State v. Coutts
Decision Date | 10 April 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 12874,12874 |
Citation | 101 Idaho 110,609 P.2d 642 |
Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Anthony COUTTS, aka Gerald Ralph Anthony Cootz, aka William Lee Schmidt, aka Billy Lee, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Neil O. Walter of Wilson & Walter, Bonners Ferry, for defendant-appellant.
David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.
Following a plea of guilty before the district court, defendant-appellant Gerald Anthony Coutts was found guilty of a charge of grand larceny (theft of a pickup truck) and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of fourteen years imprisonment. He appealed from the judgment of conviction. On appeal Coutts contends his guilty plea was not voluntary and should not have been accepted by the courts. However, it is the conclusion of this court that the record does not sustain this contention. The propriety of acceptance of a guilty plea is governed by I.C.R. 11 1 and State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 557 P.2d 626 (1976).
In State v. Colyer, this court stated:
98 Idaho at 34, 557 P.2d at 628 (Emphasis added.)
In this case, the district judge who handled this stage of the proceedings first explained to the defendant the nature and circumstances of the charge against him, the consequences of his guilty plea, including his waiver of the right to a speedy trial before a jury, the right to confront witnesses called against him, and the right to present evidence. He was advised that in the event of a trial he would not have to take the witness stand or give any testimony unless he chose to do so, of his right to an attorney, and that the State must prove to the jury his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court advised him of the maximum sentence that could be imposed, and that if he had been previously convicted of a crime, especially a felony, it would weigh heavily against him. After that explanation, Coutts entered his plea of guilty. The trial court then further inquired as to the reason he wished to plead guilty. After still further inquiry the court advised him that it wanted to be certain he knew what he was doing, and Coutts replied that he had been in prison and knew what he was doing.
Only after this exhaustive inquiry was the court fully satisfied that it should accept the defendant's plea of guilty. The record thus clearly shows that the district court meticulously explained to Coutts the nature and circumstances of the charge and the consequences of his guilty plea; it also clearly appears that Coutts actually understood the judge's explanation.
Coutts argues, however, that the plea was not voluntary, in light of his statements at arraignment and at the sentencing hearing that he was subjected to extreme conditions of incarceration, that the confession which was the heart of the state's case was the product of a deal, and that he was dissatisfied with his attorney.
Coutts claims that during his incarceration at the Boundary County jail he was "denied cigarettes," and that he was placed in a cell which had no toilet and no running water. The record also indicates that Coutts had threatened an escape attempt and had physically threatened a guard, and that because of this he was forced to lie on his stomach and to place his hands behind his back for handcuffing prior to being removed from his cell for arraignment.
We hold that the record supports the attorney's conclusion.
Nor did Coutts' allegation that his confession may have been part of a deal compel the judge to refuse to accept his guilty plea. The place to challenge the voluntariness of the confession was, of course, at trial. Such challenges are by no means unusual and are often successful. In addition, at both the arraignment and the sentencing hearing before another district judge, Coutts was repeatedly offered the opportunity to change his plea and declined to do so.
Finally, Coutts cannot successfully ground his claim of coercion on his dissatisfaction with his attorney. The clear indication from the arraignment transcript was that Coutts did not feel that he was poorly represented, but that his attorney left something to be desired in the "lawyer-client" relationship. That is, he thought that his counsellor was a "good attorney," and his dissatisfaction was "just personal."
It is the conclusion of this court that the record reflects that Coutts' guilty plea was voluntary and that he understood its consequences, and it was not error for the district court to accept it.
Coutts also contends that certain unsworn remarks made by the prosecutor at the sentencing hearing were so inflammatory as to taint that hearing beyond the limit of due process.
At that hearing the court had before it the presentence report previously ordered. The court determined that Coutts had received a copy of the report in sufficient time to examine it and then offered him an opportunity to comment on any portions of it he felt were incorrect. Coutts took advantage of this opportunity and agreed that the general account of his past history was accurate and explained certain other portions of the report. The trial court then inquired whether the plea of guilty had in any manner been forced or compelled, and advised Coutts that if he had entered a plea of guilty which he did not wish to enter the court could and would set it aside and afford an opportunity for a full jury trial. The defendant declined this offer and advised the court there was no reason sentence should not be imposed.
Appellant contends on this appeal that the trial court failed to follow the provisions of I.C. §§ 19-2515(a) and 19-2516.
Appellant has argued that the prosecutor's reference to the alleged incidents was a presentation of unsworn evidence contrary to these statutory provisions.
In response to appellant's contentions in this regard, other states have dealt with similar contentions, and two lines of authority have developed. In People v. Neal, 97 Cal.App.2d 668, 218 P.2d 556 (1950), and State v. Willms, 117 N.W.2d 84 (N.D.1962) those courts have required a strict compliance with the particular states' statutory schemes. The other line of authority, which holds that in the absence of a formal request for a hearing of evidence by actual testimony, the court may on a sentencing hearing hear the presentation in a more informal manner. See Barber v. Gladden, 228 Or. 140, 363 P.2d 771 (1961), O.R.S. §§ 137.080 and .090, which are essentially identical to I.C. §§ 19-2515(a) and 19-2516. Williams v. State, 321 P.2d 990 (Okl.1958) aff'd 358 U.S. 576, 79 S.Ct. 421, 3 L.Ed.2d 516 (1959); People v. Carter, 398 Ill. 336, 75 N.E.2d 861 (1947) cert. denied 333 U.S. 882, 68 S.Ct. 908, 92 L.Ed. 1157 (1948).
In Coffman v. Gladden, 229 Or. 366, 366 P.2d 171 (Ore.1961), the court reaffirmed Barber v. Gladden, supra, and its interpretation of the statutes to require the taking of evidence...
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