State v. Corriher
| Decision Date | 26 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | DA 20-0251 |
| Citation | 2021 MT 275 |
| Parties | STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. JOSHUA PAUL CORRIHER, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
DISTRICT COURT OF THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN, CAUSE NO. DC-19-77 HONORABLE MATTHEW J. CUFFE, PRESIDING JUDGE
For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Moses Okeyo Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Tammy K Plubell, Appellate Services Bureau Chief, Jonathan M. Krauss Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Travis R. Ahner, Flathead County Attorney, John Donovan, Deputy County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana
Marcia Boris, Lincoln County Attorney, Jeffrey Zwang, Deputy County Attorney, Libby, Montana
¶1 Joshua Corriher appeals an Eleventh Judicial District Court sentencing order requiring him to pay $3, 025 in restitution for his extradition from Georgia and to surrender his medical marijuana card. Corriher contends that:
We affirm.
¶2 In November 2017, Corriher was cited for Driving Under the Influence (DUI) in violation of § 61-8-406(1)(a), MCA, resulting from a single-vehicle accident in Flathead County. He pleaded guilty to one count of criminal endangerment in May 2019. The following month, Corriher was cited for two misdemeanors and felony DUI in violation of § 61-8-406(1)(a), MCA, in Lincoln County, following another single-vehicle accident. After being charged with the DUI, Corriher left the state for Georgia, resulting in his extradition. Corriher entered a plea agreement with the State and pleaded guilty to one count of felony DUI in Lincoln County in March 2020.[1] ¶3 Following Corriher's return to Montana, the Eleventh Judicial District Court sentenced him for criminal endangerment, committing Corriher to the Department of Corrections for ten years, with five suspended. The court ordered that Corriher pay the cost of extradition (Condition 30) and surrender his medical marijuana card (Condition 19). Corriher's only income at the time of sentencing was $3, 000 in United States Army (Army) disability benefits he received as a result of his Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). These diagnoses led to his discharge from the Army after seven years of service.
¶4 At the sentencing hearing, Corriher, through counsel, objected to Condition 19, arguing that it lacked the required nexus to his crime and thus was unconstitutional. The District Court rejected Corriher's argument:
COURT: I'm not going to strike [Condition] 19. I -- and I do feel that there's a nexus between any kind of substance abuse, whether it's legal or illegal drugs, and this offense because this offense arose out of alcohol consumption -- excessive alcohol consumption. Alcohol is a drug, and it's just different sides of the same coin, it just happens to be legal, but it has the same awful effects. I think that your drinking and driving chronically, repeatedly, persistently both before and since your traumatic brain injury indicates an addiction to alcohol, and that use [of] other mood-altering substances like marijuana is contraindicated, and therefore I'm -- I do find that there is a nexus between the use of alcohol and the use of marijuana that renders the Medical Marijuana Act inapplicable in your case.
¶5 This Court reviews sentencing conditions first for legality, then for abuse of discretion as to the reasonableness of the condition under the facts of the case. State v. Ingram, 2020 MT 327, ¶ 8, 402 Mont. 374, 478 P.3d 799 (citation omitted). "A condition is illegal when there exists no statutory authority to impose it, where the condition exceeds the limits of the relevant sentencing statute, or where the court fails to adhere to the affirmative mandates of the applicable sentencing statutes." State v. Hotchkiss, 2020 MT 269, ¶ 11, 402 Mont. 1, 474 P.3d 1273 (quoting City of Billings v. Barth, 2017 MT 56, ¶ 8, 387 Mont. 32, 390 P.3d 951) (internal quotations omitted). The Court exercises plenary review of constitutional issues. Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass'n v. State, 2016 MT 44, ¶ 12, 382 Mont. 256, 368 P.3d 1131 (MCIA II). A statute is presumed constitutional unless it conflicts with the Constitution beyond a reasonable doubt. MCIA II, ¶ 12.
