State v. Rollins
Decision Date | 17 April 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 75383,75383 |
Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Jerry Arnold ROLLINS, Appellant. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where the constitutionality of a statute is involved, the question presented is not whether the act is authorized by the Constitution, but whether it is prohibited thereby.
2. Perjury is intentionally, knowingly, and falsely swearing, testifying, affirming, declaring, or subscribing to any material fact upon any oath or affirmation legally administered in any cause, matter, or proceeding before any court, tribunal, public body, notary public, or other officer authorized to administer oaths. K.S.A. 21-3805(a).
3. In order to constitute perjury under K.S.A. 21-3805, the false testimony must be on a material matter.
4. For the purposes of establishing perjury, a statement can be neither material nor immaterial in itself, but its materiality must be determined in accordance with its relation to some extraneous matter. False testimony relative to a nonexistent issue cannot be material. But any statement which is relevant to the matter under investigation is sufficiently material to form the basis of a charge of perjury. The test of materiality is whether a false statement can influence a tribunal, not whether it does.
5. In a criminal prosecution where the defendant is charged with perjury under K.S.A. 21-3805, materiality is not an element of the crime. Rather, the trial court is to determine as a matter of law if the alleged false testimony or writing was on a material matter.
Daniel E. Monnat, of Monnat & Spurrier, Chartered, argued the cause and was on the briefs, for appellant.
Chris E. Biggs, Special Prosecutor, argued the cause and was on the briefs, for appellee.
Defendant was convicted of one count of perjury. The judge had instructed the jury that defendant's statements were material. On appeal, defendant claimed numerous errors by the trial court. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction, holding that under United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995), the jury, rather than the trial court, must decide whether defendant's statements were material. The State petitioned for review, arguing that under Kansas' perjury statute, materiality is a question of law to be decided by the trial court. Alternatively, the State argues that if Gaudin controls, the constitutional harmless error standard applies. We accepted review.
Dana Flynn was involved in a custody dispute with Randall Sheridan over their daughter, A.F. Sheridan's attorney, believing that Jerry Arnold Rollins, Flynn's minister, was negatively influencing the child, and having information that Dana Flynn was sleeping with Rollins, deposed Rollins. During this deposition, Rollins denied any relationship with Flynn outside of the church. The State was convinced that Rollins had perjured himself in the deposition and brought criminal perjury charges against Rollins.
Rollins was charged with one count of violating K.S.A.1992 Supp. 21-3805, which provided, in part:
"(a) Perjury is willfully, knowingly and falsely swearing, testifying, affirming, declaring or subscribing to any material fact upon any oath or affirmation legally administered in any cause, matter or proceeding before any court, tribunal, public body, notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths."
Although the statutes governing perjury have changed since 1872, these changes are not material to the analysis of this issue. In order to constitute perjury under 21-3805, it is essential that the false testimony be on a material matter. State v. Elder, 199 Kan. 607, 608, 433 P.2d 462 (1967). The particular answers for which defendant was convicted of perjury are:
....
....
....
....
....
The trial judge ruled that the questions and answers were material to the proceeding, stating: "The materiality is the relationship between Dana Flynn and the defendant Rollins, the relationship between Rollins and [A.F.], the relationship that the defendant Rollins has with both of them, and it's clear that it was material to the domestic case."
At the conclusion of trial, the district judge instructed the jury:
1. That the defendant willfully, knowingly, and falsely testified to a material fact upon his oath or affirmation legally administered by a person authorized to administer oaths; and
2. That this act occurred on or about the 3rd day of November, 1992, in Saline County, Kansas.
The defendant objected to Instruction No. 5 because it is "in essence, a directed verdict in a criminal case on the element of materiality." The trial court pointed out that under prior decisions, materiality is a question of law to be determined by a judge and overruled the objection.
After he was convicted, Rollins moved for a new trial pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3501, asserting the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gaudin that a trial judge's refusal to submit questions of materiality to the jury violated the federal constitutional right to have a jury determine every element of crime charged, applied to this case. Defendant also raised other issues.
The trial court denied the motion, finding:
Rollins appealed, raising numerous issues. The Court of Appeals reversed Rollins' conviction based on the rationale of Gaudin, holding materiality is an essential element of perjury under K.S.A.1992 Supp. 21-3805(a). It noted that the United States Supreme Court interprets the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution as entitling a defendant to have a jury determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on every element of a charged crime. Accordingly, under the Supremacy Clause, Kansas courts are required to follow Gaudin.
The Court of Appeals asserted the error was not subject to the harmless error rule because the trial court did not submit an essential element of the crime to the jury. It concluded that Rollins' conviction must be overturned regardless of whether the harmless error rule applied because the jury did not determine the materiality of the perjury; therefore, it had not decided an element of the crime.
We granted review.
We are required to determine if the Kansas perjury statute, which requires the trial judge to determine as a matter of law if the alleged false testimony or writing was on a material matter, is constitutional. Where the constitutionality of a statute is involved, the question presented is, therefore, not whether the act is authorized by the Constitution, but whether it is prohibited thereby. State ex rel. Schneider v. Kennedy, 225 Kan. 13, 20, 587 P.2d 844 (1978).
Following PIK Crim.3d 60.05, the judge instructed the jury:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Abrams
...perjury statute even under Gaudin, but rather a threshold issue that the court must determine prior to trial); State v. Rollins, 264 Kan. 466, 475, 957 P.2d 438 (1998) ("When interpreting the Kansas criminal perjury statute, we have always recognized that materiality was not an element of t......
-
Bergstrom v. Spears Mfg. Co.
...a standing judicial construction of that statute, legislature is presumed to agree with court's interpretation); State v. Rollins, 264 Kan. 466, 474, 957 P.2d 438 (1998) (legislature deemed to have adopted judicial construction that has been in place for 126 years); Windle v. Wire, 179 Kan.......
-
State v. Flynn, 82,983.
...of perjury. The test of materiality is whether a false statement can influence the tribunal—not whether it does. State v. Rollins, 264 Kan. 466, 471, 957 P.2d 438 (1998). The concealed statements had the potential of implicating Dana in Randy's murder; thus, the statements were relevant. Mo......
-
State v. Dreiling, 84,969.
...a different verdict if the trial error had not occurred. State v. Evans, 270 Kan. 585, 588, 17 P.3d 340 (2001). In State v. Rollins, 264 Kan. 466, 475, 957 P.2d 438 (1998), this court held that "[i]n a criminal prosecution where the defendant is charged under a state statute with perjury, t......