State v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 15 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. 15525,15525
• Citation: 241 Conn. 650,697 A.2d 1122
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Tramlus COLVIN.

Page 1122

697 A.2d 1122

241 Conn. 650

STATE of Connecticut v. Tramlus COLVIN.

No. 15525.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 24, 1997.

Decided July 15, 1997.

Robert J. Scheinblum, Deputy Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, State's Attorney, and Carl E. Taylor, Assistant State's Attorney, for appellant (State).

Jefferson D. Jelly, West Hartford, with whom was Terence P. Sexton, East Hampton, for appellee (defendant).

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and McDONALD, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Chief Justice.

The defendant, Tramlus Colvin, was charged in a two count information with possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278 (b) ¹ and with possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a housing project in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278a (b). ² On October 8, 1994, the defendant filed a motion to suppress any and all tangible evidence seized from his automobile while it was parked on Sergeant Street in Hartford. On November 2, 1994, in an oral ruling, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress, to which the state excepted. On November 15, 1994, the charges against the defendant were dismissed, and the trial court granted the state's motion for permission to appeal from the judgment of dismissal. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's granting of the defendant's motion to suppress and the subsequent judgment of dismissal. State v. Colvin, 42 Conn.App. 537, 542, 680 A.2d 1360 (1996). We granted the state's petition for certification to consider whether the Appellate Court, under the circumstances of this case, properly concluded that the cocaine discovered in the defendant's automobile must be suppressed. State v. Colvin, 239 Conn. 922, 682 A.2d 1007 (1996). ³ We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following facts, which are recited in the Appellate Court's opinion, are relevant to the determination of the issue presented in this case. "On September 16, 1992, several [Hartford police] officers who were in the area conducting an investigation observed the defendant drive to 235 Sergeant Street and park his car. They then watched the defendant walk to 91 Atwood Street, 200 feet away from his car, and sit on a stoop. The officers observed the defendant for twenty- five minutes. During their surveillance, the officers did not witness a sale of narcotics or any act giving the appearance of a sale. At the close of their surveillance, Detectives Keith Knight and Henry Martin approached the defendant. The defendant knew them as police officers, saw their sidearms and badges, and addressed one of the officers by his first name. One of the detectives ordered the defendant to accompany them to his automobile. The defendant reluctantly complied and walked with the officers to the vehicle. While standing on the sidewalk next to the defendant's automobile, Martin looked through the window of the vehicle and observed in plain view a bag containing a white substance later determined to be a narcotic substance. The officers seized the bag and charged the defendant with possession of narcotics." State v. Colvin, supra, 42 Conn.App. at 539, 680 A.2d 1360.

On the basis of these facts, the trial court concluded that the defendant's detention, while being escorted to his automobile, was a de facto arrest. The trial court then stated: "[T]here appears to now be fruits of a poisonous tree which apparently have to be suppressed, and so the court concludes that ... those items ... are suppressed for purposes of this trial." Subsequently, on November 15, 1994, the trial court dismissed the charges against the defendant and granted the state's motion for permission to appeal.

On appeal, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to suppress and the subsequent judgment of dismissal. State v. Colvin, supra, 42 Conn.App. at 542, 680 A.2d 1360. The Appellate Court based its decision on the state's inability to prove that the discovery of the narcotics was sufficiently attenuated from the allegedly unlawful arrest to cleanse it of its taint. The attenuation doctrine, as the Appellate Court noted, contains three factors that courts use to determine whether evidence is sufficiently attenuated from the alleged illegality to cleanse it of its taint: (1) "the temporal proximity of the illegal police action and the discovery of the evidence"; (2) "the presence of intervening circumstances"; and (3) "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 541, 680 A.2d 1360; see Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-604, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-2262, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); State v. Cates, 202 Conn. 615, 621, 522 A.2d 788 (1987).

With respect to the three factors of the attenuation doctrine, the Appellate Court stated: "[A]pplication of these factors to the present case supports the conclusion that the discovery of the evidence in the defendant's vehicle was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest to be purged of the taint. First, the discovery of the evidence occurred shortly after the defendant's arrest. Second, there were no intervening circumstances between the arrest and the discovery of the contraband. Moreover, as in State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), a continuum of police action existed in that, from the time the police ordered the defendant to go to his car until the discovery of the evidence, the officers did not allow the defendant to leave. Finally, by effectuating an illegal arrest, the police officers engaged in misconduct similar to that in Brown v. Illinois, supra, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. at 2262. As in Brown, this illegal arrest had a quality of purposefulness: 'The impropriety of the arrest was obvious.... The arrest, both in design and in execution, was investigatory.' Id." State v. Colvin, supra, 42 Conn.App. at 541-42, 680 A.2d 1360.

On appeal, the state contends that "the trial court should not have suppressed the cocaine because it was not obtained by exploitation of [the defendant's] detention, but rather, by virtue of the fact that it was exposed in plain view in a car parked on a public road." ⁴ The defendant argues, in support of the trial court's suppression of the cocaine, that the evidence was derived from his illegal seizure, and, therefore, should be considered fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Additionally, he claims that the evidence is not admissible by reason of any recognized doctrine, such as: (1) independent source; see Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 183, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); (2) inevitable discovery; see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L.Ed. 2d 377 (1984); or (3) attenuation. See Brown v. Illinois, supra, 422 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. at 2261. We agree with the state that the seizure was not the result of the defendant's detention, and, therefore, conclude that the trial court incorrectly granted the defendant's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

Our standard of review of a trial court's findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is "clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record...." Practice Book § 4061; State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 645, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992); State v. Kyles, 221 Conn. 643, 660, 607 A.2d 355 (1992). "[W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision...." Pandolphe's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221, 435 A.2d 24 (1980); see also State v. Trine, 236 Conn. 216, 225, 673 A.2d 1098 (1996).

"Under the exclusionary rule, evidence must be suppressed if it is found to be the 'fruit' of prior police illegality. Wong Sun v. United States, supra, [371 U.S. at] 485 . All evidence is not, however, a 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have been discovered but for the illegal action of law enforcement officials. Id., at 487-88 ; see State v. Villafane, 171 Conn. 644, 655, 372 A.2d 82 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1106, 97 S.Ct. 1137, 51 L.Ed.2d 558 (1977), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084, 104 S.Ct. 1455, 79 L.Ed.2d 772, reh. denied, 466 U.S. 954, 104 S.Ct. 2163, 80 L.Ed.2d 547 (1984). 'Rather, the more apt question in such a case is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." ' Wong Sun v. United States, supra, at 488, 83 S.Ct. at 417, quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt (1959) p. 221." State v. Cates, 202 Conn. 615, 619-20, 522 A.2d 788 (1987). The initial determination is, therefore, whether "the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal government activity." United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1250, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980); see also State v. Miller, 29 Conn.App. 207, 216, 614 A.2d 1229 (1992), aff'd, 227 Conn. 363, 630 A.2d 1315 (1993) ("[b]ecause the seizure of the gun did not owe its origin in material part to the [illegal] Terry stop, the Terry stop cannot provide a basis for excluding the gun from evidence").

Our decision in this case is controlled by our previous decision in State v. Graham, 200 Conn. 9, 509 A.2d 493 (1986). In Graham, "two Waterford police officers went to the defendant's home and searched the premises pursuant to a 'search and seizure...