¶6 1. Whether the District Court erred in ordering Corriher to pay restitution when his only income consisted of Army disability benefits.
¶7 Corriher first argues that the District Court's imposition of Condition 30 is illegal under 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) and State v. Eaton, 2004 MT 283, 323 Mont 287, 99 P.3d 661, because the court considered his monthly $3, 000 in Army disability benefits-his sole source of income-in calculating the restitution amount. As he correctly asserts, these benefits cannot be "levied, garnished, or subject to court order" under law. Corriher contends that because he cannot pay the restitution from his benefits, and because the District Court "has no mechanism to compel Corriher to pay," Condition 30 "is illegal and an abuse of discretion."
¶8 The statute Corriher cites to support his argument, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), pertains only to social security benefits. Veterans' Benefits, which include Corriher's $3, 000 in Army disability benefits, are protected by 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a). Under federal law, military disability benefits likewise are "exempt from the claim of creditors" and are not subject to "attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process." 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a). The statute does not, however, prohibit the imposition of new debts or fines. See Ingram, ¶ 11.
¶9 Corriher likens his situation to the defendant's in State v. Eaton, but Eaton is distinguishable. Ordering Eaton to pay restitution as part of his sentence, the District Court specified that the restitution must be paid from the defendant's "net income, including income from his social security benefits." Eaton, ¶¶ 23-24. On appeal, Eaton argued that the order "improperly burden[ed] his Social Security benefits" in violation of § 407(a). Eaton, ¶¶ 23-24. Concluding that "the judgment's inclusion of Eaton's social security income" conflicted with § 407(a), we remanded the restitution order to the district court for the "offending condition" to be "eliminate[d]." Eaton, ¶¶ 26-28.
¶10 Here, the District Court ordered Corriher to pay restitution without referencing his Army disability benefits. Imposing restitution on a defendant whose only income is a protected benefit is not illegal if the court's order does not "reference[ ]" a specific "source [of] income or assets, and [if it does] not attempt to capture, directly or indirectly," the defendant's benefits. Ingram, ¶ 11. Corriher could not be ordered to pay the restitution from his Army disability benefits. Nor could the court later revoke the suspended portion of Corriher's sentence for defaulting on his restitution payments if the default is not attributable to his lack of good faith effort to obtain the necessary funds. Sections 46-18-247(2) and -203(6)(b), MCA; see also State v. Welling, 2002 MT 308, ¶¶ 15-16, 313 Mont. 67, 59 P.3d 1146 (). But the fact that his only income derives from protected benefits does not render the restitution order illegal, nor does it prohibit the District Court from imposing restitution on Corriher. See Ingram, ¶ 11.
¶11 The District Court, as a matter of law, was required to impose restitution on Corriher under §§ 46-18-201(5) and -241, MCA. The State, under § 46-18-243(2)(a), MCA, was entitled to restitution for the "costs or losses" incurred "as a result of extraditing an offender from an out-of-state jurisdiction to Montana[.]" As we explained in Ingram, the Ingram, ¶ 11. The same holds true for the mandatory imposition of restitution. An offender is not prohibited from spending his benefits as he sees fit. See Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2001) ( that § 5301(a) does not preclude an inmate receiving veterans' benefits from directing that payments be deducted from the protected funds). Corriher's only source of income being a protected benefit did not absolve the District Court of its statutory duty to impose restitution. Corriher may petition the District Court, under § 46-18-246, MCA, to "adjust or waive restitution" as unjust, based upon his financial circumstances, if he is unable to pay the restitution with other, unprotected income. State v. Lodahl, 2021 MT 156, ¶¶ 24-25, 404 Mont. 362, 491 P.3d 661 (internal citation and quotation omitted). The District Court's imposition of $3, 025 in restitution is not an illegal condition, and Corriher has not established that the District Court abused its discretion when it imposed the condition.
¶12 Corriher objected at sentencing to several financial conditions, including restitution, based on his inability...
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