State v. Corbett, 8710.
| Decision Date | 25 May 1894 |
| Docket Number | No. 8710.,8710. |
| Citation | 57 Minn. 345 |
| Parties | STATE OF MINNESOTA <I>vs.</I> C. E. CORBETT. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
On October 18, 1893, the grand jury of Ramsey County brought into court an indictment against C. E. Corbett accusing him of the crime of selling a railroad ticket without a certificate or license authorizing him to engage in the sale of transportation tickets of common carriers. The offense was alleged to have been committed on October 13, 1893, at St. Paul in said county by wrongfully, unlawfully and knowingly selling and delivering to Abner L. Dalrymple for $2.50 a ticket on the St. Paul and Northern Pacific railroad from St. Paul to Little Falls contrary to Laws 1893, ch. 66. Corbett appeared in court and demurred to the indictment and specified as ground of objection that the facts stated did not constitute a public offense. The court, John W. Willis, J., on January 29, 1894, made an order sustaining the demurrer and discharging the accused on the ground that the statute is unconstitutional and void; because, first, it confers special privileges on a favored class, to-wit, on persons named by railroad companies giving them the privilege of selling railroad tickets, and is therefore special or class legislation; second, it discriminates against tickets bought within the state as compared with those bought outside the state; third, it operates to take property without due process of law, and destroys the value and salable quality of the property of the owner.
The defendant having consented, the judge deeming the question important and doubtful, reported the case and certified it to this court under 1878 G. S. ch. 117, § 11. Meantime, all proceedings in the District Court were stayed.
H. W. Childs, Atty. Genl., Pierce Butler, County Attorney, and Chas. W. Bunn, for the state.
Horton & Denegre, for the accused.
The defendant was indicted for selling on October 13, 1893, a railroad ticket of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company from St. Paul to Little Falls, in this state, contrary to the provisions of Laws 1893, ch. 66, § 2, entitled "An act to regulate the sale and redemption of transportation tickets of common carriers and to provide punishment for the violation of the same," approved April 19, 1893. The trial court, having sustained a demurrer to the indictment, has certified the case to this court, pursuant to 1878 G. S. ch. 117, § 11.
We think the statute contemplates that the report and certificate of the trial judge should indicate the particular questions of law which he deems so important and doubtful as to require the decision of this court. In the present case the "memorandum" of the judge, which is incorporated in his report, is the only thing which points out the questions of law upon which he desires our opinion, and it is apparent from this that the only question which he considered or passed upon in sustaining the demurrer was the constitutionality of the statute under which the indictment was found. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves to the consideration of the objections raised to the validity of that statute. These objections may be all summed up as follows:
(1) It is "class" legislation, in that it gives to persons named by the carriers the exclusive privilege of conducting the business of dealing in transportation tickets.
(2) It delegates to the carriers the police power of licensing persons to conduct the business of dealing in such tickets.
(3) It deprives the citizen of his property in such tickets without due process of law.
(4) It is an unlawful interference with interstate commerce.
(5) It discriminates between incorporated and nonincorporated carriers of passengers, because section 7 imposes a penalty on the former, and not on the latter, for refusing to redeem unused tickets.
Before examining the provisions of the act, or entering upon the consideration of these objections, it may be well to refer briefly to a few elementary principles applicable to such cases.
That the transportation of passengers by common carriers is a proper subject of police regulation by the state is unquestioned; and, if a business itself is the subject of police regulation, then so are all its incidents and accessories. That the matter of the issue and transfer of tickets, as evidences of the contracts of the carriers, is an incident and accessory of the business, needs no argument.
And, where a business is a proper subject of the police power, the legislature may, in the exercise of that power, adopt any measures, not in conflict with some provision of the constitution, that it sees fit, provided, only, they are such as have some relation to, and some tendency to accomplish, the desired end; and, if the measures adopted have such relation or tendency, the courts will never assume to determine whether they are wise, or the best that might have been adopted. State v. Donaldson, 41 Minn. 74, (42 N. W. 781;) Rippe v. Becker, 56 Minn. 100, (57 N. W. 331.)
Furthermore, courts are not at liberty to declare a statute unconstitutional because, in their opinion, it is opposed to the fundamental principles of republican government, unless those principles are placed beyond legislative encroachment by the constitution; or because it is opposed to a spirit supposed to pervade the constitution, but not expressed in words, or because it is thought to be unjust or oppressive, or to violate some natural, social, or political rights of the citizen, unless it can be shown that such injustice is prohibited or such rights are protected by the constitution.
Except where the constitution has imposed limitations upon the legislative power, it must be considered as practically absolute; and to warrant the judiciary in declaring a statute invalid they must be able to point out some constitutional limitation which the act clearly transcends.
With these elementary propositions in mind, we proceed to consider the evils, or supposed evils, which the legislature designed to remedy, and the measures which they have adopted to accomplish that end. It was commonly asserted and believed (to what extent correctly is not important) that spurious and stolen tickets, and tickets which had expired by limitation, or that were not transferable, were often put on the market to such an extent as to work great frauds upon both the public and the carriers; that frequently those selling such tickets were irresponsible, so that the party defrauded had no redress; that the business of trafficking in such tickets often furnished an inducement to railway employés to steal tickets, or issue spurious ones, and put them on the market. It was also commonly believed that, in order to evade statutes designed to secure uniformity of rates and to prevent discriminations, some carriers of passengers were in the habit of placing large blocks of their tickets with "scalpers," ostensibly not their agents, for sale at cut rates. To remedy these and similar abuses, real or supposed, this statute was passed. That all its provisions have some relation to, and tendency to accomplish, this end, is quite clear. Do they transcend any constitutional limitation upon legislative power?
It seems to us that most of the objections to the act — certainly the first two — are based upon a radical misconception of its provisions, and of the character of transportation tickets as property.
Counsel for the defendant seems to assume — First, that such tickets are vendible chattel property, which are the legitimate subject of barter and sale, the same as any other chattels, and, Second, that this statute is designed to be a "license law," in the ordinary sense of that term. With these two premises assumed, the task of successfully assailing the validity of the act is a very easy one.
While a "railroad ticket" is, in one sense, "property," yet it is not merchandise or a chattel. It is merely the...
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