State v. Craig
| Decision Date | 24 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | 110,707. |
| Citation | 336 P.3d 922 (Table) |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Dana CRAIG, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Sam S. Kepfield, of Hutchinson, for appellant.
Keith E. Schroeder, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before LEBEN, P.J., ARNOLD–BURGER, J., and DANIEL L. LOVE, District Judge, assigned.
Dana Craig (Dana) was convicted of perjury for testimony she gave at a preliminary hearing held to determine the likelihood that her ex-husband was involved in the murder of Jennifer Heckel. At the hearing, Dana testified that she had been with her ex-husband until about 30 minutes before the crime could have occurred and that before she left his house she had seen her daughter arrive to stay with him for the rest of the evening. Dana argues that she was convicted in error because her testimony was not material—that is, important to the determination of whether her ex-husband was involved in the murder. But the district court correctly determined that Dana's testimony—an imperfect alibi—was material. Dana also argues that she was wrongly convicted because the State did not present the evidence required to convict her of perjury under Kansas law: two witnesses or one witness and corroborating evidence that showed her testimony was false. But the State presented the testimony of Dana's daughter and her daughter's boss, as well as the corroborating evidence of her daughter's timecard, which showed that Dana's daughter was at work at the time Dana said that she had seen her. This evidence showed that Dana had testified falsely. The district court did not err by convicting Dana of perjury.
Heckel was murdered between 6:30 p.m. and 7:09 p.m. on June 14, 2011. Police began to investigate Billy Craig (Billy), and on August 3, 2011, Detective Dean Harcrow conducted a recorded interview with Dana, Billy's ex-wife and the defendant in this case. Harcrow testified that Dana had told him she had not seen her ex-husband from the end of May until the end of June and had not seen him on the night of the murder.
Billy was later charged with Heckel's murder. The district court held a preliminary hearing on Billy's case, and the State called Dana to testify. The night before Dana was supposed to testify, Dana and Billy's daughter, Nikki Craig (Nikki), came to the police. Nikki told the police that she had been with her father on the night of the murder and had gone to his house after she had finished working for the night. Nikki said that it had been dark when she had arrived at her father's house.
The next day, Dana was called to testify at the preliminary hearing. Rather than tell the court the story that she'd initially told Harcrow, Dana testified, under oath, that she had been with her ex-husband on the night of the murder until around 6 p.m—just before the murder allegedly occurred. Dana also testified that as she was leaving her ex-husband's house, their daughter and her friend were arriving. Dana testified that her daughter had told her that she had stayed with her father for the rest of the evening. Dana admitted that her ex-husband had called her after he'd been arrested for Heckel's murder and that the police had told her the time during which the murder had supposedly occurred before she testified at the preliminary hearing.
Three days later, on February 10, 2012, Dana was charged with perjury under K.S.A.2011 Supp. 21–5903(a) for the testimony that she had given at the preliminary hearing. Dana's case was tried to a jury on February 27, 2013.
Dana's daughter, Nikki, testified. Nikki said she did not remember if she worked on the day of the murder but said that her time sheet showed she had. She testified she had never had anyone other than a manager clock her in or out of work before. Nikki testified that she had seen her father on the night of Heckel's murder and that it had been dark or getting dark at the time she saw him. She said she had not gone to her father's house until after her shift and acknowledged that her time sheet stated that her shift had not ended until 9:10 p.m. The State introduced Nikki's time card—showing that she did not leave work until 9:10 p.m.—into evidence.
The State also called Nikki's manager, Cheryl Bale, to testify. Bale testified that the State's exhibit—a time sheet for Nikki on the night of the murder—accurately reflected the company's time records. Bale testified that the time sheet showed that Nikki had clocked in on June 14, 2011, at 1:13 p.m. and out at 9:10 p.m. that evening, with a 30–minute break in the afternoon. Bale testified that she remembered seeing Nikki at the beginning of her shift but that she could not account for every minute of Nikki's time at work. She also admitted she did not have any specific recollection of Nikki after she left for break. Bale admitted it was possible that Nikki could have told someone her clock-in information to clock her in and out without her being there. But Bale also said she that she had no reason whatsoever to believe that someone else had used Nikki's codes to clock in or out.
Harcrow also testified. He confirmed that it had not been dark at around 6 p.m. on the night of the murder—the time at which Dana said she had seen her daughter—and stated that suspects' alibis are important in murder cases.
Dana did not put on any evidence; but after the close of the State's case, she moved for an acquittal on the grounds that the State had not proved that her testimony was either influential or material. The district court denied the motion and allowed the case to proceed to the jury, although the judge admitted that the case was “extremely weak as far as the court's concerned.” The judge said that he was not positive if Dana had intentionally falsely testified but said that whether she had was a decision for the jury, The judge also stated that the fact that Dana claimed to have been with her ex-husband within as little as 19 minutes of the homicide made her testimony material.
The jury convicted Dana. Dana moved for a new trial and, in the alternative, an acquittal, on the grounds that she was convicted of a crime that the State had not proved she had committed because she argued the State had not shown that she had testified concerning a material fact. In ruling on Dana's motions, the district court said it did not believe that Dana's testimony had impacted the judge's ruling regarding her ex-husband in any way. The district court denied the motion for acquittal, however, because it found that a situation could exist in which Dana's testimony could have influenced the courtmaking her testimony material under the perjury statute. Dana was then sentenced to 12 months' probation, with an underlying 6–month prison term.
Dana timely appealed.
Dana was convicted by a jury of perjury, which is essentially giving false testimony in a legal proceeding related to a material fact and is defined under Kansas law as “intentionally and falsely ... testifying ... to any material fact upon any oath or affirmation legally administered in any ... proceeding before any court.” K.S.A.2011 Supp. 21–5903(a)(l). Dana argues that the district court erred by convicting her of perjury because: (1) Her allegedly false statements did not bear on a material fact in Billy's case; and (2) the State did not prove that Dana perjured herself by the testimony of two witnesses or by one witness and corroborating circumstances as required under Kansas law.
Dana's testimony was material under Kansas perjury law.
Dana argues that the district court erred by concluding that the statements she made to the court were material so as to justify convicting her of perjury. Dana is correct that her testimony must have been material in order for her to be convicted of perjury. K.S .A.2011 Supp.21–5903(a)(1).
Testimony is not material or immaterial in itself; rather its materiality must be determined in relation to the matter under investigation. Any statement that is relevant to that matter is sufficiently material to form the basis of a perjury charge. State v. Rollins, 264 Kan. 466, Syl. ¶ 4, 957 P.2d 438 (1998). It is not necessary that the false statement relate directly to the main issue under investigation. Rather, it is sufficient if the testimony is collaterally, remotely, corroboratively, or circumstantially material or has a legitimate tendency to prove any material fact in the chain of evidence, even though it is not alone enough to establish the main issue. 264 Kan. at 471 (quoting in part State v. Whitlock, 138 Kan. 602, 605, 27 P.2d 262 [1933] ); citing State v. Elder, 199 Kan. 607, 608, 433 P.2d 462 (1967). The test of materiality is whether the false testimony could have influenced the court, not whether it did. Rollins, 264 Kan. 466, Syl. ¶ 4.
Whether testimony is material in a perjury case is a question of law decided by the judge. 264 Kan. 466, Syl. ¶ 5. Because it is a legal question, this court determines whether the testimony at issue was material without deference to the district court's decision. See State v. Vandiver, 257 Kan. 53, 56, 891 P.2d 350 (1995) ().
The false statements Dana was convicted of making related to whether she had seen her ex-husband on the night of Heckel's murder. During Dana's initial interview—before her ex-husband was charged with the murder—Dana told police that she had not seen Billy for about a month, including the night of the murder. Then, after Billy was charged with the crime, she testified at his preliminary hearing that she had been with him on the night of the murder, until about 6 p.m., and that as she was leaving she saw her daughter and her daughter's friend...
To continue reading
Request your trial