State v. Cotton

• Decision Date: 03 December 1973
• Docket Number: No. 5400,5400
• Citation: 516 P.2d 715,55 Haw. 148
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James E. COTTON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 715

516 P.2d 715

55 Haw. 148

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James E. COTTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 5400.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Dec. 3, 1973.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Classification, by statute, of persons or things for regulatory purposes does not violate the equal protection clause unless the person challenging the statute on equal protection grounds successfully carries the burden of showing (1) that the statute is arbitrary and capricious and bears no reasonable relation to the object of the legislation, or (2) that no reasonable state of facts is conceivable to support the classification.

2. The constitutional guarantee of due process of law is not violated by the terms of a properly enacted statute unless the statute's substantive provisions are arbitrary and capricious; mere lack of wisdom in the enactment of the statute does not render it constitutionally void under the due process clause.

3. To justify the state in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require interference and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, not unduly oppressive upon individuals, and cannot be more narrowly achieved.

James E. Cotton, pro se.

Stephen Y. Lau, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu (Barry Chung, Pros. Atty., City and County of Honolulu, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and MARUMOTO, ABE, LEVINSON and KOBAYASHI, JJ.

ABE, Justice.

The defendant, James E. Cotton, was charged with and convicted of, operating a motorcycle without goggles or face shield in violation of HRS § 286-81(1)(B). ¹ He appealed from the judgment and sentence entered. The defendant attacks the constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted on several grounds.

I. EQUAL PROTECTION

The defendant first attacks the constitutionality of HRS § 286-81(1)(B) by contending that requiring motorcyclists to wear goggles under threat of criminal sanction, but not requiring the same of operators of automobiles, results in arbitrary and capricious discrimination and violates the equal protection guaranty of the United States and Hawaii State Constitutions. We do not agree.

'The general principle stated by the courts in the interpretation of the equal protection clause is that all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.' State v. Johnston, 51 Haw. 195, 202, 456 [55 Haw. 150] P.2d 805, 809 (1969), appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 336, 90 S.Ct. 1152, 25 L.Ed.2d 352 (1970). 'The guarantee . . . of the equal protection of the laws is not a guarantee of equality of operation or application of state legislation upon all citizens of a state.' Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U.S. 137, 142, 45 S.Ct. 424, 426, 69 L.Ed. 884 (1925). 'Thus, what is prohibited by the equal protection guaranty is class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others. The guaranty was not intended to take from the states the right and power to classify the subjects of legislation, provided such classification of persons and things is reasonable for the purpose of legislation.' State v. Johnston, 51 Haw. at 203, 456 P.2d at 810 (1969), appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 336, 90 S.Ct. 1152, 25 L.Ed.2d 352 (1970).

The classification attacked here is for regulatory purposes, and the burden is upon the defendant to show that it is arbitrary and capricious and that it bears no reasonable relation to the object of legislation. The general law is that regulatory classifications are presumed valid and constitutional, and are to be upheld unless no reasonable state of facts is conceivable to support them. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 72 S.Ct. 405, 96 L.Ed. 469 (1952); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optiacl Co., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955).

Under the record of this case, the sole basis for the equal protection argument is that motorcyclists and operators of automobiles are treated differently. We recognize that, as the U. S. Supreme Court said in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., supra at 489, 75 S.Ct. at 465:

The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proprotions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Tigner v. State of Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 60 S.Ct. 879, 84 L.Ed. 1124. Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 55 S.Ct. 570, 79 L.Ed. 1086. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. A. F. of L. v. American Sash Co., 335 U.S. 538, 69 S.Ct. 258, 93 L.Ed. 222. The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination. We cannot say that that point has been reached here.

We find no difficulty in discerning a reasonable basis for difference in the legislative treatment accorded motorcyclists, on the one hand, and operators of automobiles, on the other. The physical characteristics of automobiles and motorcycles are evidently different, as are the skills for, and conditions, of operating these vehicles. These differences have repeatedly been held to be a reasonable basis for legislative classifications. ² Thus, we hold that the in question does not violate the right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the United States or Hawaii State Constitutions.

II. DUE PROCESS.

The defendant next attacks the constitutionality of HRS § 286-81(1)(B) on the ground that wearing of goggles would jeopardize his life in violation of the due process of law guaranty. He cites various reports and studies in an attempt to show the lack of wisdom demonstrated by the legislature in its enactment of this statutory provision.

We cannot agree with the defendant that the legislature showed lack og good judgment in enacting the law. However, even if we did, we believe that enactment of laws is the prerogative of the legislature and it is not for the judiciary to secondguess the legislature or substitute its judgment for that of the legislature.

The due process of law guaranty does not give this court or any court the authority to substitute judges' opinions for legislators' opinions as to the wisdom of any law enacted. As stated by Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in A. F. of L. v. American Sash Co., 335 U.S. 538, at 556-557, 69 S.Ct. 258, 267, 93 L.Ed. 222 (1949):

As history amply proves, the judiciary is prone to misconceive the public good by confounding private notions with constitutional requirements, and such misconceptions are not subject to legitimate displacement by the will of the people except at too slow a pace. (Fn. omitted.) Judges appointed for life whose decisions run counter to prevailing opinion cannot be voted out of office and supplanted by men of views more consonant with it. They are even farther removed from democratic pressures by the fact that their deliberations are in secret and remain beyond disclosure either by periodice reports or by such a modern device for securing responsibility to the electorate as the 'press conference.' But a democracy need not rely on the courts to save it from its own unwisdom. If it is alert-and without alertness by the people there can be no enduring democracy-unwise or unfair legislation can readily be removed from the statute books. It is by such vigilance over its representatives that democracy proves itself.

Our right to pass on the validity of legislation is now too much part of our constitutional system to be brought into question. But the implications of that right and the conditions for its exercise must constantly be kept in mind and vigorously observed. Because the Court is without power to shape measures for dealing with the problems of society but has merely the power of negation over measures shaped by others, the indispensable judicial requisite is intellectual humility, and such humility presupposes complete disinterestedness. And so, in the end, it is right that the Court should be indifferent to public temper and popular wishes. Mr. Dooley's 'th' Supreme Coort follows th' iliction returns' expressed the wit of cynicism, not the demand of principle. A court which yields to the popular will thereby licenses itself to practice despotism, for there can be no assurance that it will not on another occasion indulge its own will. Courts can fulfill their responsibility in a democratic society only to the extent that they succeed in shaping their judgments by rational standards, and rational standards are both impersonal and communicable. Matters of policy, however, are by definition matters which demand the resolution of conflicts of value, and the elements of conflicting values are largely imponderable. Assessment of their competing worth involves differences of feeling; it is also an exercise in prophecy. Obviously the proper forum for mediating a clash of feelings and rendering a prophetic judgment is the body chosen for those purposes by the...