State v. Contreras
| Decision Date | 05 March 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 2121,2121 |
| Citation | 481 P.2d 861,107 Ariz. 68 |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. David P. CONTRERAS, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Robert R. Bean, Pinal County Atty., Florence, for appellee.
William Craig Haus, Apache Junction, for appellant.
David P. Contreras, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, was originally charged with first-degree murder, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13--451, in connection with the death of one Miguel Diaz. Defendant was tried in the Superior Court of Pinal County and convicted of involuntary manslaughter. He thereupon was sentenced to serve a term of not less than four nor more than five years in the Arizona State Prison at Florence. From the conviction and imposition of sentence defendant appeals to this Court.
The facts surrounding this case are as follows: Defendant and a friend of sorts, Pat DeLozier, set out from the defendant's apartment to Julio's Barber Shop, where both men got a haircut. There is evidence that defendant had been drinking prior to this time. The two men then drove to Maricopa to visit with DeLozier's father. During their journey to Maricopa and en route back to Eloy defendant stopped several times to purchase alcoholic beverages; the bulk of which he proceeded to consume. Upon returning to Eloy, DeLozier drove to the Underwood Apartments, the cotton-camp where defendant resided. As they drove into the camp Miguel Diaz, the victim, approached the vehicle on the driver's side and began to converse with DeLozier. During the course of this conversation defendant got out of the car and walked over to where Diaz was standing. Almost immediately a mutual fight ensued and after several minutes of exchanging blows Diaz was rendered unconscious. Defendant then walked to his apartment and passed out, leaving Diaz lying out in the street. When police arrived they found the accused lying on the ground near his cabin. He was arrested for being drunk and disorderly. Diaz, meanwhile, was taken to the Pinal County General Hospital where he died three days later as a result of injuries sustained in the fight.
Following the preliminary hearing defendant was bound over to stand trial for first-degree murder. After the state had presented its case, defense counsel made a motion that the charge of first-degree murder be removed from the consideration of the jury; whereupon the trial judge reduced the charge to second-degree murder. This decision was apparently based on the state's failure to prove the homicide was committed with premeditation and deliberation and testimony introduced at trial indicated that defendant had been drinking excessively and in all probability was extremely intoxicated at the time the fight occurred. Defendant, himself, testified that he remembered nothing at all of the fight or the circumstances leading up to the fight. He testified that he remembered only that he drive off with Pat DeLozier to get a haircut and awoke to find himself in jail. The arresting officer's testimony strongly corroborated defendant's contention that he was extremely drunk.
Defendant's theory of approach at trial was that the victim might have died from causes other than the injuries inflicted by the defendant and for this reason the jury should have been allowed to consider the additional requested verdicts of aggravated assault and simple assault. The trial judge refused to give these additional verdicts, submitting only to following:
(1) Guilty of Murder--Second Degree
(2) Guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter
(3) Guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter
(4) Not Guilty
The sole issue on appeal is whether the lower court should have allowed the jury to consider the verdicts of aggravated assault and simple assault, in addition to the four verdicts already given.
The law is well-settled that while voluntary drunkenness, at the time a crime is committed, is no defense to prosecution and conviction it may produce a state of mind in the accused
State v. Hudson, 85 Ariz. 77 at 80, 331 P.2d 1092 at 1095 (1958). See also: State v. Saunders 102 Ariz. 565, 435 P.2d 39 (1967); A.R.S. § 13--132.
The record reveals there was sufficient evidence of defendant's state of intoxication at the time of the homicide to present a question of fact for the jury as to whether defendant was capable of entertaining a malicious intent or the malice aforethought required for conviction of second-degree murder. The trial court, therefore, properly instructed the jury as to the possible verdict of manslaughter.
With regard to the additional requested verdicts of aggravated and simple assault we feel the trial judge justifiably refused to submit them to the jury. He was correct in instructing the jury only as to the various degrees of criminal homicide since the facts unequivocally show that the victim died as a direct consequence of the assault. Had there been any substantial evidence that the victim's death resulted from a cause other than defendant's assault, the trial court would have been in error in failing to give to additional verdict forms and instructions. In a homicide prosecution the...
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