State v. Corcoran
| Decision Date | 26 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2020-121-C.A, W3/18-464A |
| Citation | 274 A.3d 808 |
| Parties | STATE v. Joseph CORCORAN. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Mariana E. Ormonde, Department of Attorney General, for State.
Nicholas J. Parrillo, Esq., for Defendant.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
This case came before the Supreme Court on April 5, 2022, on appeal by the State of Rhode Island, seeking review of a Superior Court order granting a motion to suppress all statements made to police by the defendant, Joseph Corcoran. The state argues that the trial justice erred in finding that the defendant was in custody at the scene of an automobile collision and, therefore, erroneously suppressed the statements that the defendant made to the officers at the time. Additionally, the state avers that the rights the police officer read to the defendant at the time of his arrest and at the police station were sufficient to apprise the defendant of his constitutional rights—an issue the trial justice did not reach. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.
During the evening of October 23, 2018, Westerly police officer Travis Nichols arrived at the scene of an accident on Route 78 eastbound in Westerly, Rhode Island, where he learned from a witness that defendant's vehicle had struck a light pole on the side of the ramp approaching Route 78. According to the witness, after observing the collision, he checked on defendant and noticed that he smelled of alcohol; the witness shared this information with Officer Nichols and also identified defendant, who was standing outside of the driver's-side door of his vehicle, as the driver of the vehicle that struck the light pole. After speaking with the witness, Officer Nichols approached defendant and observed damage to the passenger-side front bumper, hood, and roof of defendant's vehicle, and that the vehicle's airbags had deployed. The light pole was on the ground. Although defendant did not appear injured and told the officer that he was uninjured, the fact that the airbags deployed prompted Officer Nichols to request an ambulance.1
While speaking with defendant, Officer Nichols noted the tell-tale signs of intoxication. The defendant's eyes were bloodshot and watery; his speech was slurred; and his breath smelled of alcohol. At that point, Officer Nichols asked defendant "if he had consumed any alcoholic beverages[,]" to which defendant replied, "[N]o." Officer Nichols then requested that defendant move to the front of his vehicle, away from the driver's-side door. Before conducting three field sobriety tests, Officer Nichols testified, he informed defendant that he had "suspicions that [defendant] had been drinking, even though he first said that he hadn't," and he proceeded to "ask[ ] [defendant] again if he had been drinking." The defendant then admitted that he had been drinking and that he had consumed "two beers." A "backup" police officer, Officer Toscano, arrived at the scene; and, while Officer Nichols conducted field sobriety tests, which indicated that defendant was impaired, an ambulance arrived and parked approximately ten feet in front of defendant's vehicle on Route 78.
The emergency medical technicians approached defendant, who remained near Officer Nichols. At that point, Officer Toscano approached Officer Nichols to report that, after the collision, the witness saw defendant toss something into the woods bordering the side of the road. Officer Nichols then asked defendant if he had thrown anything into the woods, to which defendant responded in the negative. Officer Toscano inspected the area and retrieved a paper bag containing three empty forty-two-ounce bottles of high-alcohol-content beer.2 When Officer Nichols again asked defendant if he had thrown the bag into the woods, defendant responded, "[Y]es." At that point, Officer Nichols testified, "while Patrolman Toscano stood by with the suspect ," he retrieved a preliminary breath test from his patrol vehicle and asked defendant to take the test. (Emphasis added.) The defendant agreed to submit to the test, which registered at a level of 0.201. He was placed under arrest "for suspicion of DUI."
After he arrested defendant and placed him in the police cruiser, Officer Nichols read defendant a "Rights For Use At Scene" card, which provided:
Upon arriving at the Westerly police station, Officer Nichols read defendant the "Rights For Use At Station/Hospital" form, which provided, in pertinent part, that:
After defendant was allowed a confidential phone call, Officer Nichols filled out an "Influence Report Form" while asking defendant a series of questions and recording his answers. The defendant admitted that he had been operating a vehicle, that he had drunk two forty-ounce bottles of beer, and that he was under the influence of alcohol. The defendant also agreed to take additional chemical tests. The foregoing events led to defendant being charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.
The defendant filed a motion to suppress his roadside admissions that he had been drinking, as to the amount of alcohol he had consumed, and that he tossed the empty beer bottles into the woods (the on-the-scene statements), on the basis that those statements were the product of a custodial interrogation without being advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The defendant also sought to suppress the statements that were made and recorded in the Influence Report Form at the police station (the recorded statements), on the basis that the rights cards that Officer Nichols read to him did not fully and adequately inform him of his right to have an attorney present during questioning or of his right to exercise this or other Miranda rights at any point during the interrogation.
Following an evidentiary hearing, at which Officer Nichols testified and documents were admitted, the trial justice found that defendant was in custody at the time he made the challenged admissions because "no reasonable person would feel as though he was free to leave the scene" after defendant was relocated to the roadside for further investigation and the officer expressed his disbelief about defendant's statement that he had not been drinking. As a result, the trial justice suppressed the on-the-scene statements as products of a custodial interrogation in the absence of the requisite Miranda warnings. The trial justice also found that "any further statements uttered, or written, by [defendant] during this continued custodial interrogation, [were] inadmissible as fruits of the poisoned tree." Consequently, the trial justice granted defendant's motion to suppress all statements made to the police on the night of his arrest. An order entered, and the state filed a timely appeal.
"It is well settled that this Court ‘will reverse a trial justice's findings on a motion to suppress only if (1) his or her findings concerning the challenged statements reveal clear error, and (2) our independent review of the conclusions drawn from the historical facts establishes that the defendant's federal constitutional rights were denied.’ " State v. Grayhurst , 852 A.2d 491, 513 (R.I. 2004) (quoting State v. Garcia , 743 A.2d 1038, 1044 (R.I. 2000) ). "With respect to questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact involving constitutional issues, however, this Court engages in a de novo review[.]" State v. Jimenez , 33 A.3d 724, 732 (R.I. 2011) (quoting State v. Linde , 876 A.2d 1115, 1124 (R.I. 2005) ); see State v. Parra , 941 A.2d 799, 803 (R.I. 2007) ().
The state contends that the trial justice clearly erred in finding that "defendant's freedom of movement was * * * curtailed in such a way prior to his actual arrest so as to constitute custody" and erred in considering the officer's suspicion of defendant's intoxication as a factor in determining whether defendant was in custody.
"Both the United States and the Rhode Island Constitutions forbid the use of a defendant's involuntary confession." State v. Monteiro , 924 A.2d 784, 790 (R.I. 2007). "The Fifth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] provides: ‘No person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]’ " Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 428, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ). "In accordance with the crucially important holding in Miranda [,] * * * before a confession can be used at trial, the state must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his or her right against self-incrimination[.]" Monteiro , 924 A.2d at 790.
To safeguard this right, "prior to custodial interrogation a suspect...
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