by the court and its charge to the jury.
At the defendant's trial the only agreement the state sought to prove was between the defendant and Young. The state's case rested primarily on the testimony of Young and Michael McLeese. There was evidence from which the jury could have found the following facts. On February 11, 1974, the defendant asked Young to burn down O'Connell's bar in New Haven because the competition was hurting the defendant's own bar business. Young agreed in return for the defendant's promise to pay him $500. On the night of February 13, Young enlisted the aid of McLeese. They went to the defendant's bar and discussed the job with the defendant, who advised them of the best way to start a fire. Young and McLeese left to investigate O'Connell's bar, placed a mattress against the rear of the structure and doused it with lighter fluid. After going back to the defendant's bar, they returned that night to O'Connell's. Young lit a flare. He was immediately confronted by police officers who had staked out the location, acting on information supplied by McLeese. Young subsequently pleaded guilty to criminal charges arising from the incident. At his trial the defendant denied any knowledge of or participation in the conspiracy, and sought to impeach the testimony of Young and McLeese.
The defendant first assigns as error the court's admission into evidence of a statement now claimed to be excludable as hearsay. While the jury was excused, Young's father, Harold Young, Sr., testified to a conversation with the defendant. Defense counsel objected. No grounds for the objection were specified, no exception was taken to the court's overruling of the objection, and no objection or exception was made to the court's allowance of essentially the same testimony before the jury. We have repeatedly held that rulings on evidence will not be reviewed unless there has been compliance with the procedural requirements for raising error. Practice Book § 652; State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 67, 327 A.2d 576; State v. Ferraro, 164 Conn. 103, 106, 318 A.2d 80; State v. Hawkins, 162 Conn. 514, 517, 294 A.2d 584, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 984, 93 S.Ct. 332, 34 L.Ed.2d 249. Only in the most exceptional circumstances, which are not present here, will this court consider a claim that has not been raised and decided in the trial court. See State v. Evans, supra.
The defendant next contends that in two respects his attempts to impeach the testimony of his co-conspirator Young were so severely curtailed by the court that he was denied his constitutional right of confrontation. The defendant's first claim arises from his counsel's efforts to show that Young had made prior inconsistent statements in the presence of Ronald Jones, an investigator for the public defender's office representing Young, and Louis Buonfiglio, an investigator for the defendant. Defense counsel questioned Jones at length about his conversation with Young, which, according to Jones, took place in the morning. Jones could not recall any other conversation with Young that day. Defense counsel requested permission for Jones to examine his notes on Young's statements in order to refresh his recollection. The court refused on the ground that Jones' notes, which Young had signed, were within the attorney-client privilege. Only confidential communications between attorney and client are privileged. Rienzo v. Santangelo, 160 Conn. 391, 395, 279 A.2d 565; State v. Hanna, 150 Conn. 457, 466, 191 A.2d 124; McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed.) § 91. Young could not reasonably have expected that his statements to Jones in Buonfiglio's presence would be kept confidential, since he must have known that Buonfiglio intended to reveal the content of Young's remarks to the defendant and the defendant's attorney. Therefore, Jones should have been allowed to use his notes to refresh his recollection. The defendant bears the burden of establishing that the court's error was so materially injurious as to constitute a cause for reversal. State v. L'Heureux, 166 Conn. 312, 323-24, 348 A.2d 578. Subsequent to the court's ruling, Jones testified extensively concerning his later conversation with Young. We conclude the error was harmless.
The defendant's second claim is that his attorney should have been allowed to impeach Young by asking him on cross-examination whether he had been adjudicated insane. The state's objection to this question was sustained and an exception was taken. Then a discussion took place outside the hearing of the jury where it was revealed that at one time Young had been found not guilty by reason of insanity and confined and treated for mental illness pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-47. The court and both counsel reached agreement that the question was improper, but that defense counsel could question Young about his mental condition at the present time or at the time of the conspiracy. Upon the jury's return defense counsel followed this line of inquiry.
Defense counsel's acquiescence in the court's ruling raises a serious question whether his claim of error was distinctly presented at trial as required by Practice Book § 652. We will review his claim, however, since the fundamental constitutional right of confrontation is involved...
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