State v. Crace
| Decision Date | 13 July 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 48969.,48969. |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Bernard Matthew CRACE, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Burns, Burns, Rawlings & Burns and Michael O. Burns, St. Cloud, for appellant.
Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Fabel, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Gary Hansen, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, James C. Burseth, County Atty., Milaca, for respondent.
Heard before SHERAN, C. J., and SCOTT and WAHL, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Mille Lacs County District Court wherein a jury found the defendant, Bernard Crace, guilty of second degree manslaughter. We affirm.
On October 23, 1976, Crace and the decedent, Dennis J. Kowalsky, met to go duck hunting. Later that afternoon, Crace mistook Kowalsky for a bear and fatally shot him. The facts surrounding this tragic shooting are relatively undisputed.
Crace and Kowalsky met early in the morning. They intended to spend the day duck hunting at a nearby lake. Upon arriving at the lake, however, they discovered that ice had formed around the shoreline, preventing them from launching their boat. Consequently, they returned to Crace's house to drop off their boat and, while there, each drank a bottle of beer. Thereafter, they spent the remainder of the morning driving around, looking for unfrozen ponds where they could hunt. They were again unsuccessful, and eventually broke for lunch around 1 p. m.
Following lunch, they resumed their pursuit. After leaving the restaurant, they drove to a small meadow at the end of a deserted logging trail. Upon arriving at the meadow they observed bear tracks and decided to spend the remainder of the afternoon bear hunting, notwithstanding the fact that the bear season had closed. First, however, they drove home to exchange their shotguns for high-powered rifles. While there, Kowalsky decided to change his outer clothing, putting on a black Artic Cat snowmobile jacket and a camouflage-type hunting hat. Instead of returning directly to the meadow, they stopped at the Veterans Club for a couple of drinks. They returned to the meadow at approximately 5:30 p. m.
Upon arriving back at the meadow, the two decided to station themselves at separate points and wait for the bear to return. Thus, Crace positioned himself next to a large oak tree at the west end of the meadow and Kowalsky indicated that he would wait next to a large spruce tree approximately 90 yards southeast of the oak. After remaining near the oak tree for 15 to 30 minutes, Crace saw what he thought was a bear moving in willow brush approximately 100 yards across the meadow from him and 80 yards northeast of where Kowalsky had said he would be. Crace described his next actions as follows:
After firing, he ran across the meadow and was shocked to see that he had shot and killed his hunting companion.
Following the shooting Crace was emotionally distraught. He immediately left the scene and drove to a nearby resort, where he called the sheriff. Because the meadow was hard to find, Crace was instructed to meet the sheriff's deputies at a prearranged spot on the highway and lead them to Kowalsky's body. While waiting for the deputies to arrive, Crace consumed an unknown quantity of alcohol. While investigating the scene of the shooting the officers found additional evidence of drinking by both Crace and Kowalsky,1 but because Crace did not appear to be visibly intoxicated no test was performed to determine the alcohol level in his blood.
Crace was indicted by a grand jury for manslaughter in the second degree. Minn.St. 609.205(2). He did not testify at trial, but instead introduced the statement he had given to the deputy sheriffs two days after the shooting. His entire defense consisted of the testimony of five character witnesses. Following his conviction Crace was placed on 5 years' probation, with the specific provision that he not own or use firearms during that period.
The issues presented are as follows:
(1) Is Minn.St. 609.205(2) unconstitutionally vague and indefinite?
(2) Did the trial court properly instruct the jury as to the elements of manslaughter in the second degree under Minn.St. 609.205(2)?
(3) Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury regarding evidence of defendant's good character?
(4) Did the prosecutor commit prejudicial error by referring in his final argument to defendant's drinking on the day of the shooting?
(5) Should this court adopt contributory negligence as a defense to a criminal prosecution under Minn.St. 609.205(2)?
1. Crace was convicted of second degree manslaughter under Minn.St. 609.205(2). The statute provides that:
Crace's first claim on this appeal is that the above statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. Although we have not previously addressed ourselves to the constitutionality of this statute, our decision is largely controlled by our discussion in State v. Hayes, 244 Minn. 296, 70 N.W.2d 110 (1955).
At issue in State v. Hayes, supra, was the constitutionality of Minn.St.1953, § 619.15(3), the predecessor of the statute now under consideration. As then written, the statute provided, in relevant part, as follows:
Hayes demurred to the information, claiming that the phrase "carelessness in mistaking the person shot for a deer or other animal" rendered the statute so vague as to be unconstitutional under the state and federal constitutions. On appeal from the trial court's overruling of the demurrer, this court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. Specifically, we held that the word "carelessness," although not defined in the statute, was synonymous with negligence both under the common law and in general usage, and thus the statute was not vague.
The language of the present statute is only slightly different from that specifically approved in State v. Hayes, supra. The only substantive difference is the substitution of the phrase "negligently believing" for the phrase "carelessness in mistaking." In making this change, the legislature in effect enacted the construction given the statute in State v. Hayes, supra. Crace, however, argues that in adding the word "believing" the legislature rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague.
It is well settled that a statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad "* * * when the language employed fails to define the conduct or activities clearly enough to give fair notice of what is prohibited * * *." State v. Hipp, 298 Minn. 81, 85, 213 N.W.2d 610, 613 (1973). Stated alternatively, a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to enable one of common knowledge to ascertain what conduct is prohibited. State v. Johnson, 282 Minn. 153, 158, 163 N.W.2d 750, 753 (1968). See, generally, 1 Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law, § 11. Here, the statute centers on the phrase "negligently believing." Certainly the term "negligently" gives fair notice of the type of conduct prohibited. See, State v. Hayes, supra, 244 Minn. 299, 70 N.W.2d 113. Likewise, the word "believing" is commonly accepted as meaning "thinking."3 Webster's New International Dictionary (2 ed. unabridged, 1947). Thus, the statute in clear and definite terms makes it a crime to shoot another because the actor negligently thinks or believes the victim is an animal or mistakes him for one. The language of the statute is the substantial equivalent of that expressly sanctioned in State v. Hayes, supra. Accordingly, there is no merit to Crace's vagueness claim.
2. Crace next argues that the trial court erred by reading the second degree manslaughter statute to the jury, as opposed to instructing as to the specific elements of the offense. A review of the court's instructions, however, shows that there is no foundation or merit to this claim. Contrary to Crace's representations, the record shows that the trial court took great care to delineate and define each element of the offense. Thus, after reading Minn.St. 609.205(2) to the jury, the court continued as follows:
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