State v. Cooper

• Decision Date: 01 December 1915
• Docket Number: 465.
• Citation: 87 S.E. 50
• Parties: 170 N.C. 719, 8 A.L.R. 1214 v. COOPER. STATE
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

87 S.E. 50

170 N.C. 719, 8 A.L.R. 1214

STATE v. COOPER.

No. 465.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

December 1, 1915

Appeal from Superior Court, Rowan County; Shaw, Judge.

Jim Cooper was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. No error.

Where insanity was interposed as a defense to murder, an instruction to convict if defendant had failed to show that he did not have mental capacity sufficient to commit the crime held not erroneous as failing to specify that the showing must be made from the evidence, in view of another instruction given.

The defendant was charged with the murder of Lucinda Price. It appears that he had a wife, who lived in Charlotte, and that he had, for some time previous to the homicide, been living in Salisbury, with the deceased. Lee Scott, a witness for the state, testified:

"I am cousin to defendant, James Cooper; saw him on the 28th day of March, this year, at Leroy Lyerly's house; Rose Smith and Lucinda Price were there. It was about 7 or 8 o'clock in the evening. Rose Smith was sitting next to the fireplace in the back room. Lucinda Price, the deceased, asked Jim Cooper why he did not go home. Jim said nothing. In about 15 minutes James Cooper left; did not say anything; was gone about 20 minutes, and came back; came in the front door with a shotgun; stepped up into the door behind me. Lucinda Price, deceased, was near the door, and was just getting up. She hollered, and Jim Cooper shot her. She tried to run from him, and was on the right side, close to the door. He shot her once. He ran out of the door and said nothing. I saw him next after he was arrested on Thursday; the killing was on Saturday. I never heard Jim Cooper and Lucinda Price talking together. I did hear him ask Lucinda, if she was going to leave, two or three weeks before the killing. She lived about two or three minutes after he shot. I saw her after she died."

Claude Hoskin, witness for the state, testified substantially to the same facts. The cross-examination of the witnesses for the state, and the testimony of the defendant's witnesses indicated that the defense was insanity, and the prisoner was allowed the benefit of this plea. The prisoner appealed from the judgment upon a verdict finding him guilty of murder in the first degree.

A. H Price and J. M. Waggoner, both of Salisbury, for appellant.

The Attorney General and T. H. Calvert, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

WALKER J. (after stating the facts as above).

The first exception was taken to the testimony of the policeman, M. N. Earnhardt, who was allowed to state what the defendant said to him after he was arrested, and when the officer asked him "what he wanted to kill the woman for." The third exception was taken to the testimony of the sheriff, as to the statement made by the defendant to him after his arrest. Statements made to an officer are not incompetent simply because the defendant was, at the time, in custody or even in jail, if they are voluntary. State v. Exum, 138 N.C. 600, 50 S.E. 283; State v. Horner, 139 N.C. 603, 52 S.E. 136, 4 Ann. Cas. 841; State v. Bohanon, 142 N.C. 695, 55 S.E. 797; State v. Connor, 142 N.C. 700, 55 S.E. 787; State v. Jones, 145 N.C. 466, 59 S.E. 353. Besides, this testimony was competent, as showing the state of the prisoner's mind, at the time of the homicide, as words, acts, and conduct are competent for this purpose, they being natural evidence.

The prisoner objected to a question asked the sheriff by the solicitor:

"From what you have seen of the defendant while in jail, state whether or not, in your opinion, he knows right from wrong."

The ground of the objection was that the inquiry, as to the defendant's mind, should be confined to the time of the killing.

"On a prosecution for murder, defended on the ground of insanity, evidence of acts, conduct, and declarations of the accused before and after, as well as at the time of the commission of the act charged, is competent, provided the inquiry does not call for evidence which is too remote." 21 Cyc. 948; 12 Cyc. 403; 1 Wharton's Cr. Ev. (10th Ed.) § 55, p. 236.

It is well settled that where the particular state of mind of a person is a relevant fact, declarations which indicate its existence are admissible and circumstantial evidence, and are considered as primary evidence, notwithstanding that the declarant is available as a witness. Within the bounds of relevancy, the declarations may precede, accompany, or follow the occurrence, of the principal act. 16 Cyc. 1180, 1181, 1182. Judge Brewer said in Mooney v. Olsen, 22 Kan. 69, 77:

"A man's words show his mental condition. It is common to prove insanity by the party's sayings as well as by his acts. One's likes and tentions, are shown by his utterances. So that it is generally true that whenever a party's state of mind is a subject of inquiry, his declarations are admissible as evidence thereof. In other words, a declaration which is sought as mere evidence of an external fact, and whose force depends upon its credit for truth, is always mere hearsay if not made upon oath, but a declaration which is sought as evidence of what the declarant thought or felt, or of his mental capacity, is of the best kind of evidence."

In the case of Waterman v. Whitney, 11 N.Y. 157, 62 Am. Dec. 71, which presents a careful analysis of this matter, Justice Selden says:

"The difference is certainly very obvious between receiving the declarations of a testator, to prove a distinct external fact, such as duress or fraud, for instance, and as evidence merely of the mental condition of the testator. In the former case, it is mere hearsay, and liable to all the objections to which the mere declarations of third persons are subject; while in the latter it is the most direct and appropriate species of evidence."

Declarations are competent not only to show insanity, but also weakness of the mental faculties. 16 Cyc. 1181. This court, by Chief Justice Smith, in McLeary v. Norment, 84 N.C. 235, 237, states the rule very clearly and the reasons underlying it. It dislikes, fears and friendships, hopes and inwas there objected that an interested witness could not testify to such declarations being excluded by C. C. P. § 343 (Code of 1883, § 590, Revisal 1905, § 1631), and the court met the objection in this way:

"The conversations offered are not to prove any fact stated or implied, but the mental condition of the plaintiff, as declarations are received to show the presence of disease in the physical system. How, except through observation of the acts and utterances of a person, can you arrive at a knowledge of his health of body or mind? As sanity is ascertained from sensible and sane acts and expressions, so may and must any conclusion of unsoundness be reached by the same means and the same evidence. The declarations are not received to show the truth of the things declared, but as evidence of a disordered intellect, of which they are the outward manifestations. Would it not be competent to show an attempt at self-destruction? And do not foolish and irrational utterances equally tend to show the loss of reason, when proceeding from the same person? In either case the conduct and the language may be feigned and insincere, but this will only require a more careful scrutiny of the evidence, and does not require its total rejection."

How better can we judge of a man's physical or mental state than by what he says or what he does? Greenleaf...