State v. Cooke, IN-05-06-1529 thru IN-05-06-1533 (Del. Super. 9/8/2006), IN-05-06-1529 thru IN-05-06-1533.
| Decision Date | 08 September 2006 |
| Docket Number | IN-05-06-2390 thru IN-05-06-2394.,IN-05-06-1529 thru IN-05-06-1533. |
| Parties | State of Dalaware v. JAMES E. COOKE, Defendant. |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
Steve P. Wood, Esquire, State Prosecutor, and Diane C. Walsh, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, for State of Delaware.
J. Brendan O'Neill, Esquire, and Kevin J. O'Connell, Esquire, of Wilmington, Delaware, attorneys for the defendant
Defendant James Cooke has been indicted for murder in the first degree (the deceased being Lindsey Bonistall), felony murder in the first degree (murder-rape of Lindsey Bonistall), rape first degree (Lindsey Bonistall), burglary first degree (Lindsey Bonistall's apartment), arson in the first degree (the apartment in which Lindsey Bonistall lived), reckless endangering first degree (relating to that apartment), burglary second degree (at the residence of Amalia Caudra), robbery second degree (Amalia Caudra), theft misdemeanor (involving Amalia Caudra), burglary second degree (the residence of Cheryl Harmon), and theft misdemeanor (involving Cheryl Harmon). While the Court's decision on Cooke's suppression motions was under advisement, he filed a motion to sever into three separate trials (1) the charges involving the death of Lindsey Bonistall, (2) the second burglary and related theft charges, and (3) the other burglary and theft charge. The State has just responded to that motion, and, obviously, the Court has not rendered a decision on that severance motion.
Cooke has filed two motions to suppress. In one, he seeks to exclude evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant for a pair of boots and a sample of his blood. The blood was subjected to DNA testing. He challenges this warrant as lacking in probable cause for the murder and the rape, among other offenses related to the murder. He also claims the affidavit of probable cause contains false and misleading statements.
His second motion relates to a residence at 9 Lincoln Drive in Newark which he shared off and on with his girlfriend. The police seized certain evidence pursuant to that warrant and seized other items not within the scope of the warrant. The State contends, however, these latter items were taken with the consent of the girlfriend. Cooke argues that this search warrant lacked probable cause, was pretextual, and that his girlfriend was coerced into giving permission to the police to take the items not related to the purpose of the search warrant.
Cooke's suppression motions are directed to the charges involving the death of Lindsey Bonistall. For reasons which will become apparent, matters involving the other charges will be discussed in this opinion. Nothing said in this opinion, however, is to be viewed as a prejudgment on Cooke's severance motion.
The Court finds that probable cause existed for the issuance of both search warrants. Further, the search warrant for the boots and his blood does not contain false and misleading statements. The Court finds that the search warrant for the residence was not pretextual and that the additional items seized were obtained through the uncoerced consent of the girlfriend. Both motions to suppress are DENIED.
A brief recitation of some facts is necessary to place in context the Court's consideration of these motions. In the early morning hours of May 1, 2005 there was a report of a fire at an apartment at 81-6 Thorn Lane in Newark, Delaware. The local fire company, Aetna Hose and Ladder, responded and put out the fire. The Newark Fire Marshall also went to the scene. A little earlier there had been a fire in a garage at 208 Murray Road in Newark. Because arson was suspected there, Det. Andrew Rubin of the Newark Police had been called at home to investigate the garage fire.
Around noon on May 1st, the Fire Marshall called Det. Rubin to come to 81-6 Thorn Lane. He had discovered some unusual writing on the wall inside the burnt apartment and wanted the detective to see it. When Det. Rubin arrived, he saw writing referring to the KKK, "more bodies are going to be turning up dead," and "we want our weed back, give us our drugs back." Det. Rubin and the Fire Marshall looked around the apartment.
The Fire Marshall believed the fire had originated in the bathroom. Det. Rubin looked into it and noted that there was a significant amount of damage. He also saw a lot of debris in the bathtub. Det. Rubin then went elsewhere in the apartment while the Fire Marshall continued looking through the debris in the bathtub. While doing so, he found what he believed was a body. He called for Det. Rubin. The two of them continued to sift through the debris. When they found what appeared to be fingers, they stopped. Det. Rubin then secured the apartment as a crime scene and summoned the evidence detection officer(s). Further examination of the tub revealed a gag on the body that had been tied. Underneath the body was a cord which police then believed also had been tied at one time.
