State v. Coyle

• Decision Date: 23 March 1912
• Citation: 122 P. 243,7 Okla.Crim. 50,1912 OK CR 126
• Parties: STATE v. COYLE et al. (two cases).
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

122 P. 243

7 Okla.Crim. 50, 1912 OK CR 126

STATE v. COYLE et al. (two cases).

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

March 23, 1912

Syllabus by the Court.

The Legislature passed an act approved June 6, 1908, commonly called the Labor Act, which provided: "Sec. 2. No agreement, combination or contract by or between two or more persons to do or procure to be done, or not to do or procure to be done, any act in contemplation or furtherance of any trade dispute between employers and employés in the state of Oklahoma, shall be deemed as criminal nor shall those engaged therein be indictable or otherwise punishable for the crime of conspiracy, if such act committed by one person would not be punishable as a crime, nor shall such agreement combination or contract be considered as in restraint of trade or commence, nor shall any restraining order or injunction be issued with relation thereto. Nothing in this act shall exempt from punishment otherwise than is herein excepted, any person guilty of conspiracy for which punishment is now provided by an act of the Legislature, but such act of the Legislature shall as to the agreement combination and contracts hereinbefore referred to, be construed as if this act was therein contained: Provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize force or violence." Laws 1907-08, c. 53, art. 2. And passed another act approved June 10, 1908, commonly called the Anti-Trust Act, prescribing in section 1: "That every act, agreement, contract, or combination in the form of trust, or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce within this state, which is against public policy is hereby declared to be illegal." Laws 1907-08, c. 83, art. 1.

Held, (a) That the Legislature intended the provisions of said section 2 and the provisions of the Anti-Trust Act should constitute one whole, and if both could not be carried into effect, neither would have received legislative sanction.

(b) That said section 2 and the Anti-Trust Act so considered is not in violation of the Constitution of this state, nor of that of the United States, and is not in contravention of the fourteenth amendment, guaranteeing the equal protection of the laws, and that both are within the scope of legislative power and authority.

The courts cannot annul or pronounce void any act of the Legislature upon any other ground than that of repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States or of the state.

Every legislative act is presumed to be constitutional, and the courts should not declare an act to be unconstitutional unless it is clearly so. If there is doubt, the expressed will of the Legislature should be sustained.

The construction of a statute in a civil proceeding is authority for a like construction in a criminal prosecution.

The courts must look to the Constitution and the statutes to determine the public policy of the state on a given subject, hence the words "public policy," as used in section 1 of the Anti-Trust Act of June 10, 1908 (Laws 1907-08, c. 83, art. 1 [8800, Snyder's St. 1909]), are interpreted to mean the law of the state whether found in the Constitution or the statutes. A constitutional statute cannot be contrary to public policy, since it is public policy.

An indictment under section 1 of the Anti-Trust Act of June 10, 1908 (Laws 1907-08, c. 83, art. 1 [8800, Snyder's St. 1909]), charging a conspiracy in restraint of trade, is not bad for duplicity, on the theory that it alleges what was agreed to be done, and the acts to have been done in pursuance of the alleged conspiracy.

An indictment under said section 1 of the Anti-Trust Act (Laws 1907-08, c. 83, art. 1 [Snyder's St. 1909, § 8800]), charging a conspiracy in restraint of trade, sufficiently sets out the time when it alleges the time when the several acts relied on to establish the offense were done, and it is not essential to set out the precise time when the conspiracy was formed.

(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)

The Legislature cannot pass an irrepealable law.

The Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3200]) does not continue in force in Oklahoma since statehood.

Appeals from District Court, Logan County; A. H. Huston, Judge.

W. H. Coyle and others were indicted for violation of the Anti-Trust Law of June 10, 1908. From judgments sustaining demurrers to the indictment, the state appeals. Reversed and remanded.

There is no limitation on the Legislature's power to repeal or modify grants of power, or authority to a citizen not involving interference with a vested contract right, and, subject to that exception, there can be no such thing as an irrepealable legislative act.

Omitting the captions and indorsements, the indictments read as follows:

"Indictment No. A-662. At the July term, a term of the district court of the Eleventh judicial district of the state of Oklahoma, held in and for Logan county, in the state of Oklahoma, at the city of Guthrie, and begun on the 26th day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and nine, the jurors of the grand jury of the said county, good and lawful men, then and there returned, tried, impaneled, sworn, and charged according to law to diligently inquire into and true presentment make of all public offenses against the laws of the state of Oklahoma, committed or triable within said county, upon their said oaths, in the name and by the authority of the said state of Oklahoma, do present and find that in said county of Logan, in said state of Oklahoma, on the 15th day of November, 1907, and continuously from said date up to the filing of this indictment, the defendant The Southwestern Cotton Oil Company was and now is a corporation organized and existing and doing business under the laws of the state of Oklahoma; that the defendant Houghton & Douglas Cotton Company was and now is a corporation organized and existing and doing business under the laws of the state of Oklahoma; that the defendant W. H. Coyle Consolidated Companies was and now is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under the laws of the state of Oklahoma; that the defendant W. H. Coyle Oil Company was and now is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under the laws of the state of Oklahoma; and that the Cawthon Cotton Company was and is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under the laws of the state of Oklahoma; and that they, together with W. H. Coyle, E. E. Houghton, R. A. Vose, W. O. Cawthon, E. Cook, J. M. Aydelotte, and P. A. Norris, G. Z. Page, and other persons, to the grand jurors unknown, committed the following acts, entered into the following conspiracies, combinations in the form of a trust or pool, made the following agreement, contract with the intent to restrain trade and commerce in Logan county, in said state, in cotton and the products thereof, each and all of which was and is against public policy, and in so doing each and all of whom, together and singular, acted illegally, wrongfully, intentionally, and feloniously, and with the intent of monopolizing the market for and of cotton and its products and to control and regulate the prices thereof, unreasonably in restraint of trade and commerce therein and against public policy, that is to say: They and each of them, acting together and singly, have sought to acquire and have acquired a virtual monopoly in the marketing and ginning of cotton and seed cotton and in the marketing of the products thereof, in that they, acting together and singly, through various contracts, agreements, and understandings, had among themselves, the exact nature whereof is to the grand jurors unknown, have acquired control of about 90 per cent. of all the gins operating in said county, and ginning the cotton and seed cotton produced in said county, and have among themselves divided the field and the territory in the marketing and purchasing of cotton and its products, with the intent of feloniously stifling competition therein, that is to say: That at the town of Lovell, Okl., in said county of Logan, there is a gin operated and controlled by the Southwestern Cotton Oil Company, operated under an understanding and agreement between said defendants that the cotton seed shall be acquired by the Southwestern Cotton Oil Company, and that another gin located at said town of Lovell, owned by Houghton & Douglas Cotton Company, shall not be operated, and that at the town of Seward a cotton gin, operated and controlled by the Southwestern Cotton Oil Company, shall be so operated so that all the cotton seed there ginned from seed cotton shall be acquired by Houghton & Douglas Cotton Company; and that another gin located at the said town of Seward, owned by Houghton & Douglas Cotton Company, shall not be operated; and that at the town of Meridian a cotton gin, owned and operated and controlled by defendant W. H. Coyle, W. H. Coyle Consolidated Companies, and W. H. Coyle Oil Company, shall be operated and all the cotton seed ginned from seed cotton at that point shall be acquired by said W. H. Coyle, W. H. Coyle Consolidated Companies, and W. H. Coyle Oil Company; and that another gin located at said town of Meridian, owned by Houghton & Douglas Cotton Company, shall not be operated; there being at the towns aforesaid only the two aforesaid gins in each case, and that in the city of Guthrie that cotton shall be so bought and purchased by said defendants that the Cawthon Cotton Company, Houghton & Douglas Cotton Company, W. H. Coyle, W. H. Coyle Consolidated Companies, and W. H. Coyle Oil Company shall acquire as nearly as practicable one-third each of the amount of cotton sold upon the market, without competitive bidding therefor, and that

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