State v. Cook

• Decision Date: 22 October 1934
• Citation: 175 A. 200,36 Del. 298
• Court: Court of General Sessions of Delaware
• Parties: STATE v. EUGENE COOK, CLIFFORD JOHNSON, STANLEY SALAMON, and W. CARTER BAKER

175 A. 200

36 Del. 298

STATE v. EUGENE COOK, CLIFFORD JOHNSON, STANLEY SALAMON, and W. CARTER BAKER

Court of General Sessions of Delaware, New Castle County

October 22, 1934

Court of General Sessions for New Castle County; Indictment for conspiracy to obstruct public justice, No. 127, September Term, 1934.

Motion to quash indictment.

The defendants were indicted for conspiracy to obstruct public justice. On motion to quash. Motion granted. Indictment ordered quashed. The reasons for the motion to quash are stated in the opinion.

The motion to quash granted.

P Warren Green, Attorney-General, and Robert H. Richards, Jr. Deputy Attorney-General, for the State.

H Eugene Savery for the defendants.

LAYTON C. J., and REINHARDT, J., sitting.

OPINION

REINHARDT, J.

The indictment contains but one count, the material part of which is as follows:

The defendants, late of Wilmington Hundred, in the County aforesaid, between the first day of April, A. D. 1933, and the first day of May, A. D. 1934, with force and arms, at Wilmington Hundred, in the County aforesaid, unlawfully did conspire, combine, confederate and agree together, and with other persons, to the Grand Jurors aforesaid unknown, to obstruct public justice by divers false and fraudulent means.

The reasons upon which the motion to quash the indictment is based are that the indictment does not sufficiently inform the defendants of the offense they are required to meet, in that there is no description in the indictment of the object of the conspiracy. The object is set forth in the indictment in the following words:

"To obstruct public justice by divers false and fraudulent means."

The defendants claim that, under this indictment, they cannot prepare their defense and, if convicted, plead the judgment in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

The rule is well settled that an indictment must set forth the offense with such certainty as to apprise the defendants of the nature of the accusation upon which they are to be tried and to constitute a bar to any subsequent proceeding for the same offense. 1 Bishop, New Crim. Proc., par. 544.

In considering how far the object or purpose of the conspiracy must be described in the indictment, the rule is that the crime intended to be accomplished by the conspiracy need not be described in the indictment with the accuracy or detail which would be essential in an indictment...