The body was that of Lindsey Bonistall.
On June 8, 2005, when Det. Rubin sought the search warrant for Cooke's blood and for a pair of boots, the Newark Police were investigating four sets of crimes which they believed were connected, possibly through the participation of Cooke. These crimes are described here in summary fashion for clarity's sake:
March 8, 2005 — burglary at 208 Murray Road in which the burglar left a boot print.
April 26-27, 2005 — burglary at 11-2 Thorn Lane, Town Court Apartments, the home of Cheryl Harmon (hereinafter referred to as "the Harmon burglary").
April 30, 2005 — second burglary at 208 Murray Road.
April 30, 2005 — home invasion burglary at 209 West Park Place, home of Amalia Cuadra and Carolina Bianco (hereinafter referred to as "the home invasion").
April 30-May 1, 2005 — burglary, rape and homicide of Lindsey Bonistall at her apartment at 81 Thorn Lane, Town Court Apartments (hereinafter referred to as "the homicide" or "the murder scene").
As described in the affidavit for Cooke's blood and boots,1 the connection between some or all of these offenses was made initially in a call to 911. Subsequent to the call, Cooke's girlfriend and mother of three of his children, identified the caller as Cooke.
Search Warrant for Blood Sample and Boots
Cooke concedes that there are sufficient facts in the affidavit to link him to the home invasion incident on April 30th at 209 Park Place. But, he argues, there is insufficient information stated in the affidavit to link him to the murder and rape. Further, he asserts linking these two incidents does not provide probable cause for the murder. He states that his girlfriend's identification of his voice on the 911 call fails to link him to the murder. He claims that Det. Rubin's conclusory statement in the search warrant affidavit, that the caller had facts only someone present would know, lacks requisite detail. The affidavit must recite facts, he argues. Det. Rubin's statement, Cooke claims, is not a fact but an opinion. Opinions do not provide the basis for probable cause. Such an opinion is not, therefore, subject to a neutral magistrate's scrutiny.
Alternatively, Cooke argues that there are false and misleading statements in the affidavit. Even if the full affidavit were sufficient to establish probable cause in relation to the murder, if the false and/or misleading statements are removed, the remainder does not establish probable cause. This argument implicates Franks v. Delaware.2
The State's responses are that the affidavit provides sufficient probable cause to link Cooke to the murder. Further it argues that obtaining his blood for DNA testing was, therefore, lawful. It asserts there are no false or misleading statements in the affidavit. Finally, the State contends there was probable cause to seize Cooke's boots.
The Delaware Constitution provides that a search warrant may be issued only upon a showing of probable cause.3 The constitutional requirements for search warrants are codified in Sections 2306 and 2307 of Title 11 of the Delaware Code. Section 2306 provides that an application for a search warrant must "state that the complainant suspects that such persons or things are concealed in the house, place, conveyance or person designated [in the search warrant application] and shall recite the facts upon which such suspicion is founded."4 Section 2307 provides that a warrant may issue only upon a judicial determination of probable cause.5
A "four-corners" test is used to determine whether an application for a warrant demonstrates probable cause.6 Under this test, sufficient facts must appear on the face of the affidavit so that a reviewing court can glean from that document alone the factual basis for a determination that probable cause exists.7 Stated another way, the supporting affidavit must set forth sufficient or adequate facts for a neutral judicial officer to form a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that seizable property would be found in a particular place or on a particular person.8 The test for probable cause in support of a search warrant is much less rigorous than that governing the admission of evidence at trial and requires only that a probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity be established.9 Great deference must be paid by a reviewing court of a magistrate who has made a finding of probable cause to issue a search warrant.10 The affidavit must be considered as a whole, and not in an isolated, seriatim fashion.11 A common sense review of the affidavit is taken rather than a hypertechnical one.12
In Illinois v. Gates13, the United States Supreme Court reiterated the traditional "totality of the circumstances" test for the issuance of search warrants. The Gates Court ...
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