State v. Cox

• Decision Date: 23 May 1911
• Citation: 234 Mo. 605,137 S.W. 981
• Parties: STATE v. COX.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

137 S.W. 981

234 Mo. 605

STATE v. COX.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

May 23, 1911.

1. STATUTES (§ 125)—TITLE—SUFFICIENCY.

The title of Laws 1907, p. 263, entitled "An act to provide for party nominations by direct vote," is broad enough to authorize the inclusion in the body of the act of provisions for penalties for the violation of the act or to create penalties for such violation by reference to another statute in which penalties are set forth in detail.

2. ELECTIONS (§ 319)—OFFENSES.

The Legislature, in making the penalty clause of the general election law (Rev. St. 1899, § 6981) applicable to primary elections, must be presumed to have known of the existing criminal laws, including Rev. St. 1909, § 4363, making it a felony to interfere with a ministerial officer while discharging his duties in a felony case, which may be invoked to protect officers whose duty it is to arrest persons for violating the primary election law.

3. ELECTIONS (§ 311)—STATUTES—RETROACTIVE EFFECT.

Rev. St. 1909, § 4363, making it a felony to interfere with a ministerial officer while discharging his duties in a felony case, applies to all future arrests and prosecutions, whether for violation of laws then in force or subsequently enacted, and such a construction does not give any retroactive effect to the primary election law, making the section applicable to primary elections, because the crime of interfering with an officer arresting one for violating the primary election law is a crime committed after the enactment of the primary election law.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Daniel D. Fisher, Judge.

Thomas Cox was convicted of obstructing a police officer in the discharge of his duty, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Defendant was found guilty of obstructing a police officer in the discharge of his official duty, as prohibited by section 4363, R. S. 1909. From a judgment of the circuit court fixing his punishment at a fine of $100 and three months imprisonment in jail, defendant appeals to this court.

The evidence on the part of the state is to the effect that at the primary election held in St. Louis on August 4, 1908, the defendant and several other parties went into the polling place in precinct 4 of ward 3 of that city. One of defendant's associates called for a ballot in the name of Patrick Grace, a well-known citizen of that precinct; but the election officers, knowing that the party thus offering to vote was not Patrick Grace, refused to hand him a ballot; whereupon Police Officer Anton Tomasso, who was present in the polling place, immediately arrested the party and started with him to the police station, intending to prefer against him a charge of feloniously attempting to vote in a name not his own. When Officer Tomasso had led his prisoner about a block, defendant Cox, who was following them, ran against Tomasso with such force as to knock him down and cause him to release his hold upon the prisoner, who immediately escaped. Officer Tomasso then shot the defendant in the leg and arrested him for causing the escape of the prisoner.

The evidence on the part of defendant was to the effect that defendant did not touch or interfere with Police Officer Tomasso in any manner, and that said officer had no cause to shoot or arrest him. There was such a sharp conflict between the evidence for the state and that offered by defendant as to indicate deliberate perjury on the part of one side or the other; but it was the special province of the jury, who saw the witnesses and observed their demeanor on the stand, to weigh such conflicting evidence; and we are not called upon to review it.

Defendant asserts that sections 31 and 32 of the act of 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 269), purporting to make the provisions and penalties prescribed by the general election laws applicable to primary elections, is unconstitutional, because the title of the primary law does not refer to any other law or any penalties, and therefore does not conform to section 28, art. 4, of our state Constitution, which provides that a legislative bill shall contain but one subject, which must be clearly expressed in its title. In effect, defendant's first ground for reversal is that on the 4th of August, 1908, there was no valid law in force to punish violations of the primary election law.

Defendant further insists that section 4363, R. S. 1909,...