State v. Constantine
| Decision Date | 15 March 1991 |
| Citation | 588 A.2d 294 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Kirt K. CONSTANTINE. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Charles K. Leadbetter (orally), Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for the State.
David M. Sanders (orally), Livermore Falls, for defendant.
Before ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD and COLLINS, JJ.
Kirt K. Constantine appeals his sentence in the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Brody, C.J.) following his plea of guilty to vehicular manslaughter (Class B) in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 203 (Supp.1989). The court imposed the maximum sentence, imprisonment for a term of ten years. 1 Constantine argues that the court failed to weigh properly the statutory sentencing factors in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1151 (1983 & Supp.1990), and that the sentence is unfairly disparate from sentences imposed on others convicted of the same crime. We disagree, and affirm the sentence.
On November 25, 1989, Constantine was drinking at a dance at the Lions Club in Readfield with other members of his family. Shortly after midnight, he took his parents' car without their permission (and in violation of an agreement he had signed with his parents' insurance company that he would never operate their vehicle), and drove it for about one mile on the wrong side of Route 17 with no headlights on. He struck a car operated by David A. Keene, who died on impact. An hour and a half later, Constantine's blood-alcohol level was measured at 0.25%.
The pre-sentence investigation and other material before the court at sentencing demonstrated that Constantine, who was 22 years old at the time of sentencing, had previously been convicted of two separate juvenile offenses and at least twelve separate adult offenses. At the time of sentencing he was also under indictment on charges of burglary, theft, and unauthorized use of property. He had violated conditions of probation for at least three of his prior convictions; twice, he had left Maine without notifying his probation officer. He was subject to an outstanding fugitive from justice warrant from Florida, relating to charges of aggravated assault and aggravated battery there on which he had jumped bail. He had 21 points on his motor vehicle record, and his driver's license had been under suspension since September 9, 1989, for refusing to submit to a blood-alcohol test. He had abused drugs and alcohol since about the sixth grade. He had a tenth-grade education and no job skills, and had never held a job for more than a couple of months. He was married once, but the marriage failed due to his drug and alcohol abuse; Constantine no longer sees nor supports his three-year-old son by that marriage.
The victim, David Keene, was an 18-year-old Readfield resident who was a freshman at the University of Maine. His father, a volunteer firefighter, responded to the scene of the collision and saw the body; he has suffered significant emotional trauma. Likewise, the victim's mother and younger brother have also been strongly affected. The incident caused a great deal of outrage and indignation in the area. In letters to his mother, the victim's family, and the Superior Court justice, Constantine expressed remorse for causing David Keene's death.
Constantine pleaded guilty to charges of vehicular manslaughter, operating under the influence of alcohol, operating after suspension, unauthorized use of property, and violation of terms of probation, and to a charge of operating under the influence arising from another, unrelated incident. He appeals only the ten-year maximum sentence imposed for the vehicular manslaughter count.
The propriety of a criminal sentence has "regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest." 15 M.R.S.A. § 2155 (Supp.1990). On appeal, we review a sentence impropriety claim for misapplication of principle. State v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d 778, 781 (Me.1990). 2 Constantine contends the sentencing court misapplied the statutory sentencing principles in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1151 (1983 & Supp.1990) by giving too little weight to Constantine's remorse, and the possibility of his rehabilitation, and too much weight to the goal of deterrence.
The sentencing court discussed the factors that affected the sentencing decision: the impact on Constantine and the people concerned about him, the impact on the victim and the victim's family, the general deterrent effect of the sentence, punishment or retribution, Constantine's record, and the prospects for Constantine's rehabilitation. Constantine does not dispute that the factors considered by the court are, in general, the ones that a sentencing court should take into consideration. See State v. Samson, 388 A.2d 60, 67-68 (Me.1978).
Constantine asserts, however, that the court overemphasized general deterrence to the exclusion of other factors. The record does not support this contention. The court's discussion of deterrence occupies only a total of two of the six transcript pages containing the discussion of sentencing factors, and reflects a deliberate balancing of deterrence against other considerations. The sentencing court was justified in applying the principle of deterrence vigorously, given the circumstances of Constantine's offense.
Constantine also asserts that "the utter and complete remorsefulness of Kirt Constantine was not taken into consideration." He contends that the court did not merely underemphasize, but actually refused to consider, the factors of remorse and receptivity to rehabilitation. Again, the record fails to support this argument. While the court's assessment of the significance of Constantine's remorse and the prospects for his rehabilitation may have differed from Constantine's own, clearly the court considered those factors. We may agree with Constantine in the abstract that the principle of rehabilitation is of great importance, but, on the record before it, the court had no basis to consider Constantine's prospects for rehabilitation at all promising. The court did not err in principle when it considered the principle of rehabilitation and then rejected its application on the facts before it. See Hallowell, 577 A.2d at 781-782.
Constantine's remorse, while no doubt genuine, did not of itself outweigh the other factors under consideration. Remorse is relevant not only to rehabilitation, but also to punishment or retribution. Where remorse is present, the need for retribution is accordingly less. The sentencing court properly took this factor into account in giving punishment or retribution little weight in sentencing, in view of Constantine's remorse.
The sentencing court committed no misapplication of principle in weighing the sentencing factors, in view of the serious nature of Constantine's offense, Constantine's character as demonstrated by his...
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