State v. Cooper

• Decision Date: 08 July 1974
• Citation: 322 A.2d 836,129 N.J.Super. 229
• Parties: The STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ross L. COOPER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 229

129 N.J.Super. 229

322 A.2d 836

The STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ross L. COOPER, Defendant-Appellant.

Superior Court of New Jersey,

Appellate Division.

Submitted June 18, 1974.

Decided July 8, 1974.

Justinian G. Connors, Jr., Lakewood, for defendant-appellant.

William F. Hyland, Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-respondent (Peter S. Hamerslag, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges CARTON, LORA and SEIDMAN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

CARTON, P.J.A.D.

Defendant was convicted in the municipal court of disregarding a traffic signal, specifically, passing a red light on Hooper Avenue in Brick Township. He was fined $10 and assessed $10 additional costs. After a trial De novo in the County Court he was again found guilty.

Defendant appeals, contending on appeal, as he did below, that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of its case--that the traffic signal was placed in accordance with the law. The statute on which he was convicted reads in pertinent part as follows The driver of every vehicle * * * shall obey the instructions of any official traffic control device applicable thereto, Placed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. * * * (N.J.S.A. 39:4--81; emphasis supplied)

Both the municipal court and the County Court took the position that the alleged invalidity of the signaling device was an affirmative defense and that the burden of establishing it rested upon the proponent. We agree.

Our courts have stated that the Motor Vehicle Act is penal, and a violation of its provisions results in a prosecution of a quasi-criminal action. State v. McCarthy, 30 N.J.Super. 6, 9, 103 A.2d 169, (App.Div. 1954); State v. Ring, 85 N.J.Super. 341, 343, 204 A.2d 716 (App.Div.1964), certif. den. 44 N.J. 407, 209 A.2d 142 (1965), cert. den. 382 U.S. 812, 86 S.Ct. 24, 15 L.Ed.2d 60 (1965). Further, the courts have said that as in all criminal prosecutions the State has the burden of proving all the essential elements of a motor vehicle violation. State v. Ring, Supra at 343, 204 A.2d 716.

The statute makes it clear that the essential elements of a violation are that (1) defendant was a driver of a vehicle; (2) he failed to obey the instruction of a control device; (3) the device in question was official, and (4) the device was placed pursuant to the applicable statutes. Absent a presumption shifting the burden of going forward, it would seem that the obligation would ordinarily rest upon the State of showing that the traffic control device in question was an official one and that it was properly placed at its location.

Whether there is such a presumption in a case involving a violation of the Motor Vehicle Act has not, until this time, come before the courts of this State. However, this court has determined that there exists such a presumption as to the official nature and proper placement of traffic control devices in civil cases. Davidson v. Fornicola, 38 N.J.Super. 365, 118 A.2d 838 (App.Div.1965), certif. den. 20 N.J. 467, 120 A.2d 275 (1956). There we said * * * (I) civil actions such objects of the common and conventional size, shape and appearance as stop signs, traffic signals and devices, safety isles, and pavement markings as may be placed in or over and on the public streets and highways shall in the absence of evidence which renders the presumption unavailable, be presumed to have been lawfully erected, placed and maintained. The presumption is, however, of a rebuttable nature. * * * We emphasize that our ruling is intended only to be applicable to the trial of civil actions. * * * (at 379, 118 A.2d at 846)

See also Weinstein v. Newark, 100 N.J.Super. 199, 208, 241 A.2d 478 (Law Div.1968).

From a standpoint of reason and common sense we think a similar presumption should apply with respect to the erection of a traffic control device and its placement.

N.J.S.A. 39:1--1 defines 'official traffic control devices' as 'all signs, signals, markings, and devices not inconsistent with this subtitle placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning, or guiding traffic.'

N.J.S.A. 39:4--202 provides:

No resolution, ordinance or regulation passed, enacted or established under authority of this article, shall be effective until submitted to and approved by the director as provided in section 39:4--8 of this Title.

In pertinent part N.J.S.A. 39:4--8 reads:

No ordinance or resolution concerning, regulating or governing traffic or traffic conditions, adopted or enacted by any board or body having jurisdiction over highways, nor any such regulation promulgated by the State Highway Commissioner, shall be of any force or effect, unless the same is approved by the director or has been approved by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or the Traffic Commissioner according to law. * * *

Our courts have often stated that governmental action is presumed valid until the contrary is demonstrated. Earl v. Winne, 14 N.J. 119, 134, 101 A.2d 535 (1953); Edelstein v. Asbury Park, 51 N.J.Super. 368, 389, 143 A.2d 860 (App.Div.1958); DeMarco v. Bergen Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 36 N.J.Super. 382, 384, 115 A.2d 635 (Law Div.1955), aff'd 21 N.J. 136, 121 A.2d 396 (1956). This presumption has been carried over into criminal cases. Thus in State v. Kuznitz, 105 N.J.Super. 33, 250 A.2d 802 (Cty.Ct.1969), the court stated that there is a presumption that law enforcement officers acted legally in executing a search warrant. Similarly, the court has said there is a presumption that jury commissioners acted within the scope and authority of their office. State v. Forer, 104 N.J.Super. 481, 250 A.2d 431 (Law Div.1969). While a presumption of this kind has not been extensively discussed in the reported decisions, its existence seems beyond dispute. See United States v. Bellmer, 404 F.2d 132, 134 (3 Cir. 1968); 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), § 2534 at 488.

Moreover, there is a well settled rule of law that there is a presumption of validity of municipal action, and the governing body did what the law required in the absence of contrary proof. Cf. Campbell v. Teaneck Tp. Committee, 101 N.J.L. 461, 465, 129 A. 757 (Sup.Ct.1925); Manning v. Paramus, 37 N.J.Super. 574, 579, 118 A.2d 60 (App.Div.1955).

In Manning the court quoted from 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed. 1950), § 22.34 at 354, as follows:

The presumption of the validity of an ordinance is fully applicable with respect to the regularity of steps and proceedings in its enactment, and accordingly substantial...