State v. Cox
| Decision Date | 15 July 1927 |
| Docket Number | 26,245 |
| Citation | 215 N.W. 189,172 Minn. 226 |
| Parties | STATE v. IRA A. COX |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Defendant was indicted by the grand jury of Otter Tail county for the crime of rape. Upon trial in the district court the jury returned a verdict of guilty. This appeal is from the judgment of conviction and an order, Parsons, J., denying his motion for a new trial. Affirmed.
Conviction sustained and new trial unnecessary.
In a prosecution for rape, held:
(1) Evidence sustains verdict.
(2) Under a severe denunciation by defendant's counsel in opening the case to the jury the girl upon whom the crime was perpetrated became hysterical, fell to the floor and was carried from the court room. This incident and scene does not require a new trial.
(3) The trial court has great discretion in the application of the rule as to the propriety of expert testimony, and the mere fact that the opinion of the expert covers the very issue which the jury has to pass upon does not call for its exclusion.
Criminal Law, 16 C.J. p. 748 n. 50; p. 749 n. 56; p. 807 n. 12; 17 C.J. p. 254 n. 51; p. 255 n. 52, 54; p. 265 n. 89.
Rape 33 Cyc. p. 1475 n. 40, 46; p. 1486 n. 12; p. 1489 n. 35; p. 1517 n. 94, 98.
Anton Thompson, W. S. Lauder, and Thos. H. Kirby, for appellant.
Clifford L. Hilton, Attorney General, Chester S. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, and John L. Townley, Jr., County Attorney, for the state.
Appeal from the judgment of conviction and from an order denying a new trial. Defendant was convicted of the crime of rape.
1. Sexual intercourse is admitted. The controversy relates to defendant's claim that the girl consented. There is a sharp conflict between the two. The jury was privileged to find either way. There seems to be weakness in the version of both parties. The very common argument, in cases of this character, is made to the effect that some of the acts as detailed by the girl are improbable and that at the preliminary examination she did not give the identical version as on the trial. Experience teaches that a girl who has been subjected to rape or carnal knowledge, especially when she herself through indiscretion has given an opportunity for the commission of the crime, is reluctant to promptly make a full, frank disclosure. In many instances much is held back by shame and humiliation until little by little the substantial truth is disclosed. The composite judgment of the jury, in considering the unusual ordeal of a good girl subjected to such treatment, and its effect upon her detailed explanation of the unfortunate occurrence, is usually safe. This court cannot concern itself with these matters, which were for the jury. State v. Schomaker, 149 Minn. 141, 182 N.W. 957; State v. Greenstein, 162 Minn. 346, 202 N.W. 892; State v. Coon, 170 Minn. 343, 212 N.W. 588; State v. Jenkins, 171 Minn. 173, 213 N.W. 923; State v. Lightheart, 153 Minn. 40, 189 N.W. 408. The evidence clearly supports the version accepted by the jury and the verdict must stand.
2. The opportunity for commission of the crime resulted from the girl's taking an automobile ride with a stranger late at night. She testified in reference to entering the car: "He put one hand on my shoulder and just got me in that way." One of defendant's counsel in his opening statement to the jury pointed his finger at the girl who sat near counsel for the state, and in a loud, emphatic tone said that the defendant would prove that the charge that the prosecuting witness was dragged into defendant's car was villainous and damnable. Thereupon the girl became hysterical, fell to the floor, moaning and screaming and was carried from the room. Defendant's counsel asked for a mistrial, which was denied, but the court immediately admonished the jury not to permit the incident to affect them in any way. The girl is an educated, refined young woman. Before becoming a university student she was out of high school one year because of her health. The ordeal was probably too much for her. Tragedies do sometimes occur in the court room. The learned trial court said: "I do not see how anyone who witnessed the incident could deem it fabricated." We see nothing in the record to indicate that defendant was prejudiced by this scene. Such matters must necessarily be left largely to the discretion of the trial court.
3. Dr. Sherping, who examined the girl a few hours after the occurrence of the incident, testified that he found her right shoulder swollen and bruised, and that she had bruises on her chest, arms, thighs and other parts of her body. He found evidence of recent sexual intercourse and described conditions of swelling and irritation.
Dr. Baker was also called as a medical expert. His attention was directed to the testimony of Dr. Sherping and other evidence in the case and, over defendant's objection, he was permitted to testify that in his opinion sexual intercourse had not been voluntary on the part of the girl. Defendant challenges the right of a medical expert to express such an opinion, claiming that it usurps the province of the jury. Defendant contends that it was for the expert to describe the actual conditions and state what conditions might result from involuntary intercourse, but, because there are other adequate causes which might produce the same conditions, it is for the jury and not the expert to determine whether the conditions were the result of rape. There is authority to support this contention. Noonan v. State, 55 Wis. 258, 12 N.W. 379; State v. Vaughn, 187 Iowa 146, 173 N.W. 917; State v. Pillsbury, 195 Iowa 569, 192 N.W. 241; State v. Acklus, 126 Wash. 65, 217 P. 61; Simmons v. State, 105 Miss. 48, 61 So. 826.
But whatever may be the rule elsewhere, this court is not a follower of technicalities in procedure. State v Nelson, 91 Minn. 143, 97 N.W. 652. We are also committed to the rule that the mere fact that the opinion of an expert covers the very issue which the...
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