State v. Crace
Decision Date | 26 July 2013 |
Docket Number | Case No. 12CA13 |
Citation | 2013 Ohio 3417 |
Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JASON CRACE, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
APPEARANCES:
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Jason A. Macke and Francisco E. Lüttecke, Assistant State Public Defenders, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.
Patrick J. Lang, Athens City Law Director, and James K. Stanley, Athens City Prosecutor, Athens, Ohio, for Appellee.
{¶1} Jason Crace appeals his convictions for operating a vehicle under the influence, driving under suspension, and a marked lanes violation after he pled no contest to the charges upon the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. On appeal, Crace (Appellant hereinafter) contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his refusal to consent to chemical testing. Because we agree with the trial court's decisionto deny Appellant's motion to suppress, Appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
{¶2} This appeal involves the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress his refusal to consent to chemical testing in connection with his arrest for OVI, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2). R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) prohibits an individual with a conviction for OVI in the preceding twenty years from refusing to submit to a chemical test after being arrested for OVI a second time. Bearing in mind our standard of review on a motion to suppress, which we will discuss more fully infra, we adopt the facts as determined by the trial court in its decision and entry denying Appellant's motion to suppress, as set forth in State v. Crace, 168 Ohio Misc.2d 13, 2012-Ohio-2090, 968 N.E.2d 76, ¶ 2-7:
{¶3} After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, Appellant entered a plea of no contest to operating a vehicle under the influence, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2), driving under suspension in violation of R.C. 4510.21, and marked lanes, in violation of R.C. 4511.33. It is after these convictions and sentences that Appellant now appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, raising a single assignment of error for our review.
In his sole assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his refusal to consent to chemicaltesting in connection with his charge of OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2). We begin our analysis by considering the proper standard of review for reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress.
{¶4} Our review of a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 100; citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court acts as the trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness credibility. Id. Accordingly, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Landrum, 137 Ohio App.3d 718, 722, 739 N.E.2d 1159 (4th Dist. 2000). Accepting those facts as true, we must independently determine whether the trial court reached the correct legal conclusion in analyzing the facts of the case. Roberts at ¶ 100, citing Burnside at ¶ 8.
{¶5} Generally, at issue in this case is whether Appellant's refusal to submit to chemical testing should have been suppressed. In State v. Denney, 5th Dist. No. 03CA62, 2004-Ohio-2024, ¶ 24, the court noted that "evidence regarding a refusal to submit to a breath or blood test is admissible." Citing Maumee v. Anistick, 69 Ohio St.3d 339, 632 N.E.2d 497 (1994). Further, theDenney court noted its prior holding in State v. Carrico, 5th Dist. No. 01 CA86, 2002-Ohio-1451, ¶ 2, where it concluded that refusal to perform field sobriety tests is relevant evidence under Evid.R. 401 and therefore, admissible at trial. Id. at ¶ 21.
{¶6} Other districts have also held that refusal to submit to testing is relevant and admissible. See, Columbus v. Bickis, 10th Dist. No. 09AP898, 2010-Ohio-3208, ¶ 25 (); citing State v. Denney at ¶ 21-24; see, also State v. Evans, 12th Dist. No. CA2009-08-116, 2010-Ohio-4402, ¶ 23 (); citing Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St.2d 121, 124, 239 N.E.2d 40 (1968) ( ). Thus, it appears to be well-settled that evidence of Appellant's refusal to submit to chemical testing was relevant and, as such, admissible at trial.
{¶7} Appellant was charged and pled no contest to OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2), which provides as follows:
{¶8} Appellant conceded that there was probable cause for an OVI arrest at his suppression hearing and the trial court noted that concession inits decision denying Appellant's motion to suppress. On appeal, Appellant further concedes that he was convicted of a misdemeanor OVI charge in 1992, and therefore agrees that "he could not legally refuse to submit to a properly requested chemical test[.]" However, Appellant's argument goes beyond the initial question of whether evidence of a refusal is admissible, creatively contending that a refusal made in response to a request to submit to testing that is made beyond the "period of consent," or two hours as specified in R.C. 4511.192, is not actually a refusal within the contemplation of the statute, is therefore inadmissible, and should have been suppressed by the trial court. Appellant cites no case law in support of this contention.
{¶9} Appellee contends that Appellant's argument is based upon the premise that the request for the chemical test occurred beyond the two hour limit as set forth in R.C. 4511.192, however, Appellee argues that the trial court accepted the trooper's version of the facts, rather than Appellant's, with respect to the time of the initial accident and, thus, never actually determined that the refusal was made beyond the two hour limit. Despite its failure to find that the trooper requested Appellant submit to chemical testing more than two hours after the accident, the trial court went on to address that very question, ultimately finding that a refusal was admissible regardless of when it was made. Based upon the following reasoning, weconclude that the timing of the officer's request to submit to chemical testing was irrelevant to the admissibility of the refusal and, as such, we agree with the outcome reached by the trial court.
{¶10} Like the trial court, we conclude that Appellant's refusal to submit to chemical testing was relevant...
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