State v. Cooler

• Decision Date: 08 April 1919
• Docket Number: 10186.
• Citation: 98 S.E. 845,112 S.C. 95
• Parties: STATE v. COOLER ET AL.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

98 S.E. 845

112 S.C. 95

STATE v. COOLER ET AL.

No. 10186.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

April 8, 1919

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Jasper County; Ernest Moore, Judge.

Aleas Cooler and another were convicted of murder, and they appeal. Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered.

Cole L Blease, of Columbia, W. N. Heyward, J. P. Wise, and H. Klugh Purdy, all of Ridgeland, and J. Fraser Lyon, of Columbia, for appellants.

Geo Warren, of Hampton, and S. G. Mayfield, of Holbrook, Ariz for the State.

FRASER J.

The appellants were convicted of murder and sentenced to electrocution. There are 21 exceptions. Several of the exceptions raise the same questions, and, as they have not been separately stated, they need not be separately considered.

I. The first question in logical order refers to the stenographic report in the case. The stenographer did not take notes of the examination of jurors upon their voir dire, and this failure is a subject of appeal. The selection of the jury is a very important part of the trial. They are required to take full stenographic notes of all proceedings. The examination of jurors is an important part of the proceedings. The essential facts, however, are before the court, and this is not reversible error. The exception that raises this question cannot be sustained.

II. One of the jurors, named Papham, was sworn on his voir dire and accepted as a juror. It seems that the jury was completed at the afternoon session, but no evidence was offered until the next morning. When the court was opened, the next morning counsel for the appellant Cooler called attention of the court to the fact that this juror had expressed an opinion and examined a witness who testified that this juror had expressed the opinion that this appellant was guilty. His honor held that the juror was already accepted and it was too late to withdraw him from the jury and substitute another. At this stage of the case, the presiding judge certainly had the power to withdraw the juror, at the request of the defendant, and substitute another, and it was error not to do so.

III. The appellant raises the question of the constitutionality of the act creating the Fourteenth circuit (Act Feb. 14, 1916 [29 St. at Large, p. 688]). In so far as this case is concerned, the case of State v. McAppus, 107 S.C. 345, 92 S.E. 1053, is conclusive, and this exception is overruled.

IV. The defendant Cooler asked the presiding judge to charge the jury that it must base its findings exclusively on the evidence taken in open court. The presiding judge thought doubtless that he had included that request in his general charge. Inasmuch...