State v. County Com'rs

• Decision Date: 15 May 1886
• Citation: 10 P. 901,19 Nev. 332
• Parties: STATE ex rel. COFFIN v. COUNTY COM'RS.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

10 P. 901

19 Nev. 332

STATE ex rel. COFFIN v. COUNTY COM'RS.

Supreme Court of Nevada

May 15, 1886

Application for mandamus. The opinion fully states the facts.

J. H MacMillan, S.D. King, Thos. Wells, H. F. Bartine, and T Coffin, for relator.

R. M Clarke and R. H. Lindsay, for respondents.

HAWLEY J.

On the fifteenth of February, 1886, respondents issued a notice that an election would be held on Tuesday, the second day of November next, for state, county, and township officers, including "three district judges for the district of Nevada; and refused, upon the demand of relator, to issue a notice for the election of "one district judge for the Second judicial district of the state of Nevada, comprising Ormsby and Douglas counties." This proceeding was instituted in this court to procure a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to issue such a notice.

Is the act entitled "An act to redistrict the state of Nevada, prescribe the number and salaries of district judges, and fix the places of holding courts," (St. 1885, 60; Gen. St. 2485-2494,) constitutional? Is it within the power of the legislature to so redistrict the state as to make but one judicial district? Did the framers of the constitution intend to place any restriction upon the power of the legislature to fix the number of judicial districts, or to prescribe the number of the district judges?

1. The first and most important question is whether sections 1, 2, and 3 are constitutional? These sections read as follows:

"Section 1. On and after the first Monday in January, A. D. 1887, the state of Nevada shall constitute one judicial district.

"Sec. 2. At the general election in the year 1886 there shall be elected three judges, who shall be judges of said district.

"Sec. 3. The district judges shall be elected by the qualified electors of the state of Nevada, and shall hold office for the term of four years from and after the first Monday of January next succeeding their election."

The constitution of this state declares that "the judicial power of this state shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts, and in justices of the peace." Section 1, art. 6. "The state is hereby divided into nine judicial districts. *** The legislature may, however, provide by law for an alteration in the boundaries or divisions of the districts herein prescribed, and also for increasing or diminishing the number of judicial districts and judges therein. *** There shall be elected, at the general election which precedes the expiration of the term of his predecessor, one district judge in each of the respective judicial districts, (except in the First district, as in this section hereinafter provided.) The district judges shall be elected by the qualified electors of their respective districts. ***" Section 5. "The district courts in the several judicial districts of this state shall have original jurisdiction in all cases in equity. ***" Section 6.

The framers of the constitution created a judicial system which involved, for the time being, a division of the state into judicial districts. There is therefore no need of any extended consideration of the meaning of the word "district," as used by lexicographers and found in law dictionaries. It will be admitted that the meaning of the words "district" and "districts," as applied to the judicial system thus created by the constitution, had reference to a part or portion of the state. This must be so, because nine districts were expressly named. But what did the framers of the constitution mean by giving the legislature power to alter the boundaries or divisions of the districts prescribed by the constitution, and to increase or diminish the number of judicial districts, and the judges therein? Is not the whole subject-matter left to the wisdom of the legislature to arrange, in such manner as the necessities of the people may require?

The question, in so far as it relates to increasing or diminishing the number of district judges, is settled by the decision of this court in State v. Kinkead, 14 Nev. 117. Is it not equally as evident that it was the intention of the framers of the constitution to invest the legislature with absolute power to arrange the number of judicial districts, and, if necessary to meet the wants of the people, to reduce the number to one? True, the opinion in State v. Kinkead only discusses the question in so far as it relates to the number of judges in Storey county; but are not the provisions of the constitution as clear in the one case as the other? There is no prohibition upon the power of the legislature to increase the number of judicial districts; is there any restriction upon the power of the legislature to diminish the number of judicial districts? There is no express, and, in our opinion, no implied, provision to this effect. Is it not apparent, from all the provisions of the judicial department, that it was the intention of the framers of the constitution to leave the number of the judicial districts, and the number of judges, to be determined by succeeding legislatures? The members of the constitutional convention made a provisional arrangement to set the courts in motion so as to meet the then condition of affairs in this state; but at that time they realized the fact that the mining excitement, and the litigation arising therefrom, in Storey county, might cease; that other counties might, in the future, be placed in the same condition, and have an increase or diminution in population and judicial business; that the population in this state being then nomadic, and hence uncertain, it might, in the future, become necessary to have the boundaries of the districts, as provisionally established, altered or changed, and the number of judicial districts and judges therein increased or diminished, so as to conform to the condition of existing affairs from time to time, and to be regulated by the amount of judicial business to be transacted in the various counties of the state. This could only be done, as it was done, by the adoption of a provision which would, without any restrictions or limitations expressed or implied, give this power to the legislature. This is why they said, in plain terms, that notwithstanding the provisional arrangements embodied in this constitution, and the language used to enforce the same, the legislature may in the future, "provide by law for an alteration in the boundaries or divisions of the districts herein prescribed; and also for increasing or diminishing the number of judicial districts and judges therein."

The only limitation upon the legislative power in this respect is found in the clause that no "change shall take effect except in case of a vacancy, or the expiration of the term of an incumbent of the office." The change made by the act in question does not take effect until the expiration of the term of the present judges. It does not, therefore, violate this clause of the constitution. The clause that "the district judges shall be elected by the qualified electors of their respective districts" is not violated if it be true that the legislature has the power to diminish the number of judicial districts to one. It is fair and reasonable to presume that the framers of the constitution, if they had intended to place any other restrictions upon the legislative power, would have used apt words to express such intention, and inserted a provision to the effect that in no event should the number of districts be diminished to less than two, nor increased to more than the whole number of counties existing in the state.

In the constitution of some of the states the matter is definitely fixed without any power whatever in the legislature to change or alter the same in any respect; in others, the entire question is left to the legislature; but in a large majority of the states the power is given to the legislature to change, increase, or diminish the number of circuits or districts, and wherever any limitation upon this power exists, it is stated in clear and positive terms. Thus, the constitution of Alabama provides "that the state shall be divided into convenient circuits, and each circuit shall contain not less than three, nor more than six counties." Const. 1819. In California it is provided that "the state shall be divided by the first legislature into a convenient number of districts, subject to such alteration from time to time as the public good may require." Const. 1849. In Iowa the state is divided into 11 districts, "and after the year 1860 the general assembly may reorganize the judicial districts, and increase or diminish the number of districts, or the number of judges of the said court, and may increase the number of judges of the supreme court; but such increase or diminution shall not be more than one district, or one judge of either court, at any one session." Const. 1857. In Kansas "the state shall be divided *** into three common-pleas districts of compact territory, bounded by county lines, and as nearly equal in population as practicable." Const. 1855. This provision is taken from the constitution of Ohio of 1851. In Louisiana the constitution of 1845 provides that the legislature "shall divide the state into judicial districts, which shall remain unchanged for six years;" and that "the number of districts shall not be less than 12 nor more than 20." In Mississippi "the state shall be divided into convenient districts, and each district shall contain not less than three, nor more than twelve, counties." Const. 1832. In New York "the state shall be divided into eight judicial districts, of which the city of New York shall be one; the others to be bounded by county lines, and to be compact and equal in proportion, as nearly as may be. ...