State v. Ingram
| Decision Date | 29 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | DA 19-0120 |
| Citation | 402 Mont. 374,2020 MT 327,478 P.3d 799 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Douglas Eugene INGRAM, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Daniel V. Biddulph, Ferguson Law Office, PLLC, Missoula, Montana
For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Brad Fjeldheim, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Marcia Jean Boris, Lincoln County Attorney, Libby, Montana
¶1 Douglas Ingram appeals the criminal sentence, challenging financial assessments imposed by the Montana Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶2 Ingram presents four issues, restated as follows:
¶3 We affirm issues one, two, and three. We reverse and remand on issue four.
¶4 On September 2, 2018, Montana Highway Patrol responded to reports of a single car accident on Montana Highway 37. Ingram had been driving his Chevrolet pickup truck, pulling a Prowler Lynx camper trailer, and was headed to a camping facility in Spokane. He was with the vehicle when the patrolman arrived and exhibited symptoms of intoxication. Ingram registered a 0.273 breath alcohol content on a preliminary breath test, and a 0.220 result from an Intoxilyzer test conducted later at the Eureka Law Enforcement Center. Ingram was charged with DUI, Fourth or Subsequent Offense, a felony, in violation of § 61-8-731, MCA, and entered a guilty plea in November 2018.
¶5 A Pre-Sentence Investigation (PSI) report indicated Ingram was unemployed with no assets, had approximately $7,000 in medical debt, and that his sole source of income was $857 per month in Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) payments. It did not reference Ingram's pickup and camper trailer involved in the accident. Ingram was 61 years old, had obtained his GED, and was honorably discharged from the Navy. Ingram filed a sentencing memorandum citing 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), which provides that no social security benefits "shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law," and arguing, based upon this Court's decision in State v. Eaton , 2004 MT 283, 323 Mont. 287, 99 P.3d 661, that his Social Security benefits could not be used as income to satisfy sentencing obligations. Ingram acknowledged that the ability-to-pay inquiry under § 46-18-231, MCA, did not apply to the fine imposed under § 61-8-731, MCA,1 because it was mandatory, citing State v. Mingus , 2004 MT 24, ¶ 15, 319 Mont. 349, 84 P.3d 658. He did not raise a challenge to this precedent or any constitutional issue in his memorandum or at the sentencing hearing.
¶6 The District Court imposed the statutory minimum fine of $5,000 for felony DUI under § 61-8-731, MCA, reasoning it was mandatory under Mingus , and distinguishing the use of Social Security benefits as income for restitution purposes that had been reversed in Eaton . Ingram was required to "seek and obtain employment," and to "obtain permission from his supervising officer before engaging in a business, purchasing real property, purchasing an automobile, or incurring a debt." The District Court sentenced Ingram to a 13-month commitment to the Department of Corrections for placement in a treatment program, followed by a three-year suspended sentence, subject to terms and conditions that were recommended in the PSI, which reads in pertinent part:
¶7 During the hearing, Ingram requested the District Court suspend the $5,000 fine and strike recommended Conditions 13(b) and 27. Ingram did not object to Condition 17, but did ask that the District Court strike Condition 29, reasoning it was the same as Condition 17. Ingram raised no other objections at the hearing. The District Court denied Ingram's requests to alter the conditions, but credited him with 106 days for time served prior to the judgment. Ingram appeals, challenging the denial of his sentencing objections.
¶8 The Court reviews fines the same as sentencing conditions. State v. Reynolds , 2017 MT 317, ¶ 15, 390 Mont. 58, 408 P.3d 503. We review sentencing conditions first for legality, then for abuse of discretion as to the condition's reasonableness under the facts of the case. State v. Daricek , 2018 MT 31, ¶ 7, 390 Mont. 273, 412 P.3d 1044 (citation omitted). Whether a sentence is legal is a question of law subject to de novo review. Daricek , ¶ 7. Our review of legality is generally confined to determining: whether the sentence falls within the statutory parameters, whether the district court had statutory authority to impose the sentence, and whether the district court followed the affirmative mandates of the applicable sentencing statutes. State v. Himes , 2015 MT 91, ¶ 22, 378 Mont. 419, 345 P.3d 297.
