State v. Coyne, 891

• Decision Date: 02 July 1980
• Docket Number: No. 891,891
• Citation: 23 O.O.3d 68,430 N.E.2d 473,69 Ohio App.2d 63
• Parties: , 23 O.O.3d 68 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. COYNE, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 63

69 Ohio App.2d 63

430 N.E.2d 473, 23 O.O.3d 68

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. COYNE, Appellant.

No. 891.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Clermont County.

July 2, 1980.

Robert A. Jones, Prosecuting Atty., and Stephanie A. Wyler, Batavia, for appellee.

Andrew B. Dennison, Batavia, for appellant.

PER CURIAM.

The instant appeal derives from the judgment entered against the defendant-appellant, John E. Coyne, in the Court of Common Pleas of Clermont County following a jury trial in which he was found guilty as he stood charged of making a false statement in violation of R.C. 2921.13.

In the first of two assignments of error, the appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his timely raised motions for acquittal which were made pursuant to Crim.R. 29. He reasons that such motions should have been granted because the prosecuting attorney failed to present a prima facie case showing a violation of the statute under which he had been charged.

R.C. 2921.13 defines the offense of falsification and reads, in relevant part, as follows:

"(A) No person shall knowingly make a false statement, or knowingly swear or affirm the truth of a false statement previously made, when any of the following apply:

" * * *

"(5) The statement is made with purpose to secure the issuance by a governmental agency of a license, permit, authorization, certificate, registration, or release.

"(6) The statement is sworn or affirmed before a notary public or other person empowered to administer oaths."

The false statement allegedly made in the instant cause in violation of the statutory provision set forth above appears within a document entitled "Odometer Reading Disclosure Statement," which accompanied the assignment of title to an automobile sold by the appellant to one Bobbie Stamm on May 4, 1978. Within that document it was stated that the odometer reading of the automobile being sold was 2005 miles and that such reading reflected mileage in excess of the designated mechanical limit of 99,999 miles. It was further stated that the odometer from which the reading was taken "was not altered, set back, or disconnected."

Beneath these statements, the appellant, instead of signing his own name as the transferor of the vehicle, placed the signature of one William White, without White's consent or knowledge. ¹ After the appellant signed White's name, the document was notarized by a person holding a valid commission from the state of Ohio.

The parties stipulated at trial that all statements made within the document, pertaining to the description of the vehicle being sold and the relevant odometer readings, were accurate. Such being the case, the only issue before us is whether the appellant's act of signing William White's name was the making of a false statement within the meaning of R.C. 2921.13.

The term "statement," as it appears in R.C. 2921.13, is not defined within the criminal provisions of the Revised Code. Applying accepted principles of common usage, we therefore conclude that the term "statement" means an assertion or " * * * a declaration of matters of fact. * * * " Black's Law Dictionary (5 Ed. 1979), 1263. See, also, Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (1971), 856.

Viewing the definition set forth above in conjunction with the statutory rule of construction that "(s)ections of the Revised Code defining...