State v. Cooper

• Decision Date: 19 December 1921
• Docket Number: 10781.
• Parties: STATE v. COOPER.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

110 S.E. 152

118 S.C. 300

STATE v. COOPER.

No. 10781.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

December 19, 1921

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Marlboro County Edward McIver, Judge.

C. D Cooper was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Affirmed.

The exceptions referred to in opinion follow:

(1) It is respectfully submitted that the court committed error in not requiring the state to elect a date upon which it relied as the date of the commission of the crime so that the defendant might be advised of the time he was charged with having committed murder.

(2) In stating to the jury the reason why the witness Mrs. Chauncey was not permitted to testify, it being respectfully submitted that, the court having ruled that the defendant was incompetent in the absence of the jury, it was prejudicial error to state to the jury that the court had heard what the witness had to say, and that the court held and ruled that her testimony was not legally competent therefore the court did not submit it to the jury; it being respectfully submitted that these words carried to the jury the idea that the witness Mrs. Chauncey knew something that was detrimental to the defendant, but it was not legally competent for her to say what this damaging testimony was and left it to the jury to infer as it might see fit.

(3) It is respectfully submitted that his honor committed error in charging the jury: "I do charge you as a matter of law that a reasonable doubt is a doubt such as would influence a man of ordinary reason and prudence in the conduct of his own affairs, and I tell you that is what the law means when it speaks of reasonable doubt."

(4) It is respectfully submitted that the presiding judge committed error in charging the jury that a reasonable doubt means a "substantial doubt, such as a man of as business men of ordinary reason and prudence in the conduct of your affairs in life."

(5) It is respectfully submitted that the presiding judge committed error in charging the jury that a reasonable doubt means a "substantial doubt, such as a man of ordinary reason and prudence, in the affairs of life, would act upon in his own business."

(6) It is respectfully submitted that his honor committed error in the charging of jury: "It is proper that I should tell you that there are two kinds of evidence that the law recognizes and recognizes as of equal weight and value First, direct evidence or testimony, and that means that what the witness swears to he saw somebody else do or heard somebody else say, or knows of his own knowledge that is direct evidence. There is also another kind that is called circumstantial evidence, and which the law recognizes as just as good as direct evidence, and that is where a certain number or any number of surrounding circumstances all of which point unerringly to the guilt of the defendant and exclude any other reasonable hypothesis or theory than to the guilt of the defendant. The law says that is circumstantial evidence, and it is sufficient if it satisfies the jury sufficiently to act on. Some law-writers have said that circumstantial evidence is, in their opinion, stronger than direct evidence, and for reason that circumstances do not lie, and therefore their opinion is that you cannot connect a series of lies all of which would point unerringly to his guilt and that, therefore, it is stronger than direct evidence. I do not believe that is the fact and I do not think it is the law as established in this state, but I do say to you as law that circumstantial evidence is to be taken by the jury, independently of what their idea may be. I charge you as law that circumstantial evidence is to be taken by the jury if all of the circumstances unerringly point to the guilt of the defendant and exclude every other reasonable theory, and you are required to take that from me as a statement of the law."

(7) It is respectfully submitted that it was error for the presiding judge to say to the jury in effect that circumstantial evidence is as good as direct evidence, and in saying that circumstantial evidence is equally as strong as direct testimony, and that circumstantial evidence is to be taken by the jury as positive evidence. It is respectfully submitted that in this part of the charge the presiding judge charged upon the facts, and instructed the jury what weight to give the testimony. It is a matter entirely for the jury to pass upon. It is respectfully submitted that the question of weight to be given to the testimony, whether direct or positive, is to be determined by the jury, and it is reversible error for the presiding judge to say to the jury that one piece of evidence is as strong as another.

(8) It is respectfully submitted that his honor committed error in charging the jury: "In other words, after all the dissertations, all that is meant is that the jury must be satisfied in their minds by the...