¶9 Ingram first argues the District Court erred by failing to consider his ability to pay when imposing the $5,000 fine for felony DUI under § 61-8-731(1)(a)(iii), MCA. Ingram acknowledges the fine is statutorily mandated and was exempted from an ability-to-pay inquiry in Mingus , ¶ 15 (); see also Reynolds , ¶ 19 (). Ingram thus asks that we overturn Mingus . Further, Ingram states that, while he "is not presenting a facial challenge [to] the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum fine set forth in MCA § 61-8-731," he is challenging the statute as applied to him, arguing that his request for suspension of the fine by the District Court "naturally implicate[d] Article II § 22 of the Montana Constitution," and based upon the "implicit" recognition within our decision in State v. Yang , 2019 MT 266, 397 Mont. 486, 452 P.3d 897, an ability-to-pay analysis is required in "all cases."
¶10 Upon review of the trial record, we must conclude that Ingram's arguments cannot be sustained. Ingram cited Mingus in the District Court, and did not oppose application of the case or seek its reversal as "manifestly wrong," Formicove, Inc. v. Burlington N. , 207 Mont. 189, 194-95, 673 P.2d 469, 472 (1983), even when the District Court stated its reliance on it. And, adopting his position would require overturning more cases than just Mingus , a reality his arguments do not address. His request that the statutory DUI fine be suspended neither constituted nor preserved an as-applied constitutional challenge to the statute, which he presses here. See State v. Parkhill , 2018 MT 69, ¶¶ 15-16, 391 Mont. 114, 414 P.3d 1244 (); State v. Coleman , 2018 MT 290, ¶ 9, 393 Mont. 375, 431 P.3d 26 (). Even so, Yang contrasted statutorily-mandated fines within its reasoning, a factor that would necessitate further consideration within the constitutional challenge proffered here. Yang , ¶ 23 (). We thus conclude that the appellant's burden to demonstrate § 61-8-731(1)(a)(iii), MCA, is unconstitutional upon a properly preserved challenge, or that Mingus and other precedent should be overturned as "manifestly wrong," has not been satisfied here.
¶11 Ingram also argues his "Sentence and Judgment is judicial authorization over his SSDI to pay fines, fees and costs as mandated by the court's sentencing order," contrary to our holding in Eaton . Eaton was concerned with the anti-attachment provision of the Social Security Act, which provides:
The right of any...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Graves v. Mo. Dep't of Corr.
...legal financial obligations violates 42 U.S.C. section 407(a) when the offender's only income is SSI), with State v. Ingram , 402 Mont. 374, 478 P.3d 799, 803 (2020) (finding no violation when a court simply imposes a mandatory fine). No further factual development is necessary for a court ......
-
State v. Corriher
...first for legality, then for abuse of discretion as to the reasonableness of the condition under the facts of the case. State v. Ingram , 2020 MT 327, ¶ 8, 402 Mont. 374, 478 P.3d 799 (citation omitted). "A condition is illegal when there exists no statutory authority to impose it, where th......
-
State v. Corriher
...the "costs or losses" incurred "as a result of extraditing an offender from an out-of-state jurisdiction to Montana[.]" As we explained in Ingram, the "receipt of [protected benefits] does not immunize [the defendant] from a mandatory fine. Rather, it merely prohibits the capture of those b......
-
State v. Goodenough
...fine of $200 does not violate the anti-attachment clause. As the district court noted, the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Ingram, 478 P.3d 799, is instructive. that case, the sentencing court imposed a mandatory fine of $5,000 on Ingram for felony driving under the influence and a pres......