State v. Cowen
Decision Date | 18 April 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 14017,14017 |
Citation | 104 Idaho 649,662 P.2d 230 |
Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Weyland Ray COWEN, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
John W. Ruebelmann, Emmett, for defendant-appellant.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., and Myrna A.I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.
This is an appeal from a conviction of first degree burglary and grand larceny and of the use of a firearm in the commission of both offenses. The sole issues raised on appeal relate to the denial of Cowen's motion to suppress certain evidence. We affirm.
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on February 24, 1980, a state police officer noted an automobile traveling south about a mile south of Eagle, Idaho. The officer stopped the car because the trunk lid was raised about three feet and tied down to accommodate a large object in the trunk. The rear of the car was riding low. There was no equipment violation or traffic offense, but the officer stopped the car solely because its appearance aroused in him a suspicion of criminal activity. The officer asked the driver for his driver's license and the car's registration. Those were handed to the officer. The officer then inquired as to the contents of the trunk and the driver gave the officer consent to look into the trunk. The officer removed a rug and found a large safe. At that time the driver and the passenger Cowen fled the vehicle. The officer demanded that the fleeing occupants stop and threatened to shoot, whereupon Cowen stopped, raised his arms, and was arrested. Pursuant to the arrest, the officer frisked Cowen and removed a police scanner and two guns. These items were admitted into evidence at trial over objection that they were fruits of an illegal search. Although no warrant was obtained, police searched the car, photographing and removing numerous tools and objects which were also admitted at trial. At the time of the arrest the officer noted three small gold rings in Cowen's ponytail. Those rings were subsequently found on the floor of the room where Cowen was questioned and were admitted into evidence after having been identified by the burglary victim.
Cowen asserts that all evidence obtained as a result of the stopping of the car and the seizure of the defendant are fruits of an illegal search inadmissible as evidence and should have been suppressed under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). We do not reach the question of whether the initial stopping of the automobile was in violation of the Constitution since, even assuming the illegality of such stop, Cowen is without standing to raise the question.
We note at the outset that the provision of the Idaho Constitution, art. 1, § 17, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, is to be construed consistently with the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Oropeza, 97 Idaho 387, 545 P.2d 475 (1976); State v. Peterson, 81 Idaho 233, 340 P.2d 444 (1959). Federal case law is therefore instructive on the issue of standing in the context of the instant case.
In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the Court dealt with whether occupants of an automobile had standing to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of the interior of the car. Noting that those defendants owned neither the car nor the property seized therefrom, the Court rejected a "target" rule which would give standing to anyone against whom evidence from a search was directed. The Court noted the practical difficulties of broadening the doctrine of standing, stating:
Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. at 137-138, 99 S.Ct. at 427.
The Court also noted that in the case of passengers in an automobile, the fact of being "legitimately on the premises" was not determinative of a legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas of the automobile searched, such as would entitle them to standing. The Court stated:
Id., 439 U.S. at 148-149, 99 S.Ct. at 433.
See also United States v. Johnston, 685 F.2d 934 (5th Cir.1982).
In State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 625 P.2d 1093 (1981), defendant sought to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless car search. The argument for standing in Bottleson was much stronger than in the instant case, in that while Bottelson did not show that he actually owned the automobile, he did demonstrate he was personally in possession of the car at the time it was searched. The Court there stated:
"On the present record the defendant has not shown that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the Pontiac.
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Bottelson, supra, 102 Idaho at 92, 625 P.2d 1093.
The rule is well established that suppression may be obtained only by those whose rights are infringed, Rakas, supra; Bottelson, supra; State v. Jennings, 101 Idaho 265, 611 P.2d 1050 (1980), and that a person...
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Josephs v. Com., 0423-87-2
...at 372; see also Graham v. State, 47 Md.App. 287, 421 A.2d 1385 (1980); State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978); State v. Cowen, 104 Idaho 649, 662 P.2d 230 (1983) (Rakas interpreted as barring passenger from questioning stopping of car); State v. Ribera, 183 Mont. 1, 597 P.2d 1164 (1979......
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State v. Guzman
...serious reservations as to Leon), but rather because it believed itself so compelled by virtue of our decision in State v. Cowen, 104 Idaho 649, 662 P.2d 230 (1983): The appellant has requested that we construe the Idaho constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures ......
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State v. Henderson, 16852
...... Therefore consideration of the conduct in question--a DUI roadblock--under construction of the fourth amendment by case law is instructive and highly persuasive, if not controlling. Cf. State v. Cowen, 104 Idaho 649, 662 P.2d 230 (1983); State v. Oropeza, 97 Idaho 387, 545 P.2d 475 (1976); State v. Peterson, 81 Idaho 233, 340 P.2d 444 (1959); Arregui, supra. In this same vein, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently noted: . While we are mindful of the limited nature of the protections ......