State v. Corrales
| Decision Date | 22 April 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 1313,1313 |
| Citation | 391 P.2d 563,95 Ariz. 401 |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. John Ortega CORRALES, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Robert W. Pickrell, Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Norman E. Green, County Atty. of Pima County, Carl Waag, Deputy County Atty., Tucson, for appellee.
Martin H. Schulman, Tucson, for appellant.
John Ortega Corrales was charged with and convicted of the crime of robbery. This appeal resulted.
The facts are as follows: Shortly before midnight on August 27, 1961, a robbery occurred at the El Sudan Bar in Tucson. A short while later, a police officer stopped Corrales to check him out as a possible suspect in the armed robbery. Corrales at the time was driving a blue and white automobile.
At the trial, the State called three witnesses who were present at the time of the robbery: Lee H. Wood, bartender; Mary Wilson, barmaid; and Arleigh F. Waite, customer. The bartender testified that two armed men with handkerchiefs over their faces entered the bar. The bartender was forced to lie down on the floor while the men emptied the cash register and took his wallet. He testified that he did not get a good look at them because of the handker-chiefs. He also testified that about ten minutes before the robbery a two-tone automobile drove close to the front door. But he did not hear a car start up after the robbers left and he was not sure of the model of car that drove up to the door.
The testimony of the barmaid was substantially similar to that of the bartender. Although she was unable to see the faces of the two robbers, she did identify the appellant on the basis of height, weight, and Mexican or Spanish appearance. She was unable to pick the appellant out of the first lineup, but did pick him out of the second. Part of her identification was that both the robber and the appellant needed a haircut.
The customer testified that he was forced to lie on the floor, face down. When a detective showed him several pictures of suspects, he did not make a positive identification of the defendant from the photographs. He was never asked to pick out the appellant from a lineup. On re-direct examination, the customer testified that the appellant looked like one of the robbers, but he did not make a positive identification.
Appellant now contends that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to give an instruction on the legal requirements for identification. The instruction requested by appellant and the refusal of which is assigned as error reads as follows:
The trial court's refusal to give the instruction was not error.
When examining instructions for error on appeal, this Court will consider the instructions as a whole. State v. Evans, 88 Ariz. 364, 356 P.2d 1106 (1960). In addition to the 'identification' instruction which was refused, the trial judge gave the jury the following instructions:
'You are instructed before you can find the defendant guilty of the offense charged all material allegations alleged in the information must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
'The defendant is presumed to be innocent of the crime charged until his guilt is established by legal and competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
'The defendant in a criminal case is never required to prove his innocence; the burden is upon the prosecution to prove the defendant guilty of the crime with which he is charged and to prove every element necessary to constitute the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the jury cannot say after a careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case that the guilt of the defendant has been thereby established beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your sworn duty to acquit the defendant.'
* * *
* * *
The requested instruction on 'identification' would not have added anything to these general instructions given the jury. The trial court's references to the presumption of innocence, the necessity of proving 'all material allegations,' and the credit to be given witnesses would certainly have meaning for the jury as applied to the testimony of the 'identity' witnesses. The weight to be given the testimony of such witnesses is a matter for the determination of the jury or court trying the case. See State v. Dutton, 83 Ariz. 193, 318 P.2d 667 (1957).
Appellant also claims the trial court committed fundamental error by permitting cross-examination of the appellant as to a prior felony conviction. The record...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Goodyear
...five, contends that the court erred in permitting questions in regard to former convictions of the defendant Goodyear. In State v. Corrales, 95 Ariz. 401, 391 P.2d 563, we 'The general rule is that the state may ask the defendant, when he is a witness, whether he was previously convicted of......
-
State v. Boag
...shall not be reversed by analyzing an instruction independently, when if read together they convey the proper idea. State v. Corrales, 95 Ariz. 401, 391 P.2d 563; State v. George, 95 Ariz. 366, 390 P.2d 899; State v. Simmering, 89 Ariz. 261, 361 P.2d 4; and State v. Evans, 88 Airz. 364, 356......
-
State v. Maloney
...should be used with great caution, and exercised only when it clearly appears a sentence is too severe. See, e.g., State v. Corrales, 95 Ariz. 401, 391 P.2d 563 (1964); State v. Valenzuela, 98 Ariz. 189, 403 P.2d 286 Against the facts of this case and the difficult yardstick of the law on c......
-
State v. Sustaita
...Hadley v. State, 25 Ariz. 23, 212 P. 458 (1923); and West v. State, 24 Ariz. 237, 208 P. 412 (1922). * * * " State v. Corrales, 95 Ariz. 401, 405, 391 P.2d 563, 566 (1964). In the instant case, it was proper to ask the defendant whether he had been previously convicted of a felony and the n......