State v. Coyle
| Decision Date | 19 January 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 6162,6162 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Hugh F. COYLE, Jr., Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Clair A. Davis, State Atty., St. Petersburg, and George R. Georgieff, Assy. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.
An information was filed against Hugh F. Coyle, Jr., respondent, charging him with commission of a felony by engaging in a crime against nature with one Willie B. Heintz in violation of section 800 .01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. The State of Florida has petitioned for writ of certiorari directed to an order granting Coyle's motion to suppress the evidence of two police officers, which order was entered consequent upon a proceeding had on the motion.
At the outset, there arises the question, whether petitioner can avail itself of the remedy invoked. The order does not possess the attribute of a final judgment but is interlocutory. An examination of the record discloses that the evidence suppressed was necessary for use at the trial to establish commission of the offense charged. No trial of the cause was had, but the hearing on the motion to suppress was preliminary to it. The common law writ of certiorari is a discretionary writ, and an appellate court will review an interlocutory order in law only in exceptional cases, such as where there has been a departure from essential requirements of law and it clearly appears that there is no full, adequate, and complete remedy by appeal after final judgment. Huie v. State, Fla.1957, 92 So.2d 264; State v. Andres, 1941, 148 Fla. 742, 5 So.2d 7; and Kauffman v. King, Fla.1956, 89 So .2d 24. Petitioner urges that the order should be quashed because it does not conform to the essential requirements of the law and that, since no right of appeal exists, its only remedy is through resort to certiorari. The case is a criminal one and not civil or equitable in its nature. We agree that the state has no right of appeal; and, under the situation to which we shall advert, the method pursued is the proper one.
The sole basis of respondent's motion to suppress was his contention that the evidence and alleged knowledge by the police officers was secured by virtue of an unreasonable search and seizure and in a manner forbidden by section 22 of the Declaration of Rights of the state Constitution, F.S.A., in that the entire alleged observation was through a grill work installed in the public restroom on Municipal Pier in St. Petersburg at the instance of the police department or other officials of the city for the specific purpose of spying on its inmates. Pondering this premise, we look first to the stipulated facts agreed upon between the parties for the purpose of the trial court's consideration of the motion to suppress.
At approximately 8:08 p. m. on September 22, 1964, two police officers of the City of St. Petersburg had occasion to be present in a men's restroom of the St. Petersburg Municipal Pier for the purpose of checking the restroom for any possible illicit activities . Upon their entrance, they observed Willie B. Heintz in a stall without a door and, while they were standing at the urinals, saw him peeking at them through a hole in the stall wall. Based on their long experience as vice squad members, they felt they had reasonable ground to believe Heintz was a homosexual. At that time, they went to a storeroom which had a louvered door installed for the purpose of viewing the interior of the restroom by police officers. This storeroom looked upon the stall where Heintz was located and faced a number of such stalls which did not have doors. To the right of the line of stalls were a number of urinals. Making their observation through the louvered door, the officers saw respondent, who was to the immediate left of the urinals, and Heintz, who was in a stall, engaging in an act of oral copulation through a hole in the stall wall. Seeing the act committed, they then walked out of another door of the storeroom about eight feet from the mentioned stall, then walked down the line of stalls to the point where the respondent and Heintz were committing the alleged act, walked up to the open stall and observed the act being committed from a distance of four feet, at which time the parties so engaged saw the officers, then desisted. The designated persons were thereupon placed under arrest.
When respondent's motion is considered in connection with the stipulated facts, the thrust of his position was that the evidence consisting of the testimony of the police officers was the product of an unreasonable search because of the place he was in when he was observed and the manner in which the officers observed him, a premise which the trial court, by entry of its order granting the motion, sustained.
Section 22 specifically preserves the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches. The term 'search' in its legal meaning implies a quest by an officer of the law. It may be secret, intrusive, or accompanied by force. Ordinarily, observation of that which is open and patent is not a search. See 29 Fla.Jur., Search and Seizure, section 2, page 159; Volume 38 Words and Phrases, Search, and 1965 supplement; 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 1, pages 775-776. The constitutional guarantee of section 22 does not prohibit all searches but only those that are 'unreasonable'; nor is such guarantee circumscribed by any particular formula for determination of reasonableness of a search. Rather, in determining whether or not a reasonable and valid search was made, a court will be guided by the circumstances surrounding the search and the manner in which it was carried out. Longo v. State, 1946, 157 Fla. 668, 26 So.2d 818; Range v. State, Fla.App.1963, 156 So.2d 534.
A peace officer may make an arrest without a warrant when the person to be arrested has committed a felony in the officer's presence, when a felony in fact has been committed and the officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it, or when the officer has reasonable ground to believe that a felony has been or is being committed and reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing it. Section 901.15, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.
The record before us reveals that the trial court indicated at the hearing that, on the stipulated facts, it would deny the motion were it not for a prior ruling in its local circuit suppressing the evidence in a case wherein the facts were of a similar nature and, in its order, candidly reiterated its personal preference to overrule the motion but granted it because it felt it should follow the prior intracircuit decision. For its consideration, the court had before it two CALIFORNIA CASES, BIELICKI V. SUPERIOR COURT, MAY 1962, 57 CAL.2D 602, 21 CAL.RPTR. 552, 371 P.2D 2881 and BRITT V. SUPERIOR COURT, OCTOBER 1962, 58 CAL.2D 469, 24 CAL.RPTR. 849, 374 P.2D 817,2 apparently cited by respondent's counsel at the hearing to sustain his position that the evidence was the result of an unreasonable search. In each of those cases, it was contended that the evidence had been obtained by an illegal search and seizure in violation of the guarantees of the United States Constitution, 4th and 14th Amendments, and California's Constitution, article 1, section 19. The challenged evidence in each instance was held inadmissible.
In the earlier case, Bielicki, a police officer stationed on the roof of a men's restroom in an amusement park made the observation by means of a spypipe installed in the ceiling of the booths, each of which was a pay toilet enclosed by three walls and a door. Prior to that observation, the officer had never seen either of the defendants and had no ground for believing they were occupying the booths for anything other than a lawful purpose; rather, the observation was part of an apparently established police practice of secret surveillance of any and all occupants of the toilet...
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