State v. Perlstein

Decision Date31 December 1985
Citation206 N.J.Super. 246,502 A.2d 81
PartiesSTATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Brenda PERLSTEIN, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Herbert F. Lawrence, P.A., for defendant-appellant (Stuart J. Bierman, on brief).

John A. Kaye, Monmouth County Prosecutor (James W. Kennedy, of counsel, Kevin M. Clark, Legal Asst., on letter brief).

Before Judges KING, SIMPSON and SCALERA.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SCALERA, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned).

This appeal follows from defendant's convictions in the municipal court and later in the Superior Court after a trial de novo. Defendant has filed a notice of appeal from her conviction for obstructing the administration of justice contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1, having a PBA sticker on her windshield contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, and refusing to display her driver's license, insurance card and motor vehicle registration in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-29. In her supporting brief, appellant limits her appeal to specific attacks based on the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1, an alleged illegal arrest under N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 and then, after baldly asserting a pointless confrontation initiated by the police officer involved, asks this court to "overturn the convictions against" her. 1

Both trials resulted in the establishment of the same basic facts surrounding the incident in question. On June 6, 1984 Officer Lizzano saw Ms. Perlstein driving down Main Street in Bradley Beach in her four-door Volvo. His attention was drawn to her car because he saw a PBA door decal on her windshield just above the inspection sticker. He and Officer Sisliano followed and when she parked her car, Officer Sisliano pulled up alongside the rear portion of the Volvo. Officer Lizzano alighted from the car, while Officer Sisliano went down the block to turn around and park on the other side of the street out of traffic. Officer Lizzano walked up to the driver's side of the Volvo, confirmed that it was a PBA decal and said, "Brenda, you're going to have to take this out of the car right away." Ms. Perlstein asked "Why?" Officer Lizzano informed her that it was a violation of state law to obstruct the windshield and the prosecutor had advised the police that the PBA should not allow them to be placed anywhere on motor vehicles. Ms. Perlstein then asked Officer Lizzano if she had to remove it "right away." When he told her it had to be removed immediately, she asked if he had a scraper. She intimated that she might have one in her office a half block away. Lizzano was going to allow her to go get the scraper. However, at that point, Ms. Perlstein became uncooperative and refused to remove it. She stated that she paid the PBA for the sticker and he had no right to tell her to remove it and that the PBA was harassing her. Lizzano then told her that if she did not remove it he was going to give her a summons. She still refused and started to rant and rave that she was being harassed for donating to the PBA.

As a result, Lizzano crossed the street to the patrol car to obtain his summons book. Then he asked Ms. Perlstein for her license and registration which she refused to tender. She continued to spew a barrage of comments at Lizzano. Lizzano told her that if she did not show her license, registration and insurance card he would issue her three more summonses. She persisted in her refusal. Then she said that she was going to see the Chief of Police to see what he had to say about this incident. With the car door open, she picked up her keys from the seat, put them in the ignition, turned on the car and put it in reverse. Lizzano was standing in the open door and knew he could be hurt if the car moved so he reached in and grabbed the keys. Thereafter, he placed her under arrest.

After arresting Ms. Perlstein, Lizzano told her to get out of the car but she refused. He asked her several times to get out of the car and finally he grabbed her left wrist and gave a "slight tug" to encourage her to move. He warned her that if she continued to refuse to move he would charge her with resisting arrest. Finally, she did get out of the car, was handcuffed and was taken to police headquarters where she was given her Miranda rights. Initially, she refused to give any arrest information but finally cooperated. After the arrest information was taken and the complaints signed, Ms. Perlstein was released. She was in police headquarters approximately 45 minutes.

Ms. Perlstein denied ever having been told prior to this incident that it was illegal to have the PBA decal on her windshield. However, Officer Hesse testified that on May 11, 1984 he investigated a minor traffic accident in which Ms. Perlstein was involved. At that time he saw the decal, advised her that it was illegal and told her to remove it as soon as possible.

Brenda Perlstein was charged with having a PBA sticker in her windshield in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, obstructing the administration of law in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 and refusing to display her driver's license, insurance card and vehicle registration in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 (three separate counts). She pled guilty to the charge of having a PBA sticker on her windshield. Ms. Perlstein also filed a complaint against Officer Richard Lizzano charging him with simple assault and harassment. At the municipal court trial she pled guilty to the charge of having the PBA sticker on her windshield in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74. She was adjudged guilty of all other charges. The counter charges against the officer were dismissed. On appeal to the Superior Court, after a trial de novo, she was adjudged to be guilty of having violated N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, 39:3-29 and 2C:29-1. With regard to the violations of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 and 39:3-29 she received fines totalling $45 plus costs of $20. For violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1, she received a fine of $150 plus costs of $15.

Appellant contends that her conviction of having violated N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 was improper because (1) it "does not apply to flight by a person refusing to submit to an arrest," (2) it "does not apply to flight by a person charged with a crime," (3) it "does not apply to people who have failed to perform a legal duty," and (4) "she did not purposefully attempt to obstruct the administration of justice." She further asserts that her conviction of N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 was invalid because "the officer did not have the authority to arrest ... for merely violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-29" and "in the alternative, it is grossly improper for policemen to arrest a citizen for a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-29." Finally, as noted, she asks this court to invalidate all the convictions (presumably including the one to which she pled guilty) because it was improper here for "a policeman to so agitate and alienate a productive and law abiding citizen to the extent that she does not want to produce her documents, but instead feels that it is necessary to see the officer's superiors to register a complaint."

We feel it difficult to restrain from comment about the unprofessionalism of projecting such complex contentions without any attempt to support their validity by citations to authoritative sources or by utilization of the principle of stare decisis. Nonetheless, we will briefly address each contention as best we can comprehend it.

Appellate review of a judge's decision in a non-jury case is limited in its scope. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161, 199 A.2d 809 (1964). The appellate tribunal needs to inquire "... whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record." Id. at 162, 199 A.2d 809. In pursuing this inquiry, deference should be given to those findings of the trial judge that arise from his opportunity to hear and see witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case. Id. at 161, 199 A.2d 809. A review de novo should occur only when the appellate court "... is thoroughly satisfied that the finding is clearly a mistaken one and so plainly unwarranted that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction." Id. at 162, 199 A.2d 809.

In this case, both judges below found that defendant was guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1. This statute states:

A person commits a disorderly persons offense if he purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully performing an official function by means of intimidation, force, violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by means of any independently unlawful act. This section does not apply to flight by a person charged with crime, refusal to submit to arrest, failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other means of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative interference with governmental functions.

This statute is designed to prohibit a broad range of behavior directed at impeding or defeating the lawful operation of government. Final Report of New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission, Vol. II: Commentary, 1971 at 280. (hereinafter, "Commentary" ). It is a supplementary provision which contains limitations to avoid its utilization where other sections would be appropriate. Ibid. As a result, its use is limited to situations where there is violent or physical interference or where other acts occur which are unlawful independently of the purpose to obstruct government. State v. Kent, 173 N.J.Super. 215, 222, 418 A.2d 1322 (App.Div.1980); Commentary at 280. Consequently, the question becomes whether appellant obstructed, impaired or perverted the performance of Officer Lizzano's duties by physical interference or by engaging in an unlawful act.

Under statutory provision, municipal police are empowered to enforce the motor vehicle laws. N.J.S.A. 39:5-1. A driver of a motor vehicle...

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7 cases
  • Trafton v. City of Woodbury
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • June 29, 2011
    ...being told to leave by a law enforcement officer, was sufficient action as to constitute obstruction), State v. Perlstein, 206 N.J.Super. 246, 502 A.2d 81, 86 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1985) (concluding that an individual's refusal to produce her driver's license and car registration constitute......
  • State v. Doss
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • February 19, 1992
    ...of one. He had not refused to submit to an arrest; he was seeking to evade a stop short of an arrest. See State v. Perlstein, 206 N.J.Super. 246, 502 A.2d 81 (App.Div.1985), where this court held that a driver who refused to show her driving credentials to a policeman and who moved her car ......
  • Murphy v. Palmer
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • May 31, 2017
    ...justice" because he did not produce his identification when asked repeatedly by the police officer); see also State v. Perlstein, 206 N.J. Super. 246, 253 (App. Div. 1985) (concluding that a person's refusal to produce his driver's license constituted obstruction of justice). In the instant......
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    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • October 15, 2019
    ...requested so to do by a police officer . . . while in the performance of the duties of his office"); see also State v. Perlstein, 206 N.J. Super. 246, 252-53 (App. Div. 1985) (explaining that a vehicle operator's purposeful failure to provide identification constitutes an "independent[] unl......
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