State v. Corbin

• Decision Date: 03 October 2000
• Citation: 2000 ME 167,759 A.2d 727
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Robert J. CORBIN.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

759 A.2d 727

2000 ME 167

STATE of Maine v. Robert J. CORBIN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted on Briefs: September 14, 2000.

Decided: October 3, 2000.

Andrew Ketterer, Atty. Gen., Leanne Robbin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for the State.

Richard C. Cleary, Cleary & Gordon, Houlton, for the Defendant.

Panel: WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.

RUDMAN, J.

[¶ 1] Robert J. Corbin appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Aroostook County, Pierson, J.) following a jury verdict of guilty on two counts of theft by unauthorized taking, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 353 (1983) (Class B),¹ and on two counts of tax evasion, 36 M.R.S.A. § 5330 (1990) (Class C).² Corbin contends, inter alia, (1) that the Superior Court erred by admitting a summary chart into evidence and then permitting the jury to take that chart into the jury room during its deliberations; and (2) that the jury instructions were in error. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

I.

[¶ 2] Robert J. Corbin worked for Maine School Administrative District No. 24 (SAD 24) as its bookkeeper and business manager from December 1987 to February 1996. In this capacity, Corbin controlled all of SAD 24's funds and kept its financial books; his duties included issuing checks on behalf of SAD 24. Wayne Mowatt, as the superintendent of SAD 24, initially supervised Corbin. When Mowatt left to become State Commissioner of Education, Clayton Belanger became the superintendent. Belanger discovered certain irregularities in the books and records of SAD 24 which prompted an investigation by the District's Board of Directors and the Attorney General's Office.

[¶ 3] Corbin was indicted on two counts of theft and two counts of tax evasion. Four months later, the State filed an information with Corbin's consent that increased the value of property alleged to have been stolen. After a six-day trial, the jury found Corbin guilty on all counts. Following sentencing, Corbin timely appealed.³

II.

[¶ 4] Corbin asserts that the trial court improperly admitted a summary chart which is an enlargement of a list of several checks purportedly used by Corbin to embezzle funds from SAD 24. Since some of the checks on the chart were not involved in the charged offenses, Corbin argues that those checks should have been omitted from the chart pursuant to M.R. Evid. 404(b). Further, Corbin contends that the chart prejudiced the jury by being allowed into the jury room.

[¶ 5] We review "the trial court's evidentiary rulings for clear error and an abuse of discretion." Kay v. Hanover Ins. Co., 677 A.2d 556, 558 (Me.1996) (citation omitted). The trial court admitted the summary chart, which included checks not in the current charges, as evidence which demonstrated Corbin's motive and intent. Motive and intent are two of the permissible reasons to admit evidence under Rule 404(b). State v. Jordan, 1997 ME 101, ¶ 6, 694 A.2d 929, 931. Both parties used the chart during their presentations and all of the checks listed on the chart were admitted by stipulation. Admitting the chart of questionable checks payable to Corbin was well within the discretion of the court.

[¶ 6] Whether an admitted piece of evidence accompanies the jury into the jury room during its deliberations is a matter within the trial court's discretion. State v. Preston, 581 A.2d 404, 408 (Me. 1990); State v. Fenderson, 449 A.2d 381, 384 (Me.1982). We review such determinations to see if the trial court exceeded the bounds of its discretion. Fenderson, 449 A.2d at 384.

[¶ 7] The chart did not contain any commentary on the checks admitted into evidence. Nor did the chart bear the mark of a State exhibit. The chart simply enlarged the list of checks that both parties' counsel repeatedly referenced. In such a circumstance, it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to allow the jury to take the chart into deliberations with them. See id.

III.

[¶ 8] Jury instructions are reviewed as a whole "to ensure that they informed the jury correctly and fairly in all necessary respects of the governing law." State v. Day, 1999 ME 29, ¶ 8, 724 A.2d 1245, 1247 (citation omitted). An erroneous instruction is one that "creates the possibility of jury confusion and a verdict based on impermissible criteria." Id. (quoting State v. Rivers, 634 A.2d 1261, 1263 (Me.1993)).

[¶ 9] Corbin asserts that when the trial court in its jury charge referenced the summary chart, the court violated 14 M.R.S.A. § 1105 (1980) by summarizing evidence in a way partial to the State.⁴

[¶ 10] We have previously held that section 1105 "serves the salutary purpose of ensuring judicial impartiality and authorizes granting of a new trial upon evidence of its violation." State v. Colomy, 407 A.2d 1115, 1119 (Me.1979) (citation omitted). Corbin objects specifically to the trial court's use of the summary chart as an illustrative aid in its instructions. The court sought to clarify the questionable checks involved in the pending criminal charges and used the chart to point out to the jury the precise checks involved. The trial transcript reveals that the court simply read the numbers of the checks involved in the instant case and stated to which charge each check pertained. The court did this while apparently pointing out the individual checks as pictured on the chart. As we noted in paragraph 5 above, all the checks listed on the chart had been admitted into evidence by stipulation of the parties and both parties had regularly referred to the chart during trial. Therefore, as in State v. Waldron, 642 A.2d 148 (Me.1994), this innocuous use of a properly admitted demonstrative chart to further the jury's understanding of the evidence, especially where there had been many different checks presented over the course of the trial, does not violate section 1105. See id. at 150; Colomy, 407 A.2d at 1119.

[¶ 11] Corbin also challenges the trial court's references to his "prior bad acts" during its jury instructions. Although trial counsel did not object to the use of the term, Corbin asserts that the references, on several occasions, to his "prior bad acts" in the jury charge prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury, and, therefore, violates section 1105. We review for obvious error.

The trial court instructed the jury:

First of all, with regard to the checks that are marked in green [on the chart] and which are not charged in the indictment but have been brought to your attention by the State's attorney, the State's attorney has alleged and argued to you that these other checks although not charged in the indictment are examples of the defendant's prior bad acts. And I would instruct you that evidence regarding alleged prior bad acts or prior checks written by the defendant may be considered only in determining whether the defendant had a motive or intent with respect to the incident or indictment at issue in this trial. The evidence must not be considered by you as tending to show because a defendant may have committed other bad acts on prior occasions, he may have committed similar acts that are at issue here.

In other words, the checks marked in green may be considered by you only and may be used only in your deliberations as evidence or proof of motive of the defendant, the defendant's intent, his opportunity, of a defendant's plan, or preparation, or knowledge about the checks.

The trial court went to great lengths in its charge to stress that the prior bad acts were merely alleged by the State and had not yet been proven. Further, the court repeatedly cautioned the jury not to consider possible prior bad act evidence as it related to Corbin's propensity to commit the crime. Considering...