State v. Jennings
Decision Date | 30 May 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 12919,12919 |
Citation | 611 P.2d 1050,101 Idaho 265 |
Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Donald L. JENNINGS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Mark L. Clark of Kibler, Hamilton & Clark, Nampa, for defendant-appellant.
David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., L. Mark Riddoch, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.
Defendant-appellant Donald Jennings was convicted by a jury of two counts of delivering heroin. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress videotapes and sound recordings made by the police of the two transactions. Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, challenging the order denying his motion to suppress.
For approximately six months (February to July 1977), the City-County Narcotics Division of Canyon County operated a "storefront" undercover operation at the Darling Motel in Caldwell. The Narcotics Division rented two adjacent rooms at the motel. One room (room no. 8) was set up as a normal motel room, but with a concealed microphone in the door jamb and a two-way mirror in the wall by which officers in the adjacent room could observe, videotape and record the transactions in room no. 8.
Mickey Parks, an undercover agent, used room no. 8 to conduct illegal activities, although he did not live there personally. The defendant and Parks both testified that the defendant had lived in room no. 8, but they disagreed as to when: defendant testified that as far as he knew he had lived there in March when the alleged transactions occurred, but he wasn't sure; Parks testified that the defendant lived there in May or June, but not in March. Lt. Galland, one of the officers operating the videotape equipment, testified that to his knowledge defendant was not living in room no. 8 in March, although he felt that the defendant was living in another room in the motel.
Lt. Galland also testified that he had observed the defendant through the two-way mirror between fifteen and twenty times. No search warrant was ever obtained, although Officer Galland testified that he would have gotten a warrant if the prosecuting attorney had advised him that he needed one.
On March 4 and 16, 1977, the officers in the adjoining room observed, videotaped and recorded the defendant allegedly delivering heroin to Parks. The officers testified to observing the transactions, and the tapes were shown to the jury.
Defendant argues on appeal that admitting the videotapes and recordings into evidence violated both his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, and that they should have been suppressed. He does not argue on appeal that the testimony of Parks or the officers as to their observations of the transactions should also have been excluded.
The Fourth Amendment protects those claiming a "justifiable," a "reasonable," or a "legitimate" expectation of privacy from government-initiated electronic surveillance. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979). See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).
In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971), the court was confronted with the issue of "whether the Fourth Amendment bars from evidence the testimony of governmental agents who related certain conversations which had occurred between defendant White and a government informant, Harvey Jackson, and which the agents overheard by monitoring the frequency of a radio transmitter carried by Jackson and concealed on his person." Id. at 746-47, 91 S.Ct. at 1123 (footnote omitted). Four of the conversations took place in Jackson's home, two took place in his car, one in a restaurant and one in defendant's home. The Court in a plurality opinion upheld the admissibility of the testimony as follows:
Nor should we be too ready to erect constitutional barriers to relevant and probative evidence which is also accurate and reliable. An electronic recording will many times produce a more reliable rendition of what a defendant has said than will the unaided memory of a police agent." 401 U.S. at 751-53, 91 S.Ct. at 1125-1126.
Although the United States...
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State v. Dreier
...(1991). A legitimate expectation of privacy means more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered. State v. Jennings, 101 Idaho 265, 266, 611 P.2d 1050, 1051 (1980). There can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in what a person knowingly exposes to the public. Katz v. United......
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State v. Cowen
...that suppression may be obtained only by those whose rights are infringed, Rakas, supra; Bottelson, supra; State v. Jennings, 101 Idaho 265, 611 P.2d 1050 (1980), and that a person asserting standing to suppress must demonstrate some proprietary interest in the premises searched or some oth......
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State v. Reimer
...expectation of not being discovered. State v. Wilkins 125 Idaho 215, 222, 868 P.2d 1231, 1238 (1994) (quoting State v. Jennings, 101 Idaho 265, 611 P.2d 1050, 1051 (1980)). No reasonable person under the circumstances could justifiably expect that the police would have to obtain a separate ......
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State v. Wilkins
...was reasonable and justifiable under the circumstances. Id. at 740, 99 S.Ct. at 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d at 226-27. In State v. Jennings, 101 Idaho 265, 611 P.2d 1050 (1980), the Court The Fourth Amendment protects those claiming a "justifiable," a "reasonable," or a "legitimate" expectation of pri......