State v. Conn

• Decision Date: 05 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 89,008.,89,008.
• Parties: STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. ERIC J. CONN, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

278 Kan. 387

99 P.3d 1108

STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. ERIC J. CONN, Appellant.

No. 89,008.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Opinion filed November 5, 2004.

Janine Cox, capital appellate defender, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.

Vernon E. Buck, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and J. Marcus Goodman, county attorney, and Phill Kline, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

LUCKERT, J.:

After Eric Conn was stopped for a traffic violation, he was arrested for driving without having a proper driver's license and failing to provide proof of insurance. Conn provided the arresting officer with a name and date of birth and stated that he had a valid driver's license issued by the State of Texas. When dispatch advised there was no record of a license issued in the name Conn had provided, officers conducted a search of the automobile in an effort to locate proof of identification. Officers also found methamphetamine and various items of drug paraphernalia. After being transported to jail, Conn was given an implied consent advisory and asked to consent to a urine test. The sample tested positive for methamphetamine. Conn filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search of the car and a motion in limine to prohibit introduction of evidence regarding the urine test results. Both motions were denied by the trial court.

On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, determined the evidence should have been suppressed and reversed Conn's drug convictions. State v. Conn, No. 89,008, filed August 29, 2003. We granted the State's petition for review. Conn did not cross-petition for review of the Court of Appeals' determination of an issue related to jury instructions.

Upon review, we conclude that the search of the automobile was lawful as a warrantless search because probable cause existed to believe the crime of obstruction of official duty had occurred and exigent circumstances allowed the immediate, warrantless search of the automobile for evidence that would establish that the name initially provided by Conn was false. Therefore, we affirm the trial court and reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue. However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Conn's consent to the urinalysis was coerced. With one exception not relevant to our analysis, the parties accept these facts regarding the search set forth in the Court of Appeals majority opinion:

"Trooper Phelps of the Kansas Highway Patrol stopped a vehicle because one of its headlights was inoperable. Conn was driving; the vehicle contained one passenger. Conn told the trooper that he did not have his driver's license with him and provided expired insurance documents.

"Sitting in the patrol car, Conn gave Trooper Phelps a false name and date of birth, stating that he had a valid Texas driver's license. After the dispatcher was unable to verify Conn's information, Phelps advised Conn that he was under arrest for driving without a license and having no proof of insurance. Phelps returned to Conn's vehicle to ask the passenger for the driver's name. After the passenger responded that she only knew that the driver's first name was Brian, the trooper returned to the patrol car, handcuffed Conn, and gave him the Miranda warnings.

"After waiving his rights, Conn gave his correct name and date of birth, as well as advising the trooper that he had a Colorado driver's license. A computer check verified the information and disclosed that Conn had an outstanding felony warrant.

"Trooper Phelps asked Trooper Tucker, who had responded to Phelps' call for assistance, to look for information on Conn's identity around the driver's area in the vehicle. Tucker ordered the passenger to exit the vehicle, obtained her identification, and advised her that he was going to search for information on the driver's identity. As Tucker entered the vehicle, the passenger pushed the trooper aside and grabbed a box that was situated between the driver's and passenger's seats. As the passenger tried to throw the box into the back of the vehicle, Trooper Tucker arrested her.

"The box contained drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine residue. Trooper Tucker continued the search, locating Conn's Colorado driver's license in a wallet behind the driver's seat. The search also uncovered drugs and items that are commonly used for the manufacture and ingestion of methamphetamine."

Conn filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. The parties stipulated that the trial court could base its decision on the transcript of the preliminary hearing. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. In making oral findings after the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial judge stated: "I am convinced from the evidence that this is a search incident to arrest . . . ." Conn and the Court of Appeals focus upon this statement. However, in addition, the written journal entry contains a different reason for upholding the search which does not refer to a "search incident to arrest." The journal entry states:

"[T]he Court finds that the search of the vehicle operated by the defendant [Conn] was conducted at least in part because of the defendant's obstruction of the official duty performed by Trooper Elwood Phelps by falsely identifying himself, and that the search of the passenger's compartment of the vehicle for proof of the defendant's [identity] and driving status and which led to the discovery of illegal contraband was justified under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 15 of the Bill of Rights to the Kansas Constitution."

A jury convicted Conn of attempted manufacture of methamphetamine, possession of pseudoephedrine as a precursor to methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, felony possession of drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, obstruction of official duty, and driving without insurance. The jury acquitted Conn of driving without a driver's license. The trial court granted Conn's motion for judgment of acquittal on the charges of attempted manufacture of methamphetamine and felony possession of drug paraphernalia.

Conn was sentenced to a controlling term of 44 months' imprisonment. He timely appealed.

Did the Court of Appeals Err in Ruling That Evidence Discovered During the Search of Conn's Vehicle Should Have Been Suppressed?

When a motion to suppress evidence is filed, the State bears the burden of proving to the trial court the lawfulness of the search and seizure. State v. Boyd, 275 Kan. 271, 273, 64 P.3d 419 (2003). When the facts material to a decision of the court on a motion to suppress evidence are not in dispute, the question of whether to suppress is a question of law subject to unlimited review. State v. Rexroat, 266 Kan. 50, 53, 966 P.2d 666 (1998).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights proscribe all unreasonable searches and seizures. Searches conducted without a valid search warrant are deemed per se unreasonable unless a specifically established and well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement applies. Boyd, 275 Kan. at 273. Generally recognized exceptions include: consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause to search accompanied by exigent circumstances, of which hot pursuit is one example; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses. State v. Mendez, 275 Kan. 412, 66 P.3d 811 (2003).

In this case, the trial court, in oral findings, determined that the search was valid as a search incident to arrest and in written findings made broad statements, without reference to a search incident to arrest, regarding the search being justified because of Conn's obstruction of official duty.

Search Incident to Arrest

In Kansas, the permissible circumstances, purposes, and scope of a search incident to arrest are controlled by statute. State v. Anderson, 259 Kan. 16, 910 P.2d 180 (1996). K.S.A. 22-2501 provides:

"When a lawful arrest is effected a law enforcement officer may reasonably search the person arrested and the area within such person's immediate presence for the purpose of

"(a) Protecting the officer from attack;

"(b) Preventing the person from escaping; or

"(c) Discovering the fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of the crime."

In Anderson, this court rejected the view that case law applying the Fourth Amendment, in particular New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101 S. Ct. 2860,reh. denied453 U.S. 950 (1981), meant that a search of an automobile could automatically be conducted when an occupant was arrested, noting that K.S.A. 22-2501 "may possibly be more restrictive than prevailing case law on the Fourth Amendment would permit, but this does not alter the plain language of the statute." 259 Kan. at 22. Anderson was stopped for a traffic offense and arrested for driving on a suspended license and for an outstanding traffic warrant. The officer then searched the car for drugs. This court held that the search was purely a search incident to arrest and was improper because it was not conducted for any of the purposes listed in K.S.A. 22-2501. 259 Kan. at 24. Specifically, the court found the officer was not concerned for his personal safety, nor was he looking for evidence of the crimes for which the defendant was arrested. 259 Kan. at 19.

Similarly, the trooper in this case did not indicate any concern for safety. The trooper's testimony was that the purpose of the search was to look for Conn's identification. Under those circumstances the Court of Appeals rejected the State's argument that the search for identification could be justified as a search incident to arrest,...