State v. Conyers, 501

• Decision Date: 16 June 1966
• Docket Number: No. 501,501
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE, v. Frank Leon CONYERS.

Page 569

148 S.E.2d 569

267 N.C. 618

STATE, v. Frank Leon CONYERS.

No. 501.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 16, 1966.

Atty. Gen. T. W. Bruton and Staff Atty. Andrew A. Vanore, Jr., Raleigh, for the State.

Johnson, Gamble & Hollowell, Raleigh, for defendant appellant.

BOBBITT, Justice.

It seems appropriate to refer briefly to events in connection with defendant's arrest and prosecution which occurred prior to his indictment at November 1965 Session, to wit:

1. Defendant was arrested March 30, 1960; and on April 11, 1960, he was bound over without privilege of bond to the Wake County Superior Court.

2. At April 'A' Term 1960, Lester V. Chalmers, Jr., Esq., then solicitor, signed an accusation, drafted in the form of a bill of indictment, charging defendant with first degree burglary; and defendant and Earle R. Purser, Esq., his court-appointed counsel, signed a written waiver of bill of indictment and tendered a plea of guilty of burglary in the second degree. The tendered plea was accepted by the State. The presiding judge, His Honor (the late) W. Jack Hooks, pronounced judgment that defendant be confined in the State's Prison for the term of his natural life.

3. In 1965 defendant, then a prisoner, filed in Wake County Superior Court a petition alleging with particularity the denial of his constitutional rights.

4. At '2nd September Session 1965' of Wake County Superior Court, a post- conviction hearing under G.S. § 15--217 et seq. was held. Defendant was represented by William L. Thompson, Esq., court-appointed counsel. At the conclusion thereof, the presiding judge, the Honorable C. W. Hall, on the ground there was no bill of indictment and defendant's purported waiver of indictment was void, vacated the said plea and judgment entered at said April 'A' Term 1960 and ordered that defendant be released by the Director of Prisons to the Sheriff of Wake County to be held without bond pending other lawful proceedings in Wake County Superior Court. (Note: With reference to Judge Hall's order, see G.S. § 14--52. The State did not and does not seek a review thereof.)

Thereafter, defendant was indicted at November 1965 Session as set forth in our preliminary statement. Prior to his arraignment and trial thereon, the court having determined defendant was an indigent, appointed counsel, namely, Edward E. Hollowell, Esq., to represent defendant.

The primary question for decision is whether there was error in admitting, over defendant's timely objections, the testimony of the officers as to defendant's confessions.

Upon defendant's objection(s), the court, as required by our practice, conducted a preliminary inquiry, in the absence of the jury, to determine whether the confessions were voluntary. State v. Rogers, 233 N.C. 390, 64 S.E.2d 572, 28 A.L.R.2d 1104; State v. Barnes, 264 N.C. 517, 142 S.E.2d 344.

As stated by Higgins, J., in State v. Barnes, supra: 'In the establishment of a factual background by which to determine whether a confession meets the tests of admissibility, the trial court must make the findings of fact. When the facts so found are supported by competent evidence, they are conclusive on appellate courts, both State and Federal. (Citations) Of course, the conclusions of law to be drawn from the facts found are not binding on the reviewing courts.' This except is quoted with approval in State v. Hines, 266 N.C. 1, 11, 145 S.E.2d 363.

After such preliminary inquiry has been conducted, the approved practice requires that the judge, in the absence of the jury, make findings of fact. These findings are made to show the basis for the judge's decision as to the admissibility of the proffered testimony. State v. Walker, 266 N.C. 269, 145 S.E.2d 833.

The testimony on said preliminary inquiry, the Voir dire, to determine whether the evidence as to confession(s) should be admitted, was substantially the same as the testimony subsequently offered in the presence of the jury. The general purport thereof is indicated in our preliminary statement. Suffice to say, the testimony was in direct conflict. The officers testified defendant confessed orally and did so voluntarily. Defendant denied making an oral confession notwithstanding he was questioned persistently with reference to the alleged burglary. Too, the officers testified the writing was prepared in accordance with defendant's oral confession, was read to defendant, and that defendant...