State v. Rexroat, 79835

• Decision Date: 30 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 79835,79835
• Citation: 966 P.2d 666,266 Kan. 50
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. John W. REXROAT, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 666

966 P.2d 666

266 Kan. 50

STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. John W. REXROAT, Appellant.

No. 79835.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Oct. 30, 1998.

Syllabus by the Court

1. An individual may waive the requirement of a search warrant or consent to a search without a warrant, but the State has the burden to show such consent or waiver is voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly given.

2. The existence and voluntariness of a consent to search and seizure is a question of fact that the trier of fact must decide in light of the totality of the circumstances; the trial court's decision will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous.

3. An individual electing to pass through a security checkpoint upon entering a courthouse has in effect given an implied consent to the search of his or her person and to the items he or she carries into the public building.

4. The search upon entry into a courthouse or other public building must be no more intrusive than necessary to protect against the dangers sought to be avoided.

5. Members of the law enforcement community who guard courthouses and other public buildings may make an adequate determination of the contents of closed containers that could damage or harm individuals or further criminal activity.

6. We affirm the trial court and uphold reasonable searches of individuals entering courthouses where metal detectors are in place. Individuals understand the nature of and consent to reasonable searches which are not violations of the Fourth Amendment.

Thomas B. Frost, of Topeka, argued the cause, and was on the brief for appellant.

James A. Brown, Assistant District Attorney, argued the cause, Joan M. Hamilton, District Attorney, and Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General, were on the brief with him for appellee.

LARSON, Justice:

John W. Rexroat appeals his conviction for possession of methamphetamine, contending the search he was subject to should have been limited to a search for weapons and was therefore unconstitutionally exceeded in violation of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

This appeal raises the first impression issue in Kansas of the application of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to the search of an individual passing through the security checkpoint upon entry into a courthouse.

Factual Statement

On April 9, 1997, Shawnee County Sheriff's Deputy Kermit J. Crane was working at the security station in the Shawnee County Courthouse. While Deputy Crane was on duty, Rexroat entered the courthouse to meet with his probation officer. All persons entering the courthouse are required to pass through a metal detector. When Rexroat passed through the metal detector, it reacted with a tone indicating to Deputy Crane there was "the presence of something metallic on his person or in his immediate presence." Rexroat explained to the Deputy that he was "wearing steel-toed boots." Deputy Crane then utilized a hand-held metal detector "in order to check and verify that was where the metal was; down around his feet." Deputy Crane then ran the metal detector around the outside of Rexroat's clothing. Deputy Crane testified:

"I ran it across, initially, his left arm and received a tone. He just automatically pulled his sleeve up and revealed a wristwatch, so then I continued on down his body, and towards the left pocket of the sweatshirt that he was wearing, I received another tone. At that point, he put his hand into the pocket and pulled out something. I don't recall what it was; something that didn't seem metallic, but he did pull something out and put it in the tray. I checked again, and this time I again received the same tone. When I indicated that there must be something yet that was metallic, he, instead of reaching in his pocket, he just took the whole sweatshirt off and dropped it on the floor."

After Rexroat removed his sweatshirt, Deputy Crane again ran the metal detector over his body and received no indications of metal other than around Rexroat's feet. Deputy Crane then picked up the sweatshirt and ran the metal detector over it. He received a tone near the left pocket. He then squeezed the pocket and felt "a hard cylindrical object" inside the pocket and removed it. The object was a 35-millimeter film canister. Deputy Crane "popped the top on the canister and looked inside.... I felt like that I knew probably what was in that film can due to the fact that it's common to carry controlled substances in a film can." Deputy Crane discovered a baggie containing white powder inside the canister and arrested Rexroat. The contents of the canister tested positive for methamphetamine.

Rexroat moved to suppress the evidence on the ground it was obtained through an unlawful search. At the suppression hearing, the trial court questioned Rexroat as to whether he merely challenged "the reasonableness or the scope of the search" but not the officer's right to search. Rexroat's attorney responded affirmatively to the court's depiction of the issue.

The State asserted the search was "strictly and purely a consent search." In denying the motion to suppress and finding the search reasonable, the trial court stated:

"Certainly it is pretty clear that the Shawnee County Sheriff has the duty and the right to have security in the courthouse and search individuals going through, and I agree that it is a consensual process that goes on with people entering the courthouse, that they know very quickly from all the signs and rather obviously that they are subject to search.

"And also there are more than just weapons that are prohibited from the courthouse. There is mace, pepper spray, all kinds of things that are prohibited and I don't know whether the record reveals this, but I will take judicial notice of the fact since I go in and out of that everyday and I empty my pockets to go through security that several things are prohibited beyond weapons.

"So the Court finds under the circumstances given in these cases--in this case that there is nothing obtrusive or over-reaching by the officer in this matter and that the search was reasonable."

Rexroat properly preserved this issue for appeal by objecting at his bench trial to the introduction of the methamphetamine obtained from the search in question.

Standard of Review

When a motion to suppress evidence is filed, the State bears the burden of proving to the trial court the lawfulness of the search and seizure. State v. Damm, 246 Kan. 220, 222, 787 P.2d 1185 (1990) (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390-91, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 [1978] ). If the findings of the trial court on a motion to suppress evidence are based on substantial evidence, the appellate court must not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the trial court. State v. Chiles, 226 Kan. 140, 144, 595 P.2d 1130 (1979).

Substantial evidence was recently described in State v. Haskins, 262 Kan. 728, Syl. p 1, 942 P.2d 16 (1997):

"Substantial evidence is evidence which possesses both relevance and substance and which furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the issues can reasonably be resolved. Stated in another way, substantial evidence is such legal and relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as being sufficient to support a conclusion."

When the facts material to a motion to suppress evidence are not in dispute, the question of whether to suppress becomes a question of law, State v. Vandiver, 19 Kan.App.2d 786, 788, 876 P.2d 205 (1994), aff'd 257 Kan. 53, 891 P.2d 350 (1995), upon which our scope of review is unlimited. State v. Heffelman, 256 Kan. 384, 386, 886 P.2d 823 (1994).

Contentions of the parties

Rexroat makes the narrow argument that while it is reasonable to search all persons as they enter a courthouse considering the need to protect the people inside from armed individuals, it is unreasonable if the search extends beyond determining whether an individual is armed and, thus, violates the Fourth Amendment.

Rexroat also claims the search exceeded the limited scope justified by Terry when the officer opened the film canister. He further maintains the plain feel exception adopted by this court in State v. Wonders, 263 Kan. 582, 952 P.2d 1351 (1998), is not applicable because the officer could not have recognized the canister contained drugs without opening it.

The State makes numerous arguments for upholding the search. It argues that even if Terry is applicable, the canister could have contained a weapon or dangerous instrument such as a needle or razor blade, making removing and opening the canister reasonable.

The State contends the search was proper under the "plain feel" exception to the Fourth Amendment as adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), and our court in State v. Wonders.

The State further argues that because a person entering the courthouse knows he or she is subject to a weapons search, no expectation of privacy exists to shield person from such a search, relying on Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Katz held a justifiable expectation of privacy only exists if it is one that "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " The State contends that if we were to find an absolute expectation of privacy, it would effectively nullify the purpose of searching individuals for weapons or other dangerous materials prior to allowing them to enter courthouses.

Finally, the State contends the search of the canister was consensual, pointing to the trial court's holding that "it is a consensual process that goes on with people entering the courthouse, that they know very quickly from all the signs and rather obviously that they are subject to search." The State reasons that because Rexroat knew he would be searched and entered the courthouse of his own free will, he consented to the reasonable search that was...