State v. Cottrell
| Decision Date | 08 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 38129.,38129. |
| Citation | 271 P.3d 1243,152 Idaho 387 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Joshua Nathaniel COTTRELL, Defendant–Appellant. |
John Adams, Kootenai County Chief Public Defender; Craig W. Zanetti, Deputy County Public Defender, Coeur d'Alene, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jennifer E. Birken, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Joshua Nathaniel Cottrell appeals from the district court's order, on intermediate appeal, affirming the magistrate's order of restitution after a guilty plea to obstructing an officer. Specifically, Cottrell argues: (1) there was no causal connection between the commission of the crime and the loss incurred; (2) the order of restitution is unconstitutional as applied; and (3) the amount of restitution is unreasonable under Idaho's criminal restitution statute. Cottrell also appeals the district court's order for reimbursement of costs for appointed counsel. For reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Cottrell pled guilty to obstructing an officer, Idaho Code § 18–705, on a charge which arose from Cottrell's conduct during his arrest on December 12, 2008, for other offenses. The State sought restitution in connection with the resisting and obstructing charge for injuries sustained by Officer Sullivan, the arresting officer. After sentencing, the magistrate held a two-part restitution hearing and found:
[T]he obstructing consisted of the Defendant failing to put his hands behind his back as directed by Officer Sullivan as part of the arrest process. The Defendant attempted to pull his right arm away from Officer Sullivan and plunged his left hand into his front left pants pocket. (The Defendant had previously been directed numerous times by Officer Sullivan to keep his hands out of his pocket and he had continuously returned his hands to his pockets.) As a result of the Defendant's conduct, which amounted to the criminal offense of Obstructing, Officer Sullivan attempted to gain control of the Defendant and in so doing twisted his right knee.
Evidence presented at the restitution hearing included: a list of costs incurred by the Idaho State Insurance Fund (ISIF), as worker's compensation insurer to Officer Sullivan, for surgery and treatment of a lateral meniscus tear
in the officer's right knee; unrebutted testimony placing the date of injury as the date of Cottrell's arrest; and documentation of Officer Sullivan's pre-existing knee injury.
After argument from both parties, the magistrate took the matter under advisement and issued a written order awarding ISIF restitution in the amount of $24,921.47. The order included a finding that ISIF had denied any reimbursements for pre-existing injuries and had presented only those costs which arose from Officer Sullivan's injury occurring on the date of Cottrell's arrest. Additionally, the magistrate declined to include over $6,000 of costs, which it determined were not supported by sufficient evidence. Also, pursuant to the magistrate's restitution order, Cottrell's probation was amended to include monthly restitution payments by Cottrell in the amount of $250.
Cottrell appealed the order of restitution to the district court, arguing violations of Idaho statutes as well as state and federal constitutional principles. The district court affirmed the magistrate's order, finding there was substantial evidence to support the restitution award, the amount was reasonable, and the constitutional arguments were inapplicable to the case. Based on the magistrate's order appointing counsel to Cottrell, which required Cottrell to pay reimbursement for the cost of appointed counsel at the conclusion of the case, the district court ordered reimbursement of costs for appointed counsel in the amount of $1,000. Cottrell timely appeals to this Court.
We directly review decisions by the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity State v. Hudson, 147 Idaho 335, 337, 209 P.3d 196, 198 (Ct.App.2009). We examine the magistrate record for substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and to determine whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. Id. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions flow therefrom, and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court as a matter of procedure. Id.
The decision whether to order restitution is within the discretion of the trial court, guided by consideration of the factors set forth in Idaho Code § 19–5304(7) and by the policy favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer economic loss. State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct.App.2002). We will not overturn an order of restitution unless an abuse of discretion is shown. An abuse of discretion may be shown if the order of restitution was the result of arbitrary action rather than logical application of the proper factors in Idaho Code § 19–5304(7). Richmond, 137 Idaho at 37, 43 P.3d at 796. In reviewing the trial court's exercise of discretion, this Court must determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one involving the exercise of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Powell, 125 Idaho 889, 891, 876 P.2d 587, 589 (1994).
Cottrell first argues the magistrate abused his discretion in awarding restitution because it failed to determine whether Cottrell's actions amounted to the elements of obstruction and to what degree, if any, those actions caused the harm to Officer Sullivan. He argues that in light of the fact Officer Sullivan had a pre-existing knee injury
, the "but for" cause of the new injury could just as easily be the pre-existing condition. The State asserts the facts establish a direct nexus between the active resisting and obstructing conduct by Cottrell and Officer Sullivan's knee injury. Particularly, the State points out the unrebutted evidence that shows the meniscus tear was a recent injury directly caused by Officer Sullivan twisting his knee and falling to the ground with Cottrell.
Idaho's restitution statute directs a court to order a defendant, found guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim, to make restitution to the victim unless the court finds restitution would be inappropriate or undesirable. I.C. § 19–5304(2).1 With regard to the amount of restitution, Idaho Code § 19–5304(7) provides that the court shall consider the economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate. The statutory definition of "economic loss" includes, but is not limited to, lost wages and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses resulting from the criminal conduct. I.C. § 19–5304(1)(a). Idaho Code § 19–5304(6) provides that economic loss shall be based upon the preponderance of evidence submitted to the court by the prosecutor, defendant, victim, or presentence investigator.
This Court has held that a defendant can only be ordered to pay restitution where the evidence shows the victim's economic loss was caused by the criminal conduct for which the defendant is guilty. State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 372, 161 P.3d 689, 691 (Ct.App.2007). In Shafer, the defendant pled guilty to leaving the scene of an accident. There, we concluded that the victim's injuries from the accident itself did not result from the defendant's criminal conduct of leaving the scene because the crime itself did not establish responsibility for the accident. Id. at 373, 161 P.3d at 692. In so finding, we mirrored the reasoning of other courts explaining that an order of restitution requires a "causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the damages the victim suffers." Id. at 372, 161 P.3d at 691 (quoting State v. Starkey, 437 N.W.2d 573, 574 (Iowa 1989) ). Because the victim's injuries occurred from the accident and prior to the criminal conduct of leaving the scene of an accident by the defendant, we did not uphold the restitution award on that basis.2
More recently in State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011), the Idaho Supreme Court echoed the holding in Shafer: "[I]n order for restitution to be appropriate, there must be a causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the injuries suffered by the victim." The Court articulated that causation consists of actual cause and true proximate cause—the first being whether a particular event produced a particular consequence, and the second, a test of foreseeability. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401 (citing State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374, 223 P.3d 750, 757 (2009) ). For actual cause, the "but for" test is used where two or more possible causes are not acting concurrently. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401. The test for proximate cause is whether the injury and manner of occurrence are so highly unusual that a reasonable person, making an inventory of the possibilities of harm that his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably expected the injury to occur. Both are factual questions. Id.
In applying the two-part inquiry into causation to the facts of the case, the Corbus court held the defendant's criminal conduct, which supported convictions for reckless driving and eluding a police officer, was the actual cause of injuries sustained where the victim jumped out of the defendant's vehicle in the course of the police chase. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded the victim "would not have needed to do so if it had not been for [defendant]'s acts of driving